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Cultural Diplomacy: Canada-China
A Case Study:
The Exhibition of Archaeological Finds of The People's Republic of China Held at The Royal Ontario Museum From 8 August-November 16, 1974

by

Mary Jo Michelle Hague

A THESIS
SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES AND RESEARCH
IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE
OF MASTER OF ARTS
DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY

EDMONTON, ALBERTA
SPRING 1987

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ISBN 0-315-37702-X

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TITLE OF THESIS: Cultural Diplomacy: Canada-China A Case Study: The Archaeological Exhibition of the People's Republic of China Held at The Royal Ontario Museum, from 8 August - 16 November 1974

DEGREE: Master of Arts

YEAR THIS DEGREE GRANTED: 1987

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The undersigned certify that they have read, and recommend to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research, for acceptance, a thesis entitled "CULTURAL DIPLOMACY: CANADA-CHINA A CASE STUDY: THE ARCHAEOLOGICAL EXHIBITION OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA HELD AT THE ROYAL ONTARIO MUSEUM, FROM 8 AUGUST - 16 NOVEMBER 1974" submitted by MARY JO MICHELLE HAGUE in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of MASTER OF ARTS.

Brian L. Evans

Supervisor

J. Allison Dorbee

Hugh A. Dibben

Date 25 November 1986

Dedicated to

My Mother Mary Hague

and

In Memory of

My Father Joseph Hague

ABSTRACT

From 8 August - 16 November 1974, the Royal Ontario Museum was the host to an Exhibition of Archaeological Finds from the People's Republic of China. The Exhibition represented a major event in the development of cultural diplomacy between Canada and the People's Republic of China. Nevertheless as in other areas of foreign relations, cultural relations are beset with strains and challenges. These problems were particularly illustrated by the negotiations and international arrangements for this exhibition's tour and the problems were exacerbated upon the exhibition's visit to Canada. Political controversy within China at the time of this exhibition's international tour resulted in changing ideological standards and prompted more stringent adherence to the Maoist version of Marxist - Leninist historical interpretation in the exhibition. These ideological standards were subject to constant revision depending upon the political shifts within China during the Anti-Confucius Anti-Lin Piao campaign. For the exhibition, the effects of this campaign were illustrated by the withdrawal of a Confucian script from the exhibit and dramatic revisions to the souvenir catalogues, much to the frustration of the host exhibitors. Canadian - Chinese relations were particularly strained and tested since the Anti-Confucius Anti-Lin Piao campaign reached its climax as the exhibition was about to tour Canada. This thesis examines the impact of the campaign upon the arrangements and negotiations for the Exhibition and upon the text of the souvenir catalogue, and finally assesses the complexities of cultural diplomacy as illustrated by this event in Canada-Chinese relations.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I wish to thank the staff of the library and archives of the Royal Ontario Museum especially Mr. Robert Nixon and Ms. Sharon Hick. My thanks to Mrs. Barbara Stephen and Mrs. H. Downie for their information on the Exhibition. Particular thanks are extended to Dr. W. Tovell, the Director of the Museum, during the Exhibition, and to Mr. Noah Torno, the Chairman of the Chinese Exhibition Council. Both of them graciously gave me information on the Exhibition. I also wish to thank my supervisor, Dr. B.L. Evans--who was a Cultural Counsellor with the Canadian Embassy in Peking at the time of the Exhibition--for helping to fill in so many details that were not available in any other sources and for always encouraging me, especially during the difficult times. Finally, I wish to thank my mother, Mary Hague, for her continuous support and encouragment on this project.

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Chapter 1
Introduction

One of the more interesting and far-reaching aspects of foreign relations lies in the field of cultural exchanges. These exchanges are sometimes criticized for being propagandistic in tone, but they do symbolize aspirations for continued goodwill and closer ties between nations. Trade agreements appear more profitable than cultural agreements, but cultural exchanges generate more long term dividends by strengthening international bonds. Such was the case in 1973 through 1975, when an international audience was treated to a spectacular exhibition of archaeological finds from the People's Republic of China. Earlier reports of tremendous archaeological discoveries in China were confirmed with the exhibition of these finds in Peking in the early months of 1973. Later, a selection from this exhibition was sent out on a tour of Western nations. It consisted of a representative sample of archaeological finds from the Palaeolithic Period (600,000 B.C.) to the end of the Yuan Dynasty (1368 A.D.). Highlights of the exhibition included fragments of the jaw of Lan-t'ien man (600,000 B.C.), Shang dynasty bronzes (1600-1027 B.C.), the funerary jade suit of Princess Tou Wan (Late 2nd Century B.C.), bronze leopard figurines made during the Western Han Dynasty (Late 2nd Century B.C.), and an Eastern Han Dynasty bronze figurine of a flying horse (2nd Century A.D.), which seemed to defy gravity. This exhibition dazzled and impressed record crowds in Paris, London, Vienna, Stockholm, Toronto, Washington, Kansas City and San Francisco.

For the People's Republic of China, this exhibition became an effective public relations tool by helping to dispel some of the negative images of Communist ruled China, long nurtured in the West

through cold war propaganda. The exhibition also helped put in question, at least, the anti-culture image of the People's Republic of China that had developed because of the destruction of ancient historic sites and relics during the Cultural Revolution. Indeed, the Chinese took pains to emphasize that many of the major exhibits had been discovered throughout the period of the Cultural Revolution. In addition to being a public relations coup, the exhibition gave the People's Republic of China an opportunity to present its own view of history and culture to an international audience. In fact, one could think of the star attractions of the exhibition, the jade suit of Princess Tou Wan and the Flying Horse of Kansu, as silent goodwill ambassadors for the People's Republic of China.

Nevertheless, as in other areas of foreign contact, cultural relations are beset with strains and challenges. As the Exhibition of Archaeological Finds of the People's Republic of China travelled from museum to museum in the west, it became apparent that the ongoing political struggles and debates at home in China--specifically the Anti-Confucius, Anti-Lin Piao campaign--had a great deal of influence upon the interpretation and presentation of Chinese history abroad. In fact, Mao's dictum of "Let the Past Serve the Present" was the sub-title of the exhibition. Although the repercussions of the political turmoil in China were not readily apparent to the general public in the host countries, these tensions were very evident to the parties negotiating for the exhibition. The results of the political tensions in China surfaced abroad publicly through the revisions in the content and format of the Exhibition catalogues which changed--sometimes dramatically--as the

exhibition followed its tour. Thus, the exhibition's international audiences were given an opportunity to learn about China's past, present and ongoing struggles.

Official diplomatic relations between Canada and the People's Republic of China were established on October 13, 1970. For Canada, the recognition of the People's Republic of China was long overdue. Official recognition would have taken place earlier in 1950, following Great Britain's example and the advice of Canadian diplomat Chester Ronning, had it not been for the outbreak of the Korean war and the growing hostilities fostered by the Cold War.

With the establishment of official relations between Canada and China, there was great hope in Canada for increased trade and other benefits. One of these was the proposal to bring a major exhibit to Canada. An agreement in principle to send Canada the exhibition of archaeological treasures was realized between the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mitchell Sharp and Premier Chou En-lai at Peking in 1972. The continuing aspirations for closer ties seemed to be fulfilled again with Prime Minister Trudeau's visit to China in October 1973. At that time, agreements were concluded for improved trade relations, exchanges in the fields of medicine, arts and sports, and an immigration policy for the reunification of families. The internal political struggles of China which began to surface in late 1973, subsequently threatened some rather significant accomplishments in Canadian-Chinese diplomatic relations. As the result of these political struggles, suggestions came later from the Chinese of an alternative exhibition followed by threats of the cancellation of the archaeological exhibition, which

would have been an extremely serious set-back in Canada-China relations.

By reviewing the negotiations for the international agreements to hold the exhibition, and by assessing the impact of the agreements upon the curatorial efforts to present the exhibition, as well as the changes in the catalogue content and format, this thesis will illustrate the impact of politics on historical research and the interpretation of archaeological data in the People's Republic of China. Emphasis will be placed on the negotiations between China and Canada in relation to the archaeological exhibition, although the entire tour of the exhibition will be referred to as a case study demonstrating the ties between politics and history in the People's Republic of China, as well as an illustration of the challenges of cultural diplomacy. As for the political debates in China at the time, emphasis will be placed on the Anti-Lin Piao and Anti-Confucius campaign in relation to changes in the exhibits and catalogue revisions.

The primary sources of material for this thesis can be found in the archives of the Historical Division of External Affairs, Ottawa and in the archives of the Royal Ontario Museum, Toronto. Information from the Historical Division, External Affairs in Ottawa provided data on the negotiations for the Exhibition while information from the Archives of the Royal Ontario Museum provided details on the curatorial arrangements. Throughout the exhibition arrangements, letters were exchanged between External Affairs and the Royal Ontario Museum; so the two sources complemented and sometimes duplicated each other.

Further information was obtained from the private papers of Dr. B. L. Evans of the Department of History at the University of Alberta,

Edmonton. More invaluable information was obtained through interviews with participants in the Exhibition preparations, namely Mr. N. Torno, the Chairman of the Chinese Exhibition Council for the Royal Ontario Museum, Dr. W. Tovell, the Director of the Museum at the time of the Exhibition, and Mrs. B. Stephens, Chairman of the Chinese Exhibition Committee and Associate Curator of the Far Eastern Department of the Royal Ontario Museum. Finally, discussions with Dr. B. L. Evans, who was a Cultural Counsellor with the Canadian Embassy in Peking, at the time of the Exhibition negotiations, provided data on the negotiations within China.

Chapter 2

The Influence of Politics Upon History and Archaeology in the People's Republic of China: The Anti-Confucius and The Anti-Lin Piao Campaign

Before delving into the particulars of the relationship of history and archaeology with politics in China--as illustrated by the Chinese Exhibition--it is useful to examine briefly some characteristics of the Chinese historical tradition. As China has frequently been recognized for having the longest continuous civilization; scholars both inside and outside of China have attempted to devise various paradigms to analyze and explain the phenomena of China's history.

History has long been associated with government in China. This association prompted, within China, the effort to make political use of history.

> From its beginnings, history in China has been intimately associated with the politics of the Chinese state--as a justification for bold departures which it was claimed were merely restoring the "golden age" of the great sages of the past, as a means of legitimising the succession of one ruling group to the throne of its predecessor, as a powerful weapon in the struggles of factions and cliques over the centuries.[1]

The association between politics and history was encouraged and promoted by Confucius. His writings have left an indelible stamp upon successive philosophers and upon the policies influencing both the development of the state and politics in China. Living in a time of political instability, Confucius advocated the study of history as part of the process to establish a better government and society.

> . . .in the political sphere, he merely claimed to be a devoted student of antiquity and transmitter of the wisdom of the past. The disorder of his own day, he felt, could be corrected if men would return to the political and social order supposedly created by the founders of the Chou dynasty, King Wen and the Duke of Chou.[2]

In order to return to these past glories, Confucius advocated a code of ethics to be followed by all members of society.

> . . .Confucius was in fact a great, though probably unconscious, innovator in his basic concept that good government was fundamentally a matter of ethics. He did not question the hereditary right of the lords to rule, but he insisted that their first duty was to set a proper example of sound ethical conduct. In a day when might was right, he argued that the ruler's virtue and the contentment of people, rather than power, should be the true measures of political success.[3]

Thus, history became a moral yardstick assessing the ethical behaviour of leaders in comparison with their predecessors.

Nevertheless, the application of this philosphy imposed some strictures upon China's subsequent development. These traditional Confucianist views of Chinese history have been blamed by some contemporary historians in China for what appears to be historical repetition of the dynasty system and "stagnation" in China's social and political development. The traditional view of history bolstered the powerful and served to perpetuate a system that maintained their authority. Thus, the philosophy of Confucius became the traditional ideology of the ruling elite.

The Anti-Confucius campaign of late 1973-1974 can find its origins in the rebellion against Confucianism in the New Culture Movement, that had been prompted by the May 4th Incident of 1919. The movement inspired a review of the old culture and an attack on the Confucian social order. Confucianism was denounced as a fetter upon the individual.[4] This earlier anti-Confucianist campaign also prompted a critical re-evaluation of Chinese history. The 1949 revolution formally heralded changes in the political system, and philosophy. Confucianism was replaced by Marxism and any ideological backsliding to traditional views was labeled as revisionist. This break with tradition has caused however, some intellectual crises that have permeated and affected all levels of society.

The most recent inheritors of China's lengthy historical legacy have continued to question these traditional interpretations of China's past. The Dynastic cycle has been a long recognized approach to dividing China's history and it also has expressed a traditional Chinese attitude towards man's social development.

> The Chinese have traditionally interpreted their past as a series of dynastic cycles in which successive dynasties repeated a boringly repetitious story: a heroic founding, a period of great power, then a long decline, and finally total collapse. The Chinese practice of compiling history in dynastic chunks has contributed to this picture, as has their concept that the best that man could hope for was to recreate some golden age of antiquity. As a result, the tremendous growth and development of Chinese civilization has been all hidden behind this apparent circular action in human affairs, and the later history of China is made into a series of more or less successful attempts to repeat the story of the Earlier Han.[5]

This measuring and comparing the present against past precedents has also been noted in the Chinese tradition of referring to history as a mirror.

> The Chinese classically regarded history as a mirror which, properly angled, would reflect the cherished precedents of a golden age upon which present action had to be based or at least rationalised.[6]

This viewpoint demonstrated, furthermore, the traditional need of each successive dynasty for historic confirmation and legitimization of the right to rule.

Although the current regime of the People's Republic of China prefers to advocate the Marxist framework of history--thereby suggesting a steady forward progression in China's social and political development--there is a similar need for legitimization of succession. The current regime is however, concerned with demonstrating a continuity and not

conformity with the past. The mirror has been transformed into a "calibrating instrument" to ". . .measure the inexorable march of progress through time to the present."[7] Instead of being constrained by respecting and admiring historical tradition and precedent, post 1949 historians in China prefer to demonstrate the progressive line of social development in history by emphasizing class struggle as the cause of political, social and economic development in China. There is a strong effort to demonstrate how the corrupt dynastic system of a monarchy-based government held back China's development. Thus the philosophy of Confucianism--which advocated a code of ethics that maintained the class structure and preserved the dynastic system of government--has been subjected to severe criticism. According to later People's Republic of China interpretations, in periodicals such as Hsinhua News Bulletin and Peking Review (now Beijing Review) in late 1973 and then in 1974, this philosophy helped to perpetuate a system that exploited the peasants, who became the preferred historical heroes.[8]

Although the tensions between the past and the present have not yet been completely or comfortably resolved, scholars in the People's Republic of China have reinterpreted China's history within the Marxist framework of peasant, slave and feudal society. In keeping with the development of a revolutionary society, a history more suited to China's ideological needs had to be written. At Yenan in January 1940, Chairman Mao expressed his concerns for the development of a new culture. The philosophical and historical traditions of old China were severely criticized because of their support of a corrupt social system, that

exploited the peasants. Mao dealt with the issue of China's cultural legacy on many occasions. One can sense the intellectual tension created by the inheritance of this past, in Mao's writing.

> The old is composed of two parts, one being China's own semi-feudal politics, economy and culture, and the other the politics, economy and culture of imperialism, with the latter heading the alliance. Both are bad and should be completely destroyed. The struggle between the new and the old in Chinese society is a struggle between the new forces of the people (the various revolutionary classes) and the feudal class. It is a struggle between revolution and counter-revolution.[9]

This severe criticism of the past inspired, later, the destruction of its symbols, as was witnessed during the Cultural Revolution. Yet, Mao strove to balance this ideological rejection of feudal China with an effort to preserve some of the worthwhile aspects of China's history.

> China's present new politics and new economy have developed out of her old politics and old economy, and her present new culture, too, has developed out of her own culture; therefore, we must respect our own history and must not lop it off. However, respect for history means giving it its proper place as a science, respecting its dialectical development, and not eulogizing the past at the expense of the present or praising every drop of feudal poison.[10]

The problem became distinguishing the feudal poison from the past achievements. This re-assessment of the contradiction of the past is in itself an example of the dialectical process of thesis, anti-thesis and synthesis.

According to Mao, the establishment of a new culture was vital to the success of the 1949 revolution. In fact, prior to the revolution, Mao stressed the importance of the "cultural front" to politicize and to win the loyalty of the masses.

> In our struggle for the liberation of the Chinese people there are various fronts, among which there are the fronts

> of the pen and of the gun, the cultural and the military fronts ... .Since the May 4th Movement such a cultural army has taken shape in China, and it has helped the Chinese revolution, gradually reduced the domain of China's feudal culture and of the comprador culture which serves imperialist aggression, and weakened their influence.[11]

Although Mao wrote this originally with theatre and literature in mind, it has far reaching consequences and applications. China's history had to be re-examined in terms of serving the interests of a Marxist revolution, with a new emphasis being placed on the role of the peasant in China's history.

The application of the Marxist framework of history with its various stages of social development--primitive, slave and feudal--has created problems for China's more recent leadership and the national pride of China. These problems are readily apparent in its application to China's ancient history.

> The central question in the periodization of ancient history is when did the era of slavery end in China and consequently when did the feudal era begin. For it is assumed, of course, that Chinese society passed from primitive communism through slavery, feudalism and capitalism to socialism and that it will soon achieve the Communist paradise. The pressure to settle this question finally (and the other periodization problems as well) therefore probably stems as much from the Communist Party leadership, who are anxious lest any looseness at the beginning raise doubts about its completion as it does from the historians themselves.[12]

Critics of this application of the Marxist framework to China's history stress that Marxism has left gaps in the historical record. But aside from this, the Marxist framework has also challenged the cultural pride of China's scholars. This ideological crisis is particularly aggravated in the application of Marxism to Chinese philosophy. The rejection of

a Confucian heritage "has not been a painless amputation."[13] Moreover the life of intense manual labour may have been bitter for the peasants within the dynasty system; [14] but this seemingly "stagnant" social system created an atmosphere that allowed for many of China's outstanding accomplishments in the arts and technology, far in advance of the Western world. This fact can not be easily acknowledged by the Marxist framework of history, without recognizing the past system of leadership, thereby threatening the ideological base of China's revolution.

The western origin of Marxism is also to some degree an affront to the Chinese sense of cultural pride. Mao dealt with this apparent contradiction by proposing the sinification of Marxism to suit China's needs.

> To advocate "wholesale westernization" is wrong. China has suffered a great deal from the mechanical absorption of foreign material. Similarly, in applying Marxism to China, Chinese Communists must fully and properly integrate the universal truth of Marxism with the concrete practice of the Chinese revolution, or in other words, the universal truth of Marxism must be combined with specific national characteristics and acquire a definite national form if it is to be useful, and in no circumstances can it be applied subjectively as a mere formula.[15]

According to Mao, the past must serve the present and foreign things must serve China too. Indeed it is a long observed fact that China has been able to retain its cultural identity and unity, even in spite of "conquest," through its ability to sinify all non-Chinese forces. Thus the contradictions posed by the inheritance of a non-revolutionary culture are ignored to some extent, since these traditions help to maintain the separate national character of China. The search for new links with traditional China is a search for an intellectual and cultural continuity

that is a self-defense against the West and a means of bolstering self confidence about the present and the future. These nationalistic tensions have also led People's Republic of China historians to review China's past in hopes of paralleling China's historical development with that of the West.[16] China's humiliating experience with the foreign imperialist powers at the turn of the century has also inspired a nationalistic trend in China's historical research, in an attempt to find internal as opposed to just external causes of the social changes that led to China's revolution.[17]

This effort to establish continuity between China's modern and ancient history, goes beyond nationalistic interests and serves the interests of China's political elite by confirming the legitimization of their succession from the past. History has a specific purpose in demonstrating the steady march of socialism. The sequence of history is particularly important since it must conform to the Sino-Marxist view of history and the legitimization of the current regime's succession is dependent upon an ideologically satisfactory interpretation of the past. Despite the ideological contradictions and conflicts, both the traditional Confucian view of history and the Sino-Marxist approach share the same objectives of seeking proof of the ongoing regime's continuity from the past.

> Continuities and similarities there are to be sure: the need to legitimise the present by appeals to the past, the bureaucratic historian paid to praise the "throne," the avowed didactic purpose of history, the organization of the record from the centre, the hardening of methodology into a moralistic scholasticism, the inclusion and suppression of preferred data, the pride in preserving the record and rearranging it in vast compendia all are common to both traditions.[18]

Although the results sought by China's elite through the Confucian tradition and then through the Marxist viewpoint, may be similar, the approaches of the viewpoints are distinctive. In the Sino-Marxist approach to history, the peasant assumes a new role of importance. History becomes an examination of the struggles of the common man against the system that exploited him. Furthermore the study of history is not just the occupation of scholars, the entire society is engaged to seek out the past, in hopes of renewing or strengthening their commitment to the new society.

> The Great Leap Forward in the realm of historiography included a renewed emphasis on "directing historical research with theory, "i.e., the thought of Mao Tse-tung; a call to emphasize the present and de-emphasize the past," i.e. to use the study of the past to serve present day political needs; a demand that the history of emperors, generals and ministers be replaced by attention to the historical struggles of the laboring masses; and a call for the "broad masses of history workers" to join with workers and peasants and write histories of families, villages, communes and factories.[19]

Undoubtedly, the "talking bitterness" sessions--recalling the horrors of the feudal regime and the long struggle against it--[20] confirmed the loyalty of peasant survivors and their children to the revolution and the changes made by the government to carry on the revolutionary process. History served the peasant and helped promote the new social order.

The new emphasis and reassessment of the role of the peasant in China's history served to justify the succession of Marxism as the correct historical approach.

> Mao Tse-tung had said it: "These class struggles of the peasants--the peasant uprisings and peasant wars--alone formed the real motive force of historical development in China's feudal society. Each of the major peasant risings and wars dealt a blow to the existing

> feudal regime and more or less furthered the development of the social productive forces.[21]

The peasants, the new social heroes, were recognized for their promotion of China's social and ideological development. A different interpretation of the role of the peasant in the dynasty cycle, detracts from this more heroic purpose of leading to the development of a socialist system.

> Peasant revolts, it is seen, in order to have their beneficial effects are inextricably tied to the successful establishment of a new dynasty to replace that which the revolts had overthrown.[22]

Accordingly, the peasants' revolt can be interpreted as supporting either a radical or revisionist interpretation of history.

Contemporary Political Uses of History

Chinese theatre and literature traditionally depended on the rich historical and cultural legacy of China for its story lines. It is not surprising that China's past became a source of analogy for the political debates of the Cultural Revolution (1966-1969), as was exemplified by Wu Han's play, The Dismissal of Hai Jui. In a style reminiscent of Arthur Miller's The Crucible, which criticized the political witch-hunts under McCarthy in the United States by analogy to the Salem witch-trials; the issues of Wu Han's play were contemporary despite the mid-sixteenth century setting.

> In this play, he (Wu Han) covertly attacked the economic policies of Chairman Mao and implicitly identified the dramatic protagonist, a mid-sixteenth century official of almost legendary popularity with the dismissed Marshall P'eng Te-huai, ousted by Mao in 1959 for opposing the Great Leap and for advocating a mending of fences with the Soviet Union.[23]

Historical figures and events provided the means to all political factions to criticize and debate about China's contemporary leaders, policies and ideology.

In an atmosphere of political tension, the interpretation of the past takes on new dimensions. Mao's effort to check the development of revisionism in the party during the Cultural Revolution set the entire society into convulsions, almost threatening its existence. The re-evaluation of history became vital and pertinent to the ongoing debates. This trend was resumed in 1973 and 1974 with the return of Confucius to the political center stage during the anti-Confucius anti-Lin Piao campaign. Confucianism symbolized revisionism, a deadly party sin. Although the debate was primarily concerned with combatting revisionism in the party leadership, it spread to all levels of Chinese society threatening China's political stability at home and foreign relations abroad.

In many ways, the campaign represented the death throes of the Cultural Revolution, which was put to rest finally with the downfall of the Gang of Four--led by Mao's wife, Chiang Ching--in 1976. Nevertheless, as with other rectification campaigns, the anti-Confucius anti-Lin Piao campaign sought to abolish "the four olds"--ideas, tradition, behaviour and customs.[24] The campaign sought to address the problems of backsliding in revolutionary fervor, ideological purity as expressed by the tendency towards compromising Marxism in favour of capitalism, the growth of elitism amongst the party leadership and intellectuals, and revisionism at all levels of society. But the pivotal aspect of the campaign was the debate over the succession to Mao's style of leadership, and the

continuation of the revolutionary struggle as the guiding ideological ethic. The significance of the campaign cannot be underestimated since it was a topic in almost every issue of Peking Review and the Hsinhua News Bulletin throughout 1974.

The campaign prompts historical association by referring to Confucius, but the campaign involved more contemporary issues and the destiny of China's people. It was an emotional campaign that touched all strata of China's society. The battle against revisionism--embodied in the spirit of Confucianism--was carried out on many fronts--from the steel mills to the households--but the ideological discussions reveal a concern with the direction of China's struggle towards socialism and China's future leadership. Confucianism was the perfect historical analogy for revisionism, since the philosophy supported the dynastic system and traditional social structure. It advocated moral ethics rather than revolutionary change, and was considered to be the perfect antithesis to Marxism. From the revolutionary perspective, revisionism meant backsliding from the revolutionary spirit that was expected to lead China into the future.

Mao was himself concerned with the issue of succession. The campaigns of the Cultural Revolution had routed many contenders and demonstrated the vulnerability of China's revolution. These issues were not resolved since the anti-Lin Piao and Anti-Confucius campaigns expressed similar concerns.

Lin Piao became a symbol illustrating both the vulnerability of China's leadership and the revolution. Lin Piao, a former minister of defense, attempted a coup d'etat with his project 571--the numbers

of which when pronounced in Mandarin enigmatically suggests armed rebellion. He had been one of Mao's closest comrades and fostered the cult of Mao with the promotion of the little "red book" entitled Quotations from Chairman Mao Tse-tung--complete with a foreward by Lin Piao--as a guiding ideological standard for revolutionary study.[25] Later, all of this admiration of Mao was cited as evidence of Lin Piao's own efforts at self promotion as a successor upon Mao's expected demise.

During the anti-Confucius anti-Lin Piao campaigns, Lin Piao's admiration of Confucius became a target of criticism and evidence of his revisionism. The campaigns linked Lin Piao and Confucius as traitors to China's development and ideas of both individuals had to be routed from the party, the people and the ideology. In an analysis of Project 571, Lin Piao's plan for coup d'etat, Hsinhua News Bulletin outlines the reasons for criticizing Confucius.

> . . .the criticism of Confucius is being made for the purpose of deepening the criticism of Lin Piao. "To kill weeds we must kill their roots; to criticize Lin Piao, we must criticize Confucius."[26]

Thus in a blaze of metaphors, the campaign sought to purge the vestiges of Confucianism and thereby revisionism from all sectors of Chinese life.

Besides purging revisionism and Confucianism from Chinese society, there was an effort to justify the political campaigns to maintain revolutionary ideology. The campaign was justified as part of the perpetual process of struggle, vital to the theory of continuous revolution, a pillar in Mao's rhetoric.

> The philosophy of the Communist party is the philosophy of struggle.[27]

Articles on the campaign refer frequently to the struggle between the two lines--Marxism versus Confucianism, the revolution versus revisionism, the proletariat versus the new elite. Based on this ideological rhetoric, the campaign criticized the more recent history of the party and also attempted to redirect the immediate future of the party. A closer examination of the link between the historical past and the political present reveals more of the objectives of the campaign.

The Symbolism of Confucius and Lin Piao

Confucius and Lin Piao are linked together in this campaign since both of them apparently tried to hold back China's development and tried to prevent social change and development. By developing a philosophy that maintained the existing social structure and advocated a return to past customs and rituals, Confucius provided the ideology to uphold a slave society. Living in a time of rebellion and upheaval Confucius advocated a return to stability through his code of ethics that affected all levels of society. During the anti-Confucius anti-Lin Piao campaign, Confucius' theory of innate genius was cited as the cause of the repression of slave uprisings.

> Confucius (551-479 B.C.) supported suppression of slave uprisings by armed force and harsh punishment. He did all he could to spread his theory that "the highest are the wise and the lowest are the stupid," to attempt to hoodwink the labouring people and make them submit to the reactionary rule of the slave owners and preserve the decadent slave-owning system.[28]

Although these criticisms of Confucianism and revisionism in Hsinhua News Bulletin were often written by different worker and peasant groups, the issues involved the leadership.

Lin Piao and Confucius

For the possession of scrolls with quotations from Confucius, Lin Piao was labeled a reactionary and an advocate of non-revolutionary thinking. For example, Lin apparently advocated "restoring the rites" which meant the restoration of the bourgeoisie and the landlord class to their former status. References to the theory of "innate Genius" were cited as evidence of Lin's support of an idealist view that "the highest are the wise and the lowest are the stupid,"[29] which also subverted the power of the masses and the proletariat. His aspirations to lead China were noted in his comparison of himself with a T'ien Mah, the heavenly or celestial horse.[30] Lin Piao also compared himself to King Wen, an emperor of the Chou dynasty, which was noted as evidence of Lin's desire to usurp party leadership.[31] All this evidence was summoned to prove Lin Piao hoped to lead China back toward capitalism.

Other Objectives of the Campaign

The campaign objectives were more than criticizing Confucius and combatting revisionism. Radical party ideologues were determined to revive revolutionary purity and prevent any compromises which party pragmatists would make to promote China's modernization. For symbolic purposes and as a counter-weight to the Confucius-Lin Piao model, comparisons were drawn between Emperor Chin Shih Huang ti and Mao Tse-tung.

Mao enjoyed the analogy since Chin Shih Huang ti was the first emperor to unify all of China, as Mao re-unified China in 1949. Emperor Chin is remembered most for ordering the building of the great wall, burning books and burying Confucian scholars alive. The apparent cruelty in these acts is excused since the Emperor's actions prompted

China's historical development.

> In light of the materialist concept of history, by "burning books and burying Confucian scholars alive, Chin Shih huang was dealing a blow at the old ideas so as to defend the newly established political and economic system.[32]

Under this emperor, China left the ideology of Confucianism in favor of Legalism. Radical party ideologues found Emperor Chin's career was a useful illustration of the persistence of class struggle as the motive force in China's historical development. It fitted into the Marxist framework, the preferred model of historical development. While Confucius was regarded as the ideological mainstay of the slave system, Chin Shih Huang ti was ushering in a new era of feudalism with legalism as the state philosophy. By analogy, Lin Piao symbolizes the revisionist effort to restore capitalism while Mao, as the father of the revolution, represents the effort to maintain the ideology of perpetual struggle pushing China towards socialism.

From the perspective of ideology, the radical campaign ideologues searched for illustrations to support the materialist view of history and to support the dialectical approach of analysis--specifically thesis-antithesis-synthesis. The campaign radicals urged a stronger commitment to the revolution, to the point of jeopardizing production.

> A regiment of the Peking garrison puts the criticism of Lin Piao and Confucius above all other work, . . . this fired the commanders and fighters with greater revolutionary enthusiasm to step up their military training for the purpose of consolidating the dictatorship of the proletariat.[33]

Since the campaign was affecting all sectors of society, it was dealing a crippling blow to China's economy and productivity by slowing work.

Nevertheless for the radical ideologues, the campaign represented a last stand on theoretical issues and a final bid for leadership.

One of the main targets of the campaign was Chou En-lai. Mao was the father of the revolution but Chou organized the rebuilding of the nation. Thus, any criticism of Chou had to be indirect since he had attained so much respect at home and abroad. One can conclude he was the object of criticism through the cover of historical analogy offered by Confucius. This cover of criticism was noted in Dick Wilson's biography of Chou En-lai.

> A newspaper article criticized him in veiled terms: "The class enemies in society, and in particular the chieftain of the opportunist line in the Party, have always attempted to revive Confucianism in order to prevent the establishment of the revolutionary line of Chairman Mao." (In the symbolism of the day, Confucius represented Zhou(Chou) to many Chinese, and it was easy to get the press to publish articles criticizing Confucius).[34]

As a symbol of backsliding in his own time, Confucius was reputed to have advocated, while living in a period of turmoil, a return to what he perceived as the ideal state, the Chou dynasty. Accordingly, articles in Hsinhua News Bulletin criticized Confucianism for the efforts at the restoration of slavery.[35]

Chou became an indirect subject of criticism since he had tried to contain the excesses of the Cultural Revolution. He also restored many of those who had been criticized and disciplined for their non-revolutionary thinking. Ebon's biography aptly characterizes Chou as "the gyroscope that kept the pitching vessel of Chinese Communism from capsizing and drowning its inhabitants."[36] His calmness throughout these stormy campaigns gained the greater affection and respect of

the people. Undoubtedly the experiences of the Cultural Revolution urged Chou to apply his pragmatic approach to limit the impact of the anti-Confucius anti-Lin Piao campaign upon China's efforts at rebuilding.

> . . .the bans on "making revolution" during working hours and on individuals leaving their normal employment, smack of Chou En-lai.[37]

The campaign, however, gained more momentum when Chou became ill. By June 1974, he was reported to be in hospital again. Chou had been ill for quite some time with heart problems and after his death on January 8, 1976, it was reported that he had suffered from cancer. Nevertheless, while he was ill in the summer of 1974, the Gang of Four lead by Chiang Ching used the opportunity to discredit Chou's policies and contacts with the West under the guise of anti-Confucianism. The impact of the Anti-Confucius anti-Lin Piao campaign upon Canadian-Chinese cultural diplomacy was felt most keenly during the summer of 1974 as the arrangements for the archaeological exhibition were to reach completion. Although the exhibition crisis was resolved, as the discussion in later chapters shall demonstrate, the campaign issues in China were only resolved with the fall of the Gang of Four in 1976, after the death of Chou En-lai and the death of Mao Tse-tung.

Hard as they tried, the Gang of Four never succeeded in tarnishing the reputation of Chou En-lai. His final rebuttal of the Gang of Four's innuendos was encompassed in his Congress report of January 13, 1975.

> He justified the Cultural Revolution as anti-bourgeois and he did not set the economy above politics, since class struggle and social revolution were still necessary. "Only when we do well in revolution, is it possible to do well in production. He proceeded to outline a

> breathtaking programme to accomplish the comprehensive modernization of agriculture, industry, national defence and science and technology before the end of the century, so that our national economy will be advancing in the front ranks of the world!" These were the so-called Four Modernizations, with which China has been concerned ever-since.[38]

His report represented an ideological last will and testament.

The Campaign and Culture

In retrospect, the anti-Confucius anti-Lin Piao campaign affected many cultural activities. As the campaign intensified, the ministry of culture began to exercise more authority over the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. To criticize the foreign ministry was to criticize Chou En-lai. Cultural activities that established contacts between China and the West came under particular scrutiny. With regards to Canadian-Chinese relations, foreign ministry staff in China chose to ride out the storms of controversy, seeming to leave the Chinese Embassy staff in Ottawa to make the final decisions. As the campaign intensified, decisive action appeared to be more feasible in Ottawa than in Peking.

The campaign seriously affected cultural relations between Canada and China. The proposed tour of China by the Vancouver symphony had to be cancelled, as a result of a scrutiny of the class content of classical music. This aspect of the campaign indicated the radical ideologues' objectives of maintaining cultural purity and avoiding the wholesale import of western culture.

China's relations with Canada were not the only targets of criticism within China as was illustrated in the case of a film on China made by an Italian film maker, Antonioni.[39] Initially the film was

approved but then it was criticized for scenes portraying China's underdevelopment. Similar ideological sensitivities flared during the tour of the exhibition of archaeological finds. The interpretation of the artifacts was carefully reviewed and revised as the standards of ideological purity were changed. To criticize the arrangements for the exhibition was to criticize the Foreign Ministry in China and the effort to improve relations with the West. This power struggle over the interpretation of the exhibition was aimed not so much at educating Westerners about Chinese ideology, but at asserting power within China through a demonstration in the West.

Some foreshadowing of the difficulties with the exhibition's interpretation were indicated by a Hsinhua article noting the politicization of archaeology. The article notes an archaeology course on the Warring States, Chin and Han dynasties, changed its content from discussing sites and buildings to include an analysis of the social structure.

> . . .with criticism of the ideology of worshipping the Confucian school and opposing the Legalist school as the point of reference, the lecture now pays attention to the social background and class struggle at that time. This clarified the fact that the buildings were symbols of the "rule of rites" preached by Confucianists.[40]

Everything was politicized.

During the tour of the Exhibition of Archaeological Finds from the People's Republic of China, these dialectical tensions of the past and present came to the forefront. While the exhibition strove to demonstrate to the outside world how revolutionary China had come to terms with a rich cultural legacy steeped in tradition the regime, terrified lest there begin the resurgence of a traditional society,

launched the anti-Confucian campaign. The growing political and ideological tensions began to affect the progress of the exhibition leading to the withdrawal of a Confucian script from the exhibits, to changes in the descriptive catalogues and Chinese insistence that the exhibition follow closely the historical sequence as set by Marxist interpretation. In turn, western views of Chinese history came under fire primarily as the result of the internal political turmoil in China. By examining the catalogue texts, relevant archival materials from both External Affairs and the Royal Ontario Museum, this discussion shall demonstrate that the past not only serves the present, but the political present directly influences the interpretation of the cultural past.

1. Harold Kahn and Albert Feuerwerker, "The Ideology of Scholarship China's New Historiography," in History in Communist China, edited by Albert Feuerwerker, (Massachusetts: M.I.T. Press, 1968), p.13.

2. John K. Fairbank, Edwin O. Reischauer and Albert M. Craig, East Asia Tradition and Transformation, (Boston: Houghton, Mifflin Company, 1973), p.44.

3. Ibid.

4. Ibid., p.771.

5. Ibid., pp. 70-71.

6. Kahn and Feuerwerker, "Ideology", p.5.

7. Ibid.

8. The campaign against Confucius and Lin Piao urged a new appraisal of China's past in keeping with Mao's dictum of "let the past serve the present." Thus Hsinhua reported a glowing tribute to the exploits of Liuhsia chih (770-476 B.C.) the leader of a slave uprising. Hsinhua News Bulletin, July 9, 1974. This point is also illustrated in an article from Peking Review entitled: "Struggle Between Two lines in the Ideological Sphere During the Spring and Autumn Period and the Warring States Period," by Yang Jung-kuo. The article cites the'heroic' efforts of the peasants to change the slave system endorsed by Confucius. Peking Review, February 22, 1974, pp4-7.

9. Mao Tse-tung, Mao Tse-tung on Literature and Art, (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1967), p.59.

10. Ibid., p. 75.

11. Ibid., p. 1-2.

12. Albert Feuerwerker, "China's History in Marxian Dress," in History In Communist China, p. 28.

13. Ibid., p.14.

14. The bitter life of the peasants is described by Jean Chesneaux in his text entitled: Peasant Revolts in China 1840-1949 (London: Thames and Hudson, 1973), p. 10.

15. Mao Tse-tung, "On Literature and Art," p.74.

16. Feuerwerker, "Marxian Dress," p.19.

17. Ibid., p.27.

18. Kahn and Feuerwerker, "Ideology," p.5.

19. Albert Feuerwerker, "Preface" in History in Communist China, p.v.

20. The recollections of the bitter past during political campaigns is noted by James P. Harrison in The Communists and Chinese Peasant Rebellions A Study in the Rewriting of Chinese History (London: Victor Gollancz, 1970), p p. 260-261. The peasants also recalled the past during the Anti-Confucius Anti- Lin Piao campaign as was noted in Hsinhua News Bulletin, June 2, 1974, pp.10-12.

21. Feuerwerker,"Marxian Dress", p.16.

22. Ibid., p.17.

23. Albert Feuerwerker, "Preface," p. viii.

24. Han Suyin, The Wind in the Tower, Mao Tse-tung and the Chinese Revolution 1949-1975, (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1976), p.266.

25. Quotations From Chairman Mao Tse-tung, (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1967).

26. Hsinhua News Bulletin, February 5, 1974, p.21.

27. Ibid., February 5, 1974, p.18.

28. Ibid., March 11, 1974, p.1.

29. Ibid., June 4, 1974, p.6.

30. Far Eastern Economic Review, May 27, 1974, p.13.

31. Hsinhua News Bulletin, February 20, 1974, p.10.

32. Ibid., June 6, 1974, pp.18-19.

33. Ibid., August 3, 1974, p.16.

34. Dick Wilson, Chou: The Story of Zhou En-lai 1898-1976, (London: Hutchinson, 1984), p.283. The criticism of Chou in these debates by the Gang of four is noted in the People's Daily, January 7, 1986, p.2.

35. Hsinhua News Bulletin, February 14, 1974, p.6.

36. Martin Ebon, Lin Piao The Life and Writings of China's New Ruler, (New York: Stein and Day, 1970), p.81.

37. Far Eastern Economic Review, May 20, 1974.

38. Dick Wilson, p.288.

39. Ibid., p.286.

40. Hsinhua News Bulletin, April 21, 1974, p.6.

Chapter 3
The Chinese Exhibition
The Negotiations and Agreements

The complexities of the arrangements and negotiations for the Chinese exhibition seemed to take on the dimensions typical of a "Royal Tour," even though one of the star attractions, Princess Tou Wan's jade suit, was representing the culture of a how classless society. This juxtaposition of China's past and present ultimately caused many of the difficulties in the negotiations, because of a growing ideological conflict within China, focussed on this issue. History had to celebrate the struggles of the common man. Thus, the achievements of artisans, illustrated by the exhibition, could be praised; but the relationship of landlords to peasants under the dynastic system had to be criticized as ruthless exploitation. This ideological struggle resulting from the re-interpretation and re-evaluation of China's history was only part of the larger ideological power struggle within China's political structure between the "revisionists" or "pragmatists" and the "radicals." The following analysis of some of the difficulties in the negotiations for the Chinese exhibition seeks to demonstrate the influence of China's internal political struggles upon the terms of the agreements.

The Chinese Government required two agreements[1]--an inter-governmental agreement and an inter-agency agreement--from each country that wished to host the exhibition.[2] Although the format of the agreements with each country was similar, the wording was changed as the exhibition progressed along its tour. The first stops on the tour were Paris and London. Together, the Government of France and the Times of London sponsored the exhibition's visits to Paris from May to September, 1973 and to London from 29 September, 1973 to 23

January, 1974. For the British, this Chinese exhibition was the first of its kind since 1935.[3] Consequently, it attracted considerable public attention, particularly due to the much heralded jade suit and the bronze sculpture of the Kansu Flying Horse.

In the West, there was a ready audience with a curiosity primed by conflicting reports on how China was treating its cultural legacy. For example, Life magazine gave a report on the Red Guards destroying various cultural landmarks in China,[4] but this negative image was contradicted by other magazine accounts of remarkable archaeological discoveries made during the Cultural Revolution.[5] Until the arrival of this exhibition, western audiences had relied upon the collections of Chinese artifacts in their own museums for an introduction to China's past cultural achievements. Many of these museum collections had been acquired during the period when China was under the domination of Western powers. During the nineteenth century, China's traditional political and social structure was greatly weakened by a combination of internal and external forces. The combination of foreign aggression and domestic rebellion--as illustrated during the Opium wars[6] and the Taiping revolution[7]--was more than China's traditional political system could counteract. During the latter part of the nineteenth century and the first quarter of the twentieth century, China struggled to regain national sovereignty and to develop a new political and social system. In these unstable times, many of China's cultural treasures were either "stolen" or purchased[8] for export to the west. China did witness a brief burst of archaeological research from the mid-twenties through the mid-thirties. Then, the research

ceased because of further internal disruption caused by the Japanese invasion, the Second World War, and finally the last rounds of the Civil War. Research resumed in China only after the establishment of the People's Republic of China in 1949. Thus the exhibition promised more and new information on China's history to an eager western audience.

The Exhibition of Recent Archaeological Finds presented a glorious tribute to Chinese technological and artistic achievements. Nevertheless, the exhibition was more than a record of China's past, since its presentation revealed China's present too. China's internal political struggles influenced the negotiations, agreements, and interpretation of the exhibition. The terms of the initial cultural exchange agreements allowed for some leeway of interpretation by the exhibiting institutions of the host countries, France and Great Britain. Chinese dissatisfaction with certain aspects of the presentation in both cases, and a growing ideological controversy within China, resulted in dramatic changes in the wording of the agreements affecting both the presentation and interpretation in subsequent host countries. For the Chinese, the exhibition was a showcase, with a purpose of informing the general public of various western countries about the history and politics of China, according to the official Marxist-Leninist viewpoint of the People's Republic of China. The Chinese did not want the exhibition to provide a backdrop for western interpretations of Chinese history. Nevertheless, as the exhibition travelled about Europe, it became apparent there was also some debate within China about just what was the correct historical interpretation. Accordingly, China's politics and ideological struggles came to the forefront of negotiations. For the Chinese, the

past could not just be the past; history was to be re-interpreted and re-assessed in order to serve the needs of modern China. The following analysis of the terms of the agreements will illustrate the impact of China's political struggles upon the interpretation of her past, and her international relations. Particular attention will be paid to the negotiations between Canada and China for the exhibition. Reference to the negotiations between China and other countries will be made only in so far as they affected the terms of the Canada-China agreements.

Canada-China: Preliminary Efforts to Promote Cultural Exchanges

Efforts to initiate cultural exchanges between Canada and China were made even before official diplomatic relations were established. Suggestions to hold an exhibition of Chinese archaeological finds or a similar exhibition were made by Royal Ontario Museum officials to Canadian government officials in the mid-sixties. Cultural exchanges, as was argued, have a far-reaching and significant impact upon foreign relations by informing the general public of both countries about each other. In the case of Canada-China relations, this type of exchange would help to dispel many of the myths about China, under Communist rule. The first proposal came in a letter dated November 29, 1966 from Peter Swann, the Director of the Royal Ontario Museum, to Paul Martin, the Secretary of State for External Affairs.

> I appreciate that the lines of communication (between Canada and China) are very obscure but if the opportunity to hold an exhibition on "Recent Archaeological Discoveries in China" should present itself we would be interested in organizing it, and acting as sponsor. Such an exhibition could only take place after governmental contacts but it might provide a cultural bridge and I write to you merely

> in hope that you will keep the suggestion in mind should it be of wider value.[9]

Martin encouraged the Royal Ontario Museum to explore the channels for this type of exchange, even in the absence of official recognition, but he appreciated the difficulties:

> As you may know, it has long been the policy of the Government to encourage the development of contacts with Communist China in the cultural, scientific, educational and other fields as a means of contributing to the alleviation of that country's continuing isolation. There would probably, therefore, be no objection on our part to your seeking to organize and sponsor such an exhibition, even in the present circumstances in which there are no government-to-government contacts between the two countries.
>
> I note, however, that you have said that such an exhibition could take place only after governmental contacts were established. This, I assume, arises from some of the technical arrangements which would preclude the holding of the exhibition in the present circumstances. I shall, however bear this idea in mind.[10]

The absence of official relations at that time prevented the Canadian government from involving itself in the process for making arrangements for such an exchange. Nevertheless, it is interesting to note the minister and the government were encouraging such exchanges to improve Canada-China relations.

Two years later, Swann repeated his request in a letter of October 21, 1968 to Prime Minister Trudeau.[11] An exhibition seemed much more feasible since Trudeau, during his election campaign, had proposed Canada should recognize China.[12] Swann was anxious to remind the Canadian Government of the Royal Ontario Museum's long-standing interest in promoting a cultural exchange with China. A lot depended upon Trudeau keeping his election promise.

> In mainland China very intensive archaeological work has produced major discoveries of the greatest interest and significance for Chinese history.

> Due to diplomatic difficulties they have not been shown outside China.
>
> Sometime in the future the R.O.M. would like to plan a major exhibition of these discoveries from China. However, as you appreciate, this will depend upon the kind of diplomatic initiative which you envisaged in your election campaign. Certainly such an exhibition would be a notable first for Canada and an attraction which would bring visitors from all over the western world. It would have an inestimable value from the point of view of cultural exchange. . . .Thus I am anxious to know if there is any possibility of Canada recognising(sic) Communist China in the near future. Without this it would be useless to make even the preliminary moves.[13]

In order to begin negotiations for an exhibition, Canada's official recognition of the People's Republic of China was a necessary first step.

The interest in Canada-China cultural exchanges was shared by another group in Montreal. The Montreal group--whose members were Mlle. Legendre, Tibor Mende, Professor Paul T.K. Lin, and Jean Sarrazin--proposed holding an exhibition at the Terre des Hommes site in Montreal, with the possibility of presenting it later in Toronto or Vancouver.[14] This suggestion was also made to Prime Minister Trudeau in the fall of 1968. Trudeau, in reply, wanted to be certain that there would be reciprocity from the Chinese, and that the National Gallery be consulted.

> Vous vous souviendrez que Mlle. Legendre avait écrit au Premier ministre en novembre 1968 pour le mettre au courant d'un projet d'exposition intitulée "Cinq Mille ans de culture et de civilisation chinoise". Dans sa réponse le Premier ministre insistait sur trois points: assurer la réciprocité des echanges culturels avec la Chine, consulter la Galerie Nationale et tenir le Ministere au courant des développements majeurs de cette exposition.[15]

In a later meeting in Ottawa, Mlle. Legendre stressed that the objective

of the exhibition was "démystifier la Chine aux yeux des Canadiens et de la présenter à travers son historie d'une façon non politique."[16] Mlle. Legendre, however, was aware of the need to prevent such an exhibition from becoming a political showcase for Maoism.

> Le gouvernment canadien voudrait pour sa part étudier de très près les divers aspects du projet, y compris l'exigence de réciprocité auquel il tenait beaucoup. Il voudrait enfin s'assurer que l'entreprise ne sera pas utilisée aux fins de propagande Maoiste. Mlle. Legendre s'est dite très consciente de ces problèmes indiquant qu'elle n'entendait pas céder aux pressions des Chinois à cet égard mais s'en tenir à une exposition historique et culturelle exclusivement.[17]

Without the apparatus of official recognition, however, negotiations for this type of exchange could not be supported by the Canadian side without some assurance of reciprocity. As far as official recognition was concerned, Canada was awaiting, at that time, the outcome of negotiations underway in Stockholm, Sweden.[18]

The establishment of diplomatic relations between Canada and China in October, 1970 brought renewed requests for cultural exchanges. Swann reiterated R.O.M.'s wish to host an archaeological exhibition from the People's Republic of China, in a letter to Mitchell Sharp, Martin's successor at External Affairs, written the very day recognition was announced, October 13, 1970.[19] The National Art Gallery was also interested in setting up some possible exchanges of exhibitions, but noted the influence of ideology in China and acknowledged the importance of selecting a theme appropriate to China.

> Although we assume that for ideological reasons contemporary Canadian art will not be acceptable to China, it is just <u>possible</u> that they will be as curious and genuinely interested to see what

> contemporary Canadian art is like as we are to see Modern Chinese art.[20]

It is clear that the interested Canadian parties were aware of the potential influence of China's politics and ideology upon cultural exchanges.

The Royal Ontario Museum persisted in efforts to begin negotiations for an exhibition. In April, 1971, Dr. H.Y. Shih approached Arthur Andrew, the Director-General of the Bureau of Asian and Pacific Affairs and one of the Stockholm negotiators, hoping to visit colleagues in China informally, to help to promote an exchange.[21] Andrew advised Shih to contact the Chinese Embassy in Ottawa since the exact nature of cultural exchanges was still under discussion.

> While we are now giving preliminary consideration to the nature of the proposals we might wish to make to the Chinese Government regarding a possible agreement on cultural exchanges, which would be of mutual benefit to Canada and China, it is not possible to predict with any certainty when we might be able to conclude such an agreement.
>
> In the interim, I think you might find it useful to discuss your interests directly with the Chinese, ...
>
> We shall, of course, give careful consideration to the most appropriate way in which we might support your proposals for an exhibition of Chinese archaeological discoveries, and I should be grateful, therefore, if you would keep me informed about the progress of your representations.[22]

Subsequently, in September 1971, Shih presented the museum's proposals to the Chinese Ambassador, Huang Hua.[23] It was to become clear later that China regarded this type of exchange as one primarily from country to country--with the respective governments taking major responsibility--and not one at which an institution could be permitted such an independent role. This view by the Chinese may have been the source of

some of the later difficulties surrounding the presentation and the interpretation of the exhibition. In fact, the western tradition that makes public institutions such as museums independent of government direction in matters such as mode of presentation and interpretation of history, may have perplexed the Chinese.

With the establishment of official relations between the People's Republic of China and Canada, there was more optimism for the promotion and development of cultural exchanges. The Canadian government was limited in pursuing these exchange proposals until the Chinese government expressed an interest in these exchanges.[24] Nevertheless External Affairs forwarded to the Canadian Ambassador in Peking a list of the inquiries from Canadian artists and institutions hoping to be involved in Canada-China exchanges. The Royal Ontario Museum and the National Gallery were included on that list.[25] The Royal Ontario Museum was noted as repeatedly requesting the privilege of hosting an exhibition of archaeological finds from China, while the National Gallery hoped to exchange exhibitions with the People's Republic of China.[26]

According to the analysis in 1971 by the Canadian Ambassador in China, the efforts to promote cultural exchanges would have to wait until the political climate in China was more ideologically stable. The continuing influence of the Cultural Revolution was identified by the Canadian Ambassador as the chief obstacle hindering the promotion of cultural exchanges. For 1972-73, the Canadian government was limited also by a $50,000.00 budget for exchanges with the People's Republic of China.[27]

> As regards content, art is considered of value only insofar as it is didactic and "serves the People" (in particular, the workers and peasants). This

> principle naturally makes almost all western cultural exhibitions or performances here irrelevant or anathema. Organizationally, a further effect of the GCR has been to create a vacuum in the sphere of cultural relations with foreign countries. (One of the major casualties of the Cultural Revolution was, of course, the Commission for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries.)[28]

Even in casual conversations with Chinese officials, the Canadian Ambassador found the Chinese were quite vague about the cultural organization. The Canadian Ambassador was optimistic however, about the possibilities of China sending the Peking Opera or art exhibitions abroad. At this time, the French had just started preliminary investigations into the possibility of hosting the exhibition of archaeological finds.[29] Members of the Canadian embassy were among the foreign delegations to see the archaeological exhibition which was "opened first to Mr. Kissinger."[30] The Canadian visitors to the exhibition concluded that the visit of the exhibition to Canada would be worthwhile. The Chinese remained quite vague and non-committal.[31]

On an official visit to Peking in August 1972, Mitchell Sharp put forward a formal Canadian request for the exhibition, and obtained an "agreement in principle" from the Chinese government.[32] This agreement was reaffirmed the next year when Prime Minister Trudeau visited China in October.[33] The final agreements on the exhibition, came only after rather complicated and protracted negotiations. Canada had to wait its turn to begin negotiations with the Chinese; negotiations had begun in sequence with the other countries that had requested the exhibition before Canada. To some degree, this procedure worked both for and against Canada. On the one hand, Canada was able to draw on the experiences of the other nations that had finished or were in the

process of negotiating for the exhibition; but on the other hand Canada was to be stymied on certain issues because of Chinese dissatisfaction with the precedents established by other nations.

Precedents affecting the Canadian Negotiations: The British and the French

The policy of consultation among the various interested nations was acknowledged if not encouraged by the Chinese. For example, the Chinese originally intended to provide Canada with copies of the China-Great Britain and China-France agreements.[34] Yet this promise was not kept[35] perhaps because the Chinese realized the "grapevine" of the foreign service would provide the information, or maybe they hesitated because they were unhappy with some aspects of the negotiations and final agreements, with the French and the British. Whatever the reasons for the Chinese reluctance, Canada came to rely on the British for leads in the negotiations and other matters affecting the exhibition.

The British and the French established many of the precedents affecting the exhibition in the agreements, the content, the presentation, the marketing and the catalogue. Indeed it was they who approached the Chinese with the suggestion for an exhibition and it was they who were given the privilege of choosing the artifacts for the exhibition from a selection of pieces provided by the Chinese. Of these items, the British and the French chose more silver pieces and fewer of the bronzes, which the Chinese valued much more. They also insisted upon the inclusion of original items rather than copies. This point was accepted by an authority in these cultural matters, Kuo Mo-jo, chairman of the Chinese Academy of Sciences. The British and French organizers

limited the number of items, out of consideration of exhibition space and out of preference for what they considered would be the exhibition highlights, specifically items from the Tang, Sung and Yuan dynasties.[36] Although there were differences over the selection and the number of artifacts (finally, about 400 items); the Chinese remained firm about the amount of floor space required for an adequate and secure presentation--specifically 2000 square meters. The British, however, felt they could display everything adequately within the 1500 square meters of the Royal Academy.[37] Although the significance of the exhibition was not underestimated by any of the parties, Chinese insistence upon the size of the exhibition and over all floor space foreshadowed some of the later difficulties with regard to presentation. Eventually, the Chinese had opinions about the purpose and layout of the exhibition. The exhibition had to illustrate the historical development of China according to Marxist interpretation. As the first exhibition of its type to come from the People's Republic of China, its significance as a public relations tool could not be underestimated.

Nevertheless these political and ideological objectives of the Chinese were not firmly set when the French and the British made their preparations for the exhibition negotiations. Instead they were left to speculate about what was the most important issue in their negotiations with the Chinese. The British felt the Chinese agreement to the exhibition depended primarily upon the settlement of transportation costs. The British and the French decided to share the costs of transportation and idemnification from Peking to London and Paris, equally. The Chinese permitted each country to display the exhibition

four months and thus be better able to recover some of the costs.[38]

For the British, the next point of concern was how to recoup the huge costs of transportation and of the indemnity.[39] The Chinese may not have taken this capitalistic viewpoint completely into consideration. They differed with the British over the profitability of the exhibition; but they did not wish to be involved in this aspect of the matter.

> The Chinese in their negotiations with the British seemed convinced that Britain would realize substantial profits from the exhibition. In fact, the British expect that breaking even will be difficult; as an (sic) negotiating ploy the British offered to provide the Chinese with any profits if the Chinese were prepared to absorb any losses involved. This met with the not unexpected response that the Chinese were not interested in "Western Capitalistic Arrangements."[40]

Working with a budget of 400,000 pounds, the British exhibitors regarded admission and catalogue sales as their main sources of revenue. They anticipated breaking even, based upon their previous experience with the Tutankhamen Exhibition. Little did they know that Jade fever would outdo Tut fever. Motivated by a similar concern for profits, all the exhibitors were concerned with making the product--the Chinese Exhibition--as appealing as possible to the tastes of a western audience. This was not a concern of the Chinese who put politics first. The "best seller" British catalogue became a bone of contention for subsequent negotiators when the Chinese demanded more control over all the aspects of presentation of the exhibition.

The sensitivities of the Chinese can also be noted in their negotiations with the French. The smallest issues became complicated because the Chinese accompanying the exhibition lacked the authority to

make decisions. The French had to assure the Chinese of every detail of the exhibition's preparation and to attend carefully to questions of protocol and diplomacy. The Chinese took a position of take it or leave it in the negotiations--a position the French largely accepted.[41] The Chinese appeared determined to retain control over the arrangements for the exhibition.

The precedents established by the French and the British in the agreements, and in the exhibition displays became the guidelines and points of reference in later negotiations. Because of these precedents, Canada could not influence the contents of the exhibition or the Chinese terms of loan.[42] Furthermore, the Chinese retained the prerogative of making changes up to the last moment.

Canada-China Negotiations:

Although the official Canadian request for the exhibition had been made in 1972, final agreements were only reached on March 15, 1974,[43] with the signing of an inter-governmental agreement, and on April 16, 1974,[44] with the signing of an inter-agency agreement. Negotiations took place in Peking and in Ottawa.

One of the first issues that had to be resolved, in the Canada-China negotiations, was which exhibition? By now, the Chinese had two exhibitions for circulation--one that was sent to Japan and consisting primarily of bronzes and the one that was sent to London and Paris. Canada had already received some commitment that the exhibition being sent to London and Paris, would be sent to Canada. Under the burden of so many requests for that exhibition, however the

Chinese began in late 1972 to suggest some alternatives. By November, China was becoming evasive about its prior commitment. A representative of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs told the Canadian Ambassador that the Chinese had not decided if Canada would definitely be included among the nations to host this exhibition.[45] The exhibition was already slated to be in Paris and London for two to three months each, and with other commitments in Europe the Chinese were concerned about this collection being abroad for over a year.[46] The Canadian Ambassador reminded the Chinese of Canadian interest in Chinese history, but the Chinese expressed some anxieties over the security of the exhibition because of excessive transit.[47] This polite hedging on a direct commitment foreshadowed some of the future difficulties. In December 1972, however, the Chinese acknowledged that the exhibit would definitely go to Canada, but the exhibition would have to be scheduled for late 1974 or early 1975, rather than late 1973 or early 1974, as had been originally suggested.[48] The Chinese had now decided to meet some of the additional European requests with another exhibit rather than prolonging the European tour of the flying horse and Princess Tou Wan's jade suit.

In meetings of April 1973,[49] however the Chinese repeated their strong concern for the security of the artifacts.[50] According to the Chinese, the artifacts had been subjected to undue wear, with frequent packings and unpackings. Although the Chinese seemed to be willing to placate Canadian requests for the first North American showing, before any exhibit in the United States,[51] they could not reassure Canada of its original choice of exhibitions. In August 1973, the Chinese asked Canada to consider an exhibition that was sent to Japan.[52] This

alternative exhibition was said to contain a jade suit and some items recently excavated at Ma Wangdui in Hunan.[53] Canada expressed disappointment but felt the choice of which exhibition would be made by the Chinese.

By now, however, the Americans became a factor. The Chinese had approached the Americans, with a choice of the Tokyo exhibit for the fall of 1974 or the European exhibit for early 1975.[54] According to a Canadian report on the negotiations between the Americans and the Chinese, the Americans indicated a preference for the quality of the European exhibition. (Curiously, the Americans were also informed the European exhibition would have to be returned to China for inspection before commencing a North American tour.)[55] The Canadian negotiators were left to conclude that the:

> . . .Chinese are stalling on making firm proposal to us until Americans have replied. While we will get exhibit first, choice of exhibit will apparently be up to Americans.[56]

This desire to cater to the Americans was rather irksome to Canada because there were still no full diplomatic relations between the U.S. and China. The effort, however, may have been made for that reason. Princess Tou Wan's goodwill tour was giving China an opportunity to counter long time animosity built up by the Nationalist China Lobby and the right wing of American politics and press, against the People's Republic of China. Hence, in spite of its prior recognition of China, Canada seemed to be relegated a position subordinate to the U.S..

Fortunately, both the Americans and the Canadians shared the same preference for the exhibit that was sent to London and Paris. The choice of the European exhibit was significant both from a cultural

and a financial standpoint.[57] Nevertheless although the Americans chose the "European Collection," they felt they could press for more from the Chinese. Because of the lateness of the U.S. showings, the Americans planned to request the exhibition "be augmented by the best items in the Tokyo collection and priceless objects known by the Freyer(sic) gallery to be in China."[58] The Americans hoped to show the exhibition in three cities with the American premiere at the National Gallery in Washington.[59] Although the Chinese tried earlier to promote the choice of the Japanese exhibition by Canada, they later expressed their "pleasure" and agreement with the American preference for the European exhibit.[60] One can not help but sense that regardless of the motives, the Chinese employed a double standard in the negotiations.

Along with ~~determining~~ which exhibition, Canadian negotiators were concerned that the exhibition's first stop in North America should be Toronto rather than Washington. Although the Canadians had received some confirmation from the Chinese that the exhibition would be held in Canada first, contradictions on other issues made the Canadians seek explicit reassurances. The opening of the exhibition at the Royal Ontario Museum before any opening in the Eastern United States was not just a matter of national pride, it was an economic necessity. Indeed many visitors to the exhibition in Canada would come from the Eastern United States. Profits would go to the museum and to Toronto. Thus, being first on the North American itinerary and the length of allotted exhibition time became issues of prime importance to the exhibition organizers at the Royal Ontario Museum.

Along with trying to resolve other issues, Canadian negotiators

briefly strove to have a second Canadian city, namely Vancouver because of its large Chinese community, included on the tour itinerary.[61] Instead during a meeting in early April between Canadian Ambassador Small and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Deputy Head of the Information Department, Madame Chang Ying, only confirmed that the exhibition would be sent to Canada.[62] Issues became more complicated when she noted that there had not been a decision whether the "exhibition would travel first to Canada or the U.S.A.".[63] The concerns for the security of the artifacts were mentioned to discourage the request for a second Canadian showing. The exhibition policy was outlined as:

> . . . one city per country. . .because Chinese archaeological authorities were concerned for the survival of exhibits in good condition. These were priceless and authorities wished to reduce minimum number of times exhibit would be packed, unpacked, shipped etc.[64]

Chang Ying, however, agreed to submit Canada's requests for precedence over the United States, and a second Canadian showing but she

> . . .was not hopeful early answer would be forthcoming because Ministry of Foreign Affairs (was) only one of those involved in decision making.[65]

She also remained non-commital on the Canadian request for an extension in exhibit time, but as Ambassador Small noted she

> . . .appeared to accept need (which I had put at four months per city) for fairly lengthy period to recoup costs, she personally seemed impressed with argument that Secretary of State for External Affairs agreement with Chi Peng-Fei took precedence over subsequent Kissinger request.[66]

In the absence of guarantees, Small recommended that Ottawa make a "high level pitch in Ottawa"[67] to the Chinese Ambassador, since a "decision in Canada's favour"[68] remained doubtful. According to Small,

the possibility of a second Canadian showing was

> . . .even less likely, though size of U.S.A. and Canada and fact that their Pacific coasts are en route home might persuade them to relent on what up to now has been firm principle of exhibiting in only one city per country.[69]

In spite of the stipulation of one city per country and concerns about the fragility of the artifacts, the Americans did manage later to have the same exhibition in three American cities--Washington, Kansas City and San Francisco. Thus the potential for the political dividends of improved Sino-American relations, as a result of the exhibition, seemed to fortify the artifacts and allow for other exceptions to the rules. Consequently, Canadian negotiators had to compete to a certain degree to obtain some firm commitments from the Chinese about the exhibition. Canada's official recognition of the People's Republic of China paid some dividends, when in May 1973, the Chinese Foreign Minister, Mr. Chiao Kuan-hua:

> . . .confirmed Exhibition would be mounted in Canada before U.S.A. since of course we have full diplomatic relations, ...[70]

Besides dealing with the unexpected complication of where and which exhibition would be held, Canada also pressed for an extension of the exhibition's stay. When the exhibition was sent to London and Paris, both cities were allotted four months of exhibition time to recover their costs. The time proposed for Canada was reduced to three months.[71] Ottawa felt this proposal was discriminatory but Canadian officials were also concerned because of the financial considerations for the Royal Ontario Museum. The time limitation prompted Canada to drop the request for a second showing in Vancouver

because the Chinese indicated that no extra time would be allotted for a second visit.[72] Canada had to pay a price for the North American premiere. Perhaps Canada could have pressed for a second Canadian showing, if Canadian negotiators had entered into a cost sharing agreement for transportation with the United States. One can only speculate whether such arrangements would have cost Canada the premiere.

Timing was also a problem for Sweden, the host country, immediately prior to Canada. The Swedes were surprised by the Chinese decision to limit the length of exhibition time. In June 1973, the Swedes were hoping to make arrangements for a four month stay. Their primary concern was re-arranging the schedule to counter any loss of revenue due to summer vacations.[73] By October 1973, however, the Chinese were determined to limit the exhibition time both for Sweden and Austria. The length of the exhibition time was correlated with transportation costs. When the Swedes argued they should have the same time as the French and the British, the Chinese countered with the argument

> . . .that the French and British have allowed a longer run because they had to bear a heavier transportation cost.[74]

Consequently Canadian negotiators in Peking pressed for more exhibition time "on grounds of the transport costs" to cross the Atlantic.[75] When Canada proposed this transportation cost argument, the Chinese replied a twenty day extension would be "very difficult."[76] Canada's transportation costs were not exactly comparable with those of the British and the French.

> British and French had to transport Peking-Paris-London which totalled 10,000 miles or 5,000 miles each. Canada would have to transport exhibition from Stockholm to Toronto which Chinese estimated to be only 4,000 miles.[77]

Final Chinese objections to time extensions appear to have been based on their own "grand plan"[78] and wish not to have the exhibition "abroad for too long."[79] In the end the Canadian side obtained a short extension of ten days but only when the Chinese were pressing for an agreement.[80]

The Indemnity

Another major issue in negotiations was the indemnity required to guarantee the security of the artifacts. Articles covering the security of the artifacts were in both agreements that every country signed for the exhibition. As with other matters, Canada drew upon the experiences of other nations in order to prepare its own proposals. Estimating the value of irreplaceable artifacts was difficult and the Chinese proposed various figures ranging from fifty million to one hundred million yuan ($25-$50 million Canadian) to different host nations.[81] Every nation found the valuation figure quite staggering especially when trying to obtain adequate insurance coverage or in considering a government indemnity.

As the first host of the exhibition, the French were the first to cope with indemnity and security issues. The French found the Chinese terms quite rigid, even "draconian."[82] Specifically the French had to accept responsibility for the costs of transport, insurance, and indemnification from the time the exhibit left Peking until it left Paris for the next destination.[83] Additional costs to be paid by the French covered the mounting of the exhibition.[84] Finally, the French

had to provide the Chinese side with "an account of security arrangements" for the exhibition and the Chinese reserved the final right of approval.[85] These conditions had to be met before any further negotiations could take place. Although the terms must have been accepted, the Chinese side later expressed dissatisfaction with many aspects of their exhibition in Paris.[86]

The British, co-sponsored along with the French, the transportation of the exhibition on the first leg of its tour.[87] In the French case, the state totally financed the exhibition. In the British case, the British government assumed the costs of the indemnity while the exhibition sponsors, The Times Group, covered the costs of transportation.[88] The British were also able to negotiate with the Chinese on the valuation figure by lowering the figure from fifty million pounds to ten million pounds.[89] There were some complications in the British negotiations with the Chinese concerning the indemnity and the British apparently strove to obtain an agreement to reciprocity.[90] The major complication concerning the indemnity appeared to be in the translation and interpretation of the terms of insurance. The British found:

> . . .the Chinese had little understanding of nuance and terminology particularly relating to insurance. It took several weeks of protracted and difficult debate with the Chinese before a text in English that was acceptable to both sides was concluded upon.[91]

In the final analysis, the terms of responsibility were quite specific according to the circumstances of loss or damage:

> . . .in the event of total loss of all the items through natural disaster, e.g. an aeroplane crash, the Chinese will be responsible for 50% of the loss

> and the Government under whose charge the exhibition is at such time will be responsible for the other 50%. . . .The Government in charge of the exhibition is responsible for damage or loss to each individual item up to 100%.[92]

The Austrians were given a valuation figure of 100 million yuan.[93] Similar to other host countries, the Austrians found the valuation quite high and hoped to be able to negotiate a reduction in order to reduce insurance costs.[94] The Austrians also considered approaching the British and the French on a cost sharing arrangment on transport, insurance and the catalogue.[95] Eventually, the Austrian government decided to accept the risk of guaranteeing the exhibit, thereby avoiding the expense of the insurance premium.[96] This decision may have been prompted to some degree by the competition from the Danes, who also hoped to host the exhibition.[97] The representatives of the People's Republic of China wanted prompt "and satisfactory assurances on insurance, shipping and handling"[98] of the exhibition.

For the Swedes, the indemnity required an amendment to their laws for insuring the property of another country Usually, the Swedish government would have taken out an insurance policy to cover the risks, but as in the Austrian case, the unusually high premium prompted the Swedes to opt for guaranteeing the indemnity.[99] This approach to the indemnity was not anticipated in the existing legal apparatus of Sweden, consequently, the Swedes decided to amend the legislation to accommodate the situation.[100]

By acquiring this background information on other nation's experiences, the Canadian side knew more of what to expect in their own negotiations. Drawing upon French and British experience, negotiators

in Ottawa were not certain that the Canadian government would be able to accept all of the Chinese conditions for the exhibition.[101] The Canadian government considered the matter carefully from all the financial and legal standpoints, as expressed by External Affairs, the Justice Department, the Treasury Board and the Royal Ontario Museum. The Chinese side set a value of fifty million dollars on the exhibition for which the Royal Ontario Museum was quoted a premium price of 350,000 dollars for an all risk insurance policy.[102] Of course the Museum needed some assistance from the Canadian government in order to sponsor the exhibition. The Canadian side had to explore the existing legal policies to support such an indemnity or to provide adequate insurance. Since the Chinese considered the exhibition to be the result of a government to government agreement, they considered the host governments to be the prime agents responsible for the security of the artifacts. With this position in mind, the Canadian side felt it was necessary to reconsider the government's position since any insurance policy would be unlikely to provide full recompense, in the event of any loss.

> In view of this we consider that it would be essential that some form of legislative backing i.e. a parliamentary vote in the estimates, should be obtained to cover this potentially very large Canadian government undertaking to indemnify.[103]

Regardless of the means of coverage, the Canadian government had to be prepared "to guarantee the collection at the valuation fixed by the Chinese."[104] Consultations among the concerned government departments proposed several possibilities of dealing with the issue. The Legal Advisory Division suggested two alternatives--either to accept

responsibility or to take out an all risk insurance policy.[105] In the opinion of the Advisory Division and International Law section, the use of an all risk insurance policy was preferable to a government indemnity.[106]

Insurance was costly although it offered the most secure option financially.

> The premium, an unconfirmed $200,000. is high and funds for this purpose would have to be requested from Treasury Board. Nevertheless if one of the carriers were to crash the Federal Government would have incurred a liability to the People's Republic of China of $12,500,000. The crash of both planes would obviously double this amount.[107]

The Canadian side wanted to resolve the indemnity issue before the Prime Minister's trip to China in October 1973, in case there was to be a confirmation of the exhibition during his visit.[108] As time was short the Secretary of State urged the Treasury Board to secure the exhibition.[109]

There remained some doubts whether the issue should have been decided in Parliament. This concern grew out of a belief that existing administrative machinery could not cope with the demands of the indemnity.[110] As a result, the Department of Finance recommended an arrangement, to avoid obtaining Parliamentary approval.

> . . "the most expeditious manner of handling the matter would be to obtain Cabinet approval to enter into an agreement with the People's Republic of China to, inter alia, indemnify that country against loss or damage to the exhibits. If necessary Parliamentary approval for payment could be obtained if such should be required."[111]

The Treasury Board finally opted for the purchase of insurance according to the following conditions:

> (a) the Honourable the Secretary of State for External Affairs be authorized to give the necessary assurance of indemnity to the Chinese Government;
> (b) such assurance be provided by the purchase of "nail to nail" insurance at a cost not to exceed $200,000;
> (c) the Chinese Government be invited to select the insurance company or at least concur in the selection: and
> (d) the Department of External Affairs make every effort to have the Royal Ontario Museum reimburse the Federal Government for the cost of insurance for the period during which the collection is at the ROM.[112]

In due course, the exhibition took place without incident which was particularly fortunate since the exhibition was not insured from "the time the wheels started to move on the Toronto tarmac until the aircraft reached American airspace."[113] Admittedly, it was only uninsured for about ten to fifteen minutes but in the light of all the other efforts to secure the exhibition, it seemed to be an unnecessary risk.

Exhibition Format

A further issue for negotiation was the format of the exhibition. Both Canadian government and museum officials drew upon the experiences of other countries to plan their strategy for negotiating a format for the exhibit. Many of the problems in the negotiations and arrangements for the exhibition in Canada stemmed from China's ideological difficulties and dissatisfaction with the presentations in other countries. Chinese dissatisfaction with the London exhibit became a case in point. Thus, fair or not Canada was pre-judged on the basis of precedents set by others.

The influence of China's internal politics and ideological struggles upon China's terms for the inter-governmental and inter-agency agreements became evident in discussions about the official title, the

museum presentation, and finally the catalogue. The official title for the exhibition became the first contentious issue. The British had entitled the exhibition--The Genius of China--the title also used for the official souvenir catalogue. The Chinese took exception to the word "Genius"[114]--as in innate genius--since it was taken to refer to Lin Piao, a former minister of defense and former designated successor to Chairman Mao, subsequently labeled a capitalist in Hsinhua articles criticizing Lin Piao and Confucius.[115] During the anti-Confucius anti Lin Piao Campaigns that began in late 1973 and continued into 1974, the factions of radicals and revisionists engaged in a bitter ideological struggle, that affected both China's internal policies and China's external relations. The word "genius" recalled the power and influence of the scholarly ruling class in traditional China and smacked of revisionism. Many of China's scholars were sent out to the countryside, during the Cultural Revolution, to engage in manual labor in order to counter any possible resurgence of elitism. Thus, "genius" aggravated some of the contradictory tensions of a Communist society inheriting the cultural legacy of China's ruling dynasties. Officially, for the Chinese government, the exhibit's artifacts represented the artistry and skill of the working classes throughout China's history. The layout of the exhibition was intended to convey the development of China's society in terms that would instruct the audience that China's peak of social and cultural development had come under the Communist system. According to the Chinese, the British title did not convey the appropriate interpretation of China's past.

Chinese dissatisfaction on this point surfaced in demands for revisions in subsequent agreements. Striking differences can be noted upon a comparison of the different wordings of Article I of the Inter-agency Agreements. Sharing a similar wording, the British, French and Swedish texts allowed for considerable liberty in the arrangement of the exhibition. The British text states the British side would "give all due consideration to the views of the Chinese side as to the arrangement of the Exhibition."[116] The draft presented to Canada by the Chinese was much more specific and inflexible. Proposed revisions to Article I specified that the Canadians "shall not make any changes in the names of exhibits, charts, captions and order of display prescribed by the Chinese side."[117] According to Canadian officials this "escalation in terminology"[118] was the result of the Chinese experience with the British exhibitors. In London the exhibition was in the hands of private organizers, who entitled the exhibition "The Genius of China" and laid out the exhibition according to the specifications of their own designer.[119] In view of the Chinese reaction, the British were concerned about the possibility that China would exercise full powers of reciprocity by giving a British exhibit "tit for tat treatment" by decribing it "in terms more ideologically pleasing to" the Chinese. Nevertheless China's negative experience tended to affect their perspective when it came to making more arrangements. Indeed Chinese dissatisfaction with the British presentation also prompted the Chinese to put everything in writing concerning the exhibition, thereby allowing little leeway of interpretation for the subsequent exhibitors.[120]

Canadian efforts to argue for revisions only brought out

more of China's objections to previous agreements and presentations. In particular, China's negative impressions of the British interpretation of the exhibition were frequently reiterated. Canada, therefore, tried for the Swedish formula which stated: "will give the highest consideration to the views of the Chinese."[121] These efforts by the Canadian side were prompted out of consideration of the benefits for the Canadian exhibitors and, curiously, for the United States. The U.S. Embassy in Ottawa was hoping the Canadians would not accept a more stringent wording since it would set an even more awkward precedent for U.S. negotiations on the agreements that were still to come. To achieve more leverage, the Canadian negotiators instructed by Ottawa to remind the Chinese of the potential effects of reciprocity on the proposed Canadian Landscape Exhibition that was to visit China. Through these efforts Canada hoped to obtain for the Royal Ontario Museum some sense of security that their arrangement of the exhibition would not be subjected to a Chinese veto.[122]

The Royal Ontario Museum wanted some flexibility to ensure the creation and promotion of a marketable exhibition. Although the exhibition's artifacts could have drawn an audience on their own merits alone, the packaging of the exhibit to suit western tastes probably helped to draw even larger crowds. Thus, the Royal Ontario Museum strove to create an exhibition layout that would appeal to Canadian tastes as well as satisfy the ideological standards of the Chinese. To this end an alternative title, partially based on one used by Hsia Nai in the Chinese publication, China Reconstructs, was proposed: "The Chinese Exhibition: Archaeological Finds in New China."[123]

Canadian negotiators in Peking doubted that much flexibility could be obtained in Article I of the Interagency Agreement because of the impressions created by the London exhibition.[124] As a result, they recommended the following compromise wording.

> The Canadian side shall not make any changes in names and order of display prescribed by Chinese side. . . .[125]

The Chinese were determined that the problems with the London exhibition would not have an opportunity to recur. This stance unfortunately cast aspersions upon both the professional capacity of the Royal Ontario Museum and the integrity of the Canadian government. The position put considerable strain upon diplomatic relations. Nevertheless, the Chinese refused to accept Canadian protests about being judged by, and penalized for the mistakes made in another country.

Chinese concerns with all aspects of the museum presentation came out as discussions continued between the Canadian and Chinese parties. The Royal Ontario Museum appeared to be quite willing to comply with most of the Chinese requests, with their assurances to preserve the "information content" of the maps and charts.[126] The Royal Ontario Museum however, wanted to retain some leeway in the agreements to allow them to make stylistic improvements on the presentation, by using their own graphics format instead of the material provided by the Chinese.[127] Nevertheless, because of the need for lead-in time, a museum official stated the Museum could not "accept position of ultimate Chinese veto rights on question of graphics, form and content."[128] To prevent any dispute, the Royal Ontario Museum planned to draw its supplementary information from recent Chinese government

publications.[129] The Chinese consistently reiterated a concern that any flexibility would allow for another situation to develop like the London exhibit.

The confusion of the negotiations was only exacerbated by the conflicting viewpoints of the Chinese themselves, as illustrated by discussions about the graphics accompanying the exhibit. The Royal Ontario Museum wanted to make their own graphics based on the Chinese. Specifically, the Canadian side was concerned that this slight alteration might be mis-interpreted. They took the position that there was a connection with Article I on presentation; but discussions on this point broke off with an "agreement to disagree to the relevance of supplementary graphic material to the presentation of the exhibition."[130]

Canadian concerns about these finer points of interpretation were supported later when the Deputy Head of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs stressed the terms of Article I. He particularly emphasized the title could not be changed.[131] The benchmark of these discussions was the British experience and the Chinese decided to push a revised wording of Article I--"shall not make any changes in the name of the exhibition, charts"--in all subsequent negotiations such as those with the Romanians.[132] The Canadians responded by stressing that unlike Britain, Canada was trying to avoid such mis-understandings by informing the Chinese of presentation plans before the signing of the agreements.[133] But despite these assurances that a situation like the British experience would not be repeated in Canada, the Chinese were quite firm on their proposals for Article I.[134]

Regardless of Canadian efforts to pledge determination to meet the Chinese ideological standards, the Chinese felt they had to retain the right to veto the exhibition. In an effort to retain some control of the presentation and to quell the Chinese threat to veto the Canadian version of the exhibition, Canada's External Affairs Department suggested raising the issue of reciprocity if necessary and to claim the right to veto the Chinese presentation of the future Canadian Landscape painting exhibition in China.[135] Although the R.O.M. presented much of their exhibition plans before the signing of the agreements, it was apparent that some leeway or understanding was needed concerning the presentation. The quality of the presentation in all its aspects, was the responsibility of the host institution. Thus both the reputation and integrity of the museum was at stake. The Royal Ontario Museum needed some firm assurance that the exhibition would be held to guarantee their already sizeable investment in the project. The request was reasonable, since the Royal Ontario Museum, a professional institution, made every effort to accommodate both the ideological and historical viewpoints of the Chinese.[136]

Canadian efforts to amend the proposed wording of Article I of the inter-agency agreement were prodigious. Nevertheless, as the struggle continued, Chinese resolution to retain the wording remained firm. Canada's External Affairs instructed Canadian officials in Peking to refuse to accept the application of the new wording that was developed for the alternative exhibition that was going to Romania.

> We continue to consider that Canada can not accept anything less than wording agreed with Swedes. . . .Acceptance by Romanians of Chinese-

> Romanian agreement related to a separate and different exhibition.[137]

As a final alternative, Canada was to offer:

> . . .the exhibition shall be entitled. . .The Exhibition of Archaeological Finds of the People's Republic of China. . .and the Canadian side undertakes to consult closely with, and give highest consideration to views of, Chinese side, as to its arrangement. . . .[138]

These efforts proved to be of no avail.

The Chinese viewpoint on the wording of Article I remained unchanged despite Canadian protests of the lack of trust. The Deputy Director of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs replied that the:

> . . . .wording had been carefully considered by Chinese side and they had decided it would be in all future agreements on archaeological exhibitions. He apologized, if Canada felt wording indicated lack of trust. This was certainly not the case. In future all countries would be given same wording in agreements of archaeological exhibitions. Even in Swedish case, although Article I has old wording, Chinese side had had a verbal understanding based on new wording.[139]

The Royal Ontario Museum was concerned about the degree to which the wording of the agreement would be enforced and they were particularly concerned about the threat of a veto over the matter of presentation.[140] Indeed the financial commitment made by the Royal Ontario Museum and Canadian national prestige made the Canadian side quite concerned about the threat of veto. Finally, Chinese "insistence that all decisions and questions of disagreement be referred to Peking at every stage,"[141] was proving to be quite awkward in the agreements for the exhibition.

These concerns about the veto were not unjustified. In subsequent meetings, the Chinese became even more emphatic about

this issue in terms of Article I affecting the presentation.

> Title cannot be changed. Information on charts cannot be changed. Introduction to each part of exhibition cannot be changed. We have arranged exhibit according to the development of our history. If you make a mistake in order, then you will create disorder.
>
> Other matters relating to presentation are technical matters, they should be in harmony with content of exhibition. I believe Canadian experts and personnel concerned can do it well in my opinion our Embassy in Ottawa can solve any questions which might arise. Only in very rare cases would they need to refer matters to Peking.[142]

Because of the veto threat, the Royal Ontario Museum, remained concerned about Chinese acceptance of any technical adjustments to the exhibition's presentation. The Chinese concern with harmony is a goal of traditional Chinese philosophy, however in this case, the Chinese were interested in demonstrating that their current ideology was the logical outcome of China's past. This objective had not been attained in the British exhibition. The concern at home in China with China's image abroad also prompted the implementation of a new agreement for the exhibition. The "radicals" within China's leadership demanded the Marxist interpretation of the traditional history of China be clearly presented. Canada's acceptance of these new terms was reluctant and conditional.[143] Canada requested that any problems, with few exceptions, encountered in the post agreement period be dealt with quickly in Ottawa. In an effort to reassure the Canadian side, the Chinese Foreign Office repeated that problems could be referred to the Embassy in Ottawa or to the Chinese accompanying the exhibition or to Peking where there would be a quick response.[144] Unfortunately, the concerned parties in China did not want to take any final responsibility and the Embassy staff

were unable to make any final decisions. Although the Chinese were dissatisfied, they were not always specific in their criticisms until it was too late to deal with them effectively.

Thus as this discussion has illustrated, and as will be expanded in a later chapter, China's internal politics influenced the terms of their international agreements. The hesitation and reluctance of Chinese officials however to identify all the specific problems prompting their criticisms only created more tensions. This indecision also indicated the degree of controversy within China about ideological questions. The officials in Foreign Affairs were not in charge of cultural policy. The old lines were incorrect, but no one could identify the correct new line. In the Canada-China negotiations, the most difficult issue to be resolved was the text of the catalogue, as the following chapter will indicate.

NOTES

1. The Department of External Affairs, Historical Division, Archeo-P.R.C. 67-7 Vol.1, Telegram from Paris 3121, to External Affairs Ottawa, September 12, 1973.
The French agreements with China differed from the format of the rest since the Sino-French agreements consisted of three accords:
   A) D'abord un accord de gouvernement à gouvernement signé par Laurent d'une part et par L'Ambassadeur Chinois à Paris de l'epoque d'autre part.
   B) Ensuite un accord entre l'association Française d'Action Artistique (que dirige Burgaud) et le Musée du Palsis(sic) de Pekin signé par Burgaud et le directeur de ce musée.
   C) Enfin un cit(sic) protocole fincit(sic) entre l'association Française d'Action Artistique et le Comité Chinois competent en la matière.

   Translation:
   A) To begin with a government to government agreement signed on one part by Laurent and on the other part by the Chinese Ambassador to Paris.
   B) Then, an agreement between the French Association of Artistic Action (that directed Burgaud) and the Palace Museum of Peking signed by Burgaud and the director of this museum.
   C) Finally a summons of protocol agreed upon between the French Association of Artistic Action and the Chinese Committee, expert in the matter.

2. Ibid. Telegram from The Canadian Embassy, Peking to the Undersecretary of State for External Affairs, Ottawa, March 1, 1973.
Each agreement covered different aspects as was stated in information forwarded to Ottawa:
   The inter-governmental agreement set out the broad principles and the inter-agency agreement covered the technical details.

3. The Great Chinese Art Exhibition was held at the Royal Academy in London from November 28 to March 7, 1935-36. The exhibition collection drew upon many sources of Chinese artifacts from China, ". . . America, Japan and several European countries." (The Illustrated London News, November 23, 1935, p.945), as well as the Queen's own collection of Chinese materials. The Chinese contribution consisted of a ". . .large and precious collection of Imperial treasures from the Forbidden City lent by the Chinese Government. . ." (The Illustrated London News, November 30, 1935, p.985).
Details on this London exhibition can be found in these two articles:
   1. C.Y. Tseng (Miss), "Her Majesty's Gracious Loan to the Chinese Art Exhibition: Exquisite Carvings in Lacquer and Canton Enamel," The Illustrated London News, November 23, 1935, p.945.
   2. "The great Chinese Art Exhibition: A Comprehensive Collection of the Arts of China," The Illustrated London News, November 30, 1935, pp.985-996.

4. This issue was discussed in a book review analyzing "New Archaeological Finds in China" and "Historical Relics Unearthed in China." The article also describes the manipulation of data to serve Western propaganda purposes:

> "Red Guards Burn China's History." It was around 1966-67, when the cultural revolution in China was at its peak, that Life magazine was able to get away with printing that sort of caption under a two-page garish colour photograph of a pagoda in China burning down, with a long line of Red Guards standing in front of it. Only the most determined reader could have been expected to notice that every tenth figure in the line was carrying a pail, and the Red Guards had in fact formed a bucket brigade to try to put out the fire."
> from: B. Lord, "Let the Past Serve the Present," The Canadian Forum, September 1974, pp.26-27.

Nevertheless, some destruction of historical relics did take place since Dick Wilson cites the efforts of Chou En-lai to contain some of the excesses of the Cultural Revolution.

> "He (Chou En-lai) ordered the saving of historically significant temples from destruction by radicals. On the long-distance telephone he talked a young zealot out of destroying the historic heritage of the garden city of Hangzhou."
> from: Dick Wilson, Chou The Story of Zhou En-lai (London: Hutchinson, 1984), p.246.

5. One of the many examples of a Western source on this topic is the article by A. Gutkind Bulling, "China, Archaeological Excavations 1966-1971." Ms. Bulling also notes the contradictions between the accounts in Western and Chinese journals.

> When in the spring of 1966 the People's Republic of China stopped the publication of all archaeological journals all of us were inclined to believe that excavations had come to a complete stand still. Some newspapers even recorded that in the course of the Cultural Revolution Red Guards had damaged or even destroyed historical buildings or works of art. Knowing the attitude of the Chinese government towards their cultural heritage I doubted this from the beginning, all the more so because I heard that precautions such as the closing of museums or historical buildings including the Forbidden City in Peking had been taken to prevent damage.
>
> Reports from China now confirm that nothing of great value had been destroyed and an exhibition held in Peking in the summer of 1971 in one of the palaces of the Forbidden City proved that archaeological work has continued all through the Cultural Revolution up to this very day.
> A. Gutkind Bulling, "China Archaeological Excavations 1966-1971," Expedition, Vol.15, no. 1, (Fall 1972), p.22.

6. The Opium War (1840-1844) is an illustration of China's loss of sovereignty to foreign aggression. Chapter 8 of Immanuel C.Y. Hsu's

text, The Rise of Modern China, describes the progressive weakening of China's sovereignty through the combination of internal rebellion and foreign aggression in this period. As a result of the Opium war, several western foreign powers were able to obtain outrageous trade concessions through unequal treaties which routed China's political authority. I.C.Y. Hsu sums up the consequences of the wars as follows:

> The Opium War touched off explosive matters with far-reaching consequences. Politically, the cession of Hong Kong gave Britain a foothold in China for further advancement; the opening of the five ports extended foreign, particularly British, influence to the entire Eastern coast of China; and the loss of . . . national rights . . . relegated China to a semi-colonial state. Militarily, permission for foreign gunboats to anchor at the five ports, a concession later extended to the other ports opened along the Yangtze River, enabled foreign warships to navigate freely and legally in Chinese inland waterways, exposing the interior of the country mercilessly to alien powers. Economically, the fixed customs rates deprived China of a protective tariff and allowed an overabundant influx of foreign goods, which reduced Chinese handicraft industries to penury, causing social unrest and rebellion. Socially, the continuation of the illicit traffic deepened the opium problem, and the growth of foreign trade in the five ports introduced a new class of business entrepreneurs, sometimes derogatorily called the "compradore" class, who came to wield an increasing influence in society. Diplomatically, China entered into official contacts with the Western maritime powers and took the first step in her long journey to membership in the international society
>
> But the Opium War did not shock the Chinese people into realizing their backwardness. . . .They refused to acknowledge China's military inferiority and political retrogressiveness, and so allowed themselves to sleep another twenty years.
>
> Immanuel C.Y. Hsu, The Rise of Modern China, second edition, New York: Oxford University Press, 1975, p.246.

7. The Taiping Revolution, 1850-1864, nearly destroyed the Ch'ing dynasty's rule over China. Chapter 10 of Immanuel C.Y. Hsu's The Rise of Modern China (New York: Oxford University Press, 1975), analyzes the impact of internal rebellions and revolutions upon China's traditional system of government and society.

8. China's cultural treasures were subjected to the effects of China's political instability. The worst example was the destruction of the Yüan Ming Yüan, the summer palace, by Lord Elgin and his troops at the end of the Anglo-French war with China.

> In the settlement at Peking, Anglo-French friction arose over the French thirst for national glory, in the absence of any commercial interest in China, while the British negotiator

> (Lord Elgin) had to restrain also the expansionist demands of the "old China hands." But when the chief British negotiator was seized while under a flag of truce and some twenty men in his party were executed before he was released, Elgin took reprisal against the emperor personally by destroying his summer palace of some two hundred buildings northwest of Peking (the Yüan Ming Yüan), which had already been looted by the invading forces and Chinese villagers.
> John K. Fairbank, Edwin O. Reischauer, and Albert M. Craig, East Asia Tradition and Transformation, Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1973, pp.477-478.

Curiously, some of the buildings of the summer palace had been built by Westerner's in the 1700's.

> For instance, in 1747 Michel Benoist built a Western-style fountain. . . and a number of Italian-style buildings were designed by G. Castiglione for the Summer Palace, called the Yüan-ming Yüan, located about five miles to the northwest of Peking.
> Immanuel C.Y. Hsu, The Rise of Modern China, second edition, New York: Oxford University Press, 1975, p.47.

However China's treasures were also marketed to collectors for various museums around the world. Dr. William C. White, a missionary, collected artifacts for the Royal Ontario Museum. His efforts at collecting are described in a biography entitled Bishop in Honan Mission and Museum in the Life of William C. White by Lewis C. Walmsley. For example:

> Dr. White made friends with a number of curio dealers in Kaifeng. One man in particular was helpful and the bishop relied upon him for purchases. This dealer, a Buddhist, became interested in Dr. White's project. He took Dr. White into his confidence and disclosed tricks of the trade. He knew the particular objects the bishop was seeking--perfect specimens of certain periods--and worked unceasingly to obtain them. These two men trusted each other as professionals and dispensed with many formalities, such as the bargaining which usually preceded a deal. The dealer agreed to tell White the exact price he had paid and add the customary commission. He took responsibility for the genuineness of his goods and for securing them at a fair price. His ability to discover new finds also proved useful. Secrecy played an important role in collecting, and valuable information was often obtained through hired spies and informers. In spite of all his precautions, the bishop frequently ran into stiff competition. Buyers often bribed peasants to rob graves, to steal and loot. Bishop White's position and offices during the Honan famine as well as his work with the Red Cross gave him an important advantage over other collectors; he was usually successful.
> Lewis C. Walmsley, Bishop in Honan Mission and Museum in the Life of William C. White, Toronto: University Press, 1974, p. 143.

9. E.A. H.D. Archeo P.R.C. 67-7 Vol.1, Letter from Mr. Peter C. Swann,

Director of the Royal Ontario Museum, to the Honourable Paul J.J. Martin, November 29, 1966.

10. Ibid., Letter from the Honourable Paul J.J. Martin, to Peter C. Swann, Director of the Royal Ontario Museum, December 9, 1966.

11. Royal Ontario Museum, Archives, Letter from Mr. Peter C. Swann, Director of the Royal Ontario Museum, to the Rt. Honourable Pierre Elliott Trudeau, Prime Minister of Canada, October 21, 1968.

12. Prime Minister Trudeau made public his plans to recognize the People's Republic of China during the May 1968 election campaign and upon election, steps were taken to make this plan a reality.

> "The Canadian decision to move from opposition to an abstention on the Albanian Resolution (to seat Peking and unseat Taiwan) at the UN General Assembly of 1966 opened the way for a shift of emphasis to a bilateral approach to the problem. This was put into more specific terms by Prime Minister Trudeau in the election campaign of May 1968, when he declared that it would be his aim to recognize the People's Republic of China as soon as possible and to enable that government to occupy China's seat at the UN.
>
> This was the situation in the summer of 1968 when the newly-elected Trudeau Government instructed the Department of External Affairs to review Canada's China policy with a view to finding a basis for establishing relations with the People's Republic of China. These studies were completed in the autumn of 1968, when the general lines of the Canadian approach to negotiations with the People's Republic of China were determined. A basic premise of this approach was reflected in a statement made in a television broadcast in January 1969, when the Secretary of State for External Affairs said that recognition of Peking would imply the 'de-recognition of the Taiwan Government as the Government of all of China." Public and international interest in Canada's intentions had reached a high level when, on February 10, 1969, Mr. Sharp announced in the House of Commons that the Canadian Embassy in Stockholm had been instructed to propose to the Chinese Embassy there the opening of talks on recognition and the exchange of ambassadors.
>
> "Canadian Recognition of the People's Republic of China," External Affairs, Volume XXII, No. 12, December 1970, pp.414-415.

13. R.O.M. Archives, op.cit.

14. E.A. H.D. Archeo P.R.C. 67-7 Vol. 1, Mémoire Direction des Affaires d'Extrême Orient, Direction des Affaires culturelles, signed by Jacques Gignac, le 8 juillet, 1969, p.1.

15. Ibid.
Translation:
You will remember that Miss Legendre had written to the Prime Minister in November 1968 to keep him up to date with an exhibition project entitled "5000 Years of Chinese Culture and Civilization." In his reply, the Prime Minister emphasized three points: to assure reciprocity of cultural exchanges with China, to consult the National Gallery and to keep the Minister updated on the major developments of this exhibition.

16. Ibid.
Translation:
"to demystify China in the eyes of Canadians and to present China through history in an apolitical manner."

17. Ibid.,p.3
Translation:
The Canadian government wants for its part to study very closely the various aspects of the project, including the requirement of reciprocity to which they attach so much importance. Finally they would like to assure themselves that the project will not be used for the goals of Maoist propaganda. Miss Legendre considers herself to be very conscientious of these problems indicating that she does not intend to surrender to Chinese pressure in this respect but to deal exclusively with an historical and cultural exhibition.

18. Ibid.,p.3
J'ai expliqué à Mlle. Legendre qu'il me paraisait difficile d'espérer obtenir un feu vért du gouvernment canadien avant de connaître l'issue des négotiations présentment en cours à Stockholm sur l'établissement des relations diplomatiques entre les deux pays.
Translation:
I explained to Miss Legendre that it appeared to me difficult to hope to obtain a green light from the Canadian Government before knowing the outcome of the negotiations presently going on in Stockholm for the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries.

19. Ibid., The request is noted in a letter from Mr. Swann, Director of the Royal Ontario Museum, to the Honourable Mitchell Sharp, Secretary of State for External Affairs, October 13, 1970.
On October 13, Mr. Sharp announced to the House of Commons ". . .agreement on mutual recognition and the establishment of diplomatic relations" between the Government of Canada and the Government of the People's Republic of China. His statement noted some of the difficulties in the negotiations as follows:

"I do not think it is any secret that a great deal of this discussion has revolved around the question of Taiwan. From the very beginning of our discussions the Chinese side made clear to us their position that Taiwan was an inalienable part of Chinese territory and that this was a principle to which the Chinese Government attached the utmost importance. Our position, which I have stated publicly and which we made clear to the Chinese from the start of our negotiations, is that the Canadian Government does not consider it appropriate either to endorse or to challenge the Chinese Government's position on the status of Taiwan. This has been our position and it continues to be our position. As the communique says, we have taken note of the Chinese Government's statement about Taiwan. We are aware that this is the Chinese view and we realize the importance they attach to it, but we have no comment to make one way or the other."
"Establishment of Diplomatic Relations with the People's Republic of China: A Statement in the House of Commons by the Honourable Mitchell Sharp, the Secretary of State for External Affairs, on October 13, 1970," Statements and Speeches, Ottawa, Canada: Information Department of External Affairs, 1970.

20. Ibid., Letter from Joanna Woods Marsden, Coordinator of International Exhibitions, to Mr. Freeman Tovell, Director, Cultural Affairs Division, July 9, 1971.

21. R.O.M. Archives, Letter from Ms. Hsio-Yen Shih, Curator, Far Eastern Department, R.O.M. to Mr. Arthur Andrew, Head of Asian and Pacific Section, Department of External Affairs, Ottawa, April 16, 1971.

22. Ibid.,Letter from Mr. A.J. Andrew, Director-General, Bureau of Asian and Pacific Affairs, Ottawa to Mr.(sic) Hsio-Yen Shih, Curator, Far Eastern Department, R.O.M., April 30, 1971.

23. Ibid.,Letter from Ms. Hsio-Yen, Shih, Curator, Far Eastern Department, R.O.M., to Mr. Huang Hua, Ambassador of the People's Republic of China, Ottawa, September 21, 1971.
Ms. Shih's note proposed a variety of exchanges between China and the Royal Ontario Museum, and Ms. Shih hoped for an interview with the Ambassador to discuss the matter.
"Our Museum is divided into three main areas--Life Sciences, Earth Sciences, and Art and Archaeology. Among these, a number of co-workers have enquired about the possibility of further information as to work by their Chinese counterparts, and of exchanges of materials and specimens.
From another point-of-view, the Museum's Director, Mr.

Peter C. Swann expressed interest, several years ago, in discussing an exchange of loan exhibitions in art and archaeology with the People's Republic of China. Toronto has long recognized the importance of Chinese archaeology. In the over twenty years since liberation, new finds have added immeasurably to fresh knowledge.

Would it be possible for me to fix an appointment with yourself, or with the Cultural Attaché, to discuss such matters at your convenience."

24. Dr. Evans' private papers, Letter from F. Tovell, External Affairs, Ottawa, to H.E.M. Ralph Collins, Canadian Ambassador to the People's Republic of China, July 9, 1971.

25. Ibid.

26. Ibid.

27. Ibid.

28. Ibid., Letter from H.E. R.E. Collins, Canadian Ambassador to the Pecple's Republic of China, September 10, 1971.

29. Ibid., p.3.

30. Ibid.

31. Ibid., p.4.

32. A communique (E.A.H.D. Archeo P.R.C. 67-7 Vol.4., Communique No. 29, March 15, 1974) announced the signatures of the agreements to have an exhibition.
A copy of the statement given by the Secretary of State for External Affairs to the Press in Peking, August 20, 1972, described the details of the official invitation.

"I have extended an invitation to my Chinese colleague to send to Canada their magnificent exhibition of recent archaeological finds. I am informed that the Chinese authorities are planning to send this exhibition to Europe in the second half of 1973 and I expressed the hope that in the course of this projected tour the exhibition might also come to Canada. This unique collection constitutes a national treasure for the people of China, as well as being of international historical importance. My host expressed his appreciation for this interest in the exhibition and we agreed that the Canadian and Chinese authorities should discuss the details of possible arrangements.
(Dr. Evan's private papers, Copy of statement given by the Secretary of State for External Affairs, the Hon. Mitchell Sharp, to the Press in Peking, August 20, 1972).

33. Reference to Prime Minister Trudeau's role in this cultural exchange was noted in the Chinese Ambassador's speech at the opening of the exhibition in Toronto. The speech credits the exhibition as a result of an invitation from Prime Minister Trudeau.

> ". . .Thanks to the kind invitation of the Right Honourable Pierre Trudeau, Prime Minister of Canada, it became possible for such a large scale exhibition of Chinese cultural relics to take place for the first time in North America."
> (R.O.M. Archives, Ambassador Chang Wen-chin's Speech at the Opening of the Exhibition of Archaeological Finds of the People's Republic of China, August 7, 1974.)

Mr. Trudeau referred to this exhibition as well as other forms of cultural exchanges between China and Canada, in a press release during a Press Conference, October 13, 1973.

> "China has agreed in principle to be host to a Canadian symphony orchestra and to an exhibition of Canadian paintings from the collection of the National Gallery. Canada will receive the Exhibition of Chinese Historical Relics now on show in London. We have also noted China's intention to participate next year in Man and His World in Montreal through an exhibition of traditional style paintings and handicrafts. The same exhibition may also go to Vancouver.
> (Dr. Evans' private papers. Draft Copy of Statement given by Prime Minister Trudeau at a Press Conference, October 13, 1973.)

34. E.A. H.D. Archeo P.R.C. 67-7 Vol.1, .Telegram from Peking 977, to External Affairs, Ottawa, April 30, 1973. This meeting took place on April 28 with Mr. Yen Hung-hiang, a member of the Information Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

35. Ibid., Memorandum from FAC to FLA and APP, Ottawa, August 13, 1973.. This point was also mentioned in Ibid. Message from Ottawa to London, 9/8/73, p.3.

36. Ibid.,Letter from the Canadian Embassy Peking, to the Undersecretary of State for External Affairs, Ottawa, signed by Morris Copithorne, no.136, March 1, 1973.

37. Ibid.,Letter from The Canadian Embassy, Peking to The Undersecretary of State for External Affairs, Ottawa, signed by Morris Copithorne, March 9, 1973.

38. Ibid.,Telegram from the Canadian Embassy Peking, No. 136, to the Undersecretary of State for External Affairs, Ottawa, signed by Morris Copithorne, March 1, 1973, p.1.

39. The indemnity required by the Chinese for the Exhibition was 100

million yuan, although the figure seemed to be negotiable as exemplified by the British case.

> I (Freeman Tovell) reported in my letter (refers to a letter of March 9, 1973) that the Chinese valuation on the exhibition for indemnification purposes was about $50 million. The British tell us that they have now succeeded in negotiating this down to £ 10 million, about half of the Chinese figure. The British government is picking up the British share of the cost of the indemnification while the British sponsor, the Times group, is responsible for the British share of the transportation costs.
> Ibid., Letter from Freeman Tovell to Walter Tovell, March 16, 1973.

40. Ibid., Message from the Canadian High Commission, London, to the Undersecretary of State for External Affairs, Ottawa, August 17, 1973, no. 870, p.3.

41. Ibid., Letter from Jacques Asselin, Conseiller Affaires Culturelles, Paris, to Freeman Tovell, Directeur des Affaires Culturelles, Ministere des Affaires Exterieures, le 9 Aout, 1973, pp.1-2.

42. Ibid.,Telegram from the Canadian Embassy, Peking, signed by Morris Copithorne, to the Undersecretary of State for External Affairs, Ottawa, March 9, 1973.

43. R.O.M. Archives, External Affairs Press Release 9:00 a.m. March 15, 1974, Exhibition of Archaeological Finds of the People's Republic of China August 7-November 16.

> "Secretary of State for External Affairs Mitchell Sharp announced today that an agreement had been signed in Peking between Canada and the People's Republic of China, under the terms of which the Royal Ontario Museum Toronto will host an Exhibition of Archaeological Finds of the People's Republic of China August 7 to November 16 next. Mr. John Small, the Canadian Ambassador to China, signed the agreement on behalf of the Canadian Government, and His Excellency Mr. Yu Chan, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs, signed on behalf of the Government of the People's Republic of China."

44. R.O.M. Archives, The Chinese Exhibition, Press Release dated 2 p.m. April 16, 1974. The inter-agency agreement was signed in Ottawa on April 16, 1974, and was reported as follows:

> "Planning for the Chinese Exhibition, which will open at the Royal Ontario Museum on August 8, advanced a significant stage further today with the signing in Ottawa of the Inter-Agency Agreement. . . . Mr. Wang Chu-liang, Counsellor at the Embassy of the People's Republic of China, signed for

the Organisation of Exhibitions of Archaeological Finds. Noah Torno, Chairman of the Chinese Exhibition Council of the Royal Ontario Museum, signed on behalf of the Council."

45. E.A. H.D. Archeo P.R.C. 67-7 Vol.1, Telegram from Peking 2210 to Ottawa, External Affairs, Nov. 1, 1972.

46. Ibid.

47. Ibid., Telegram from Peking 2210, to External Affairs, Ottawa, November 1, 1972, p.1.

48. Ibid.,Telegram from Peking 2448, to External Affairs, Ottawa, December 1, 1972.

49. Ibid.,Telegram from Peking 977, to External Affairs, Ottawa, April 30, 1973.

50. Ibid.,Telegram from Peking 2210,to External Affairs, Ottawa, November 1, 1972.

51. Ibid.,Telegram from Peking 977 to External Affairs, Ottawa, April 30, 1973.

52. Ibid., Telegram from Peking 1956, to External Affairs, Ottawa, August 24, 1973.

53. Ibid., Telegram from Peking 2047, to External Affairs, Ottawa, September n.d. 1973, pp.1-2.

54. Ibid., Telegram from Peking 2080, to External Affairs, Ottawa, September 12, 1973.

55. Ibid.

56. Ibid.

57. From a financial standpoint, the choice of the exhibition was quite significant.

The "Tokyo" collection is much smaller, has a drastically reduced timespan, is less well balanced and the ROM (Royal Ontario Museum)consider that because of its inferior quality there is some question whether its showing in Toronto would prove economically viable.

Ibid., Vol.2, Memorandum to the Minister October 3, 1973 initialled A.E.R.

The same point was raised from a cultural standpoint.

> As we would want to use the opportunity provided by a special exhibition of Chinese archaeological finds to acquaint the Canadian people both with China's past and with the impressive achievements of her present archaeological workers, the restrictions of the Japanese show would impose disappointing limitations. . . . From the very beginning of negotiations for an exhibition of Chinese archaeological finds the ROM (Royal Ontario Museum) has hoped to be able to display China's cultural history as fully as possible for the information of the Canadian people.
> Ibid. Vol.1, R.O.M. Memorandum from B. Stephen, to Dr. W. Tovell, Director, Subject: Chinese Archaeological Exhibition, September 17, 1973.

58. Ibid., Note for File, (Miss) M.C Gillies, Cultural Affairs Division, September 18, 1973.
The data is also corroborated by the following:

> Dr. Tovell had been informed by his counterpart in the National Gallery in Washington that the "European" collections would be the one to go to the U.S.A. (We subsequently learned from the State Department in Washington that the Chinese have informed the Americans in Peking that they agree with their choice of the "European" collection and that the details will be discussed in the next several months. The Americans are interpreting this latter statement as meaning that there will be negotiations on the inclusion of some of the best items from the "Tokyo" collection and some items now in China but not in either the "Tokyo" or "European" collections).
> Ibid., Memo to file from M.C. Gillies, September 26, 1973.

59. Ibid.

60. Ibid., Message from External Affairs, Ottawa, to Peking, 1666, September 26, 1973.

> State Department inform us that Chinese reaction to American proposal. . .was to indicate their . . . "pleasure that European collection was preferred" . . . and to state that details would be discussed . . . in next several months . . . Americans are interpreting this as permitting negotiation on the addition of items from the Tokyo collection and other treasures in China.

61. Early in the negotiations, the Canadian side proposed two stops on the Canadian tour.

> When during his visit to Peking in August 1972, my Minister took up with the Chinese Foreign Minister our interest in having the Chinese exhibition coming to Canada, he asked if it could be shown in two Canadian cities. In addition to

Toronto he had in mind Vancouver because of its traditional links with the Orient. This proposal was reiterated by Mr. MacDonald, the Minister of Energy, Mines and Resources, when he was in Peking earlier this year. Subsequently, the Chinese informed us that they would not agree to a second city in Canada (They have not agreed to any second city in any country to which it is going, including the United States) on grounds of security; some of the items are so fragile that they do not wish them to be packed and unpacked any more than necessary.
Ibid., Vol. 2. Letter from L.A.D. Stephens, Undersecretary of State for External Affairs, to Mr. Lafontaine, Deputy Secretary Administrative Policy, December 14, 1973.

There was also some negotiation within Canada about a showing at a second city.

We (External Affairs) have agreed to consider a formal request for a grant if required provided Royal Ontario Museum agrees that some other museum or gallery in Canada e.g. Vancouver would also be offered a showing. Royal Ontario Museum has agreed to this. It estimates that to recoup a portion of the high cost involved it would have to be assured a showing of at least 4 months. A second Canadian Museum would not doubt require showing for same length of time.
Ibid.,Vol. 1, Message from Ottawa External FAC 502, File 21, to Peking, March 23, 1973.

62. Ibid., Telegram from Peking 718, to External Affairs, Ottawa, April 5, 1973.

63. Ibid.

64. Ibid.

65. Ibid.

66. Ibid.

67. Ibid.

68. Ibid.

69. Ibid.

70. Ibid., Telegram from Peking 1002, to External Affairs, Ottawa, May 3, 1973.

71. Ibid., Message from Ottawa to Peking, 6 July 1973.

72. Ibid., Memorandum from FAC to FLA APP, August 13, 1973.

73. Ibid., Letter from B. Margaret Meagher, Ambassador of Canada to Sweden to Dr. Walter Tovell, Director, R.O.M., June 12, 1973. Mr. Gyllensvard was the director of the East Asiatic Museum in Stockholm.

74. Ibid., Vol. 2, Telegram from the Canadian Embassy, Peking signed by Dr. B.L. Evans, no. PeK-645, to the Undersecretary of State for External Affairs, October 26, 1973.

75. Ibid.

76. Ibid., Telegram from Peking, 3142, to External Affairs, Ottawa, December 28, 1973, p.2

77. Ibid., p.2.

78. Ibid., p.2.

79. Ibid., p.2.

80. The accounts suggest that the Canadian side obtained the extension since the Chinese wanted the negotiations concluded:

> (B) Extension of Exhibition in Canada (Article I): After protracted discussion repeating well known arguments Deputy Head agreed to extension additional ten days to November 16, 1974.
>
> Ibid., Telegram from Peking, 3149, to External Affairs, Ottawa, December 31, 1973, p.1.

81. The reports on the actual amount of the indemnity varied. For example the Austrians were given a figure of 100 million yuan.

> The Austrians have been told the value is in the order of Yuan 100 million. This is roughly equivalent to the figure £ 20 million given to us by the British and works out to about (Canadian) $ 50 million.
>
> Ibid. Vol. 1. Message from the Canadian Embassy, Peking no. 136, signed by Morris Copithorne, to the Undersecretary of State for External Affairs, March 1, 1973.

The British experience later suggested that the figure was negotiable.

> We have already reported that the British succeeded in having the valuation reduced to about the equivalent of 50 million yuan.
>
> Ibid., Letter from the Canadian Embassy, Peking, no. 171, to the Undersecretary of State for External Affairs, March 23, 1973.

In the Swedish case, a letter from B. Margaret Meagher to Dr. W. Tovell noted:

> The Chinese have valued their exhibition at 60 million yuan.

Ibid. Letter from B. Margaret Meagher, Ambassador, Sweden, to Dr. W. Tovell, Director, R.O.M., June 12, 1973.

82. Ibid., Telegram from Peking 2181, to External Affairs, Ottawa, October 30, 1972.

83. Ibid.

84. Ibid.

85. Ibid.

86. Criticisms of the Exhibition in Paris are noted in a report by Dr. Hsiao Yen Shih, R.O.M. Archives, Report of Dr. Shih's Visit to Chinese Treasures Exhibition, Petit Palais, Paris, France, p.2.

87. E.A. H.D. Archeo P.R.C. 67-7, Vol. 1, Message from the Canadian Embassy, Peking, no. 136, signed by Morris Copithorne, to the Undersecretary of State for External Affairs, Ottawa, March 1, 1973.

88. Ibid., Message from the Canadian Embassy, Peking, no. 149, to the Undersecretary of State for External Affairs, Ottawa, March 9, 1973.

89. Ibid.

90. Ibid., Letter from Freeman Tovell, to Walter Tovell, May 29, 1973.

91. Ibid., Message from the Canadian High Commission, London, no. 870, to the Undersecretary of State for External Affairs, Ottawa, August 17, 1973.

92. Ibid., p.2.

93. Ibid., Message from the Canadian Embassy, Peking, no. 136, op.cit.

94. Ibid., Telegram from Vienna, no. 383, to External Affairs, Ottawa, March 20, 1973.

95. The Austrians did consider a cost-sharing agreement.

The Austrians are expected to assume responsibility for transport and the indemnity from London to the end of the showing in Vienna. They intend to discuss the possibility of cost sharing with the French and the British for transport, insurance and the catalogue.
Ibid. Memorandum from Mr. F. Tovell, FAC to Mr. Church, MIN, April 6, 1973.

96. Ibid. Telegram from Vienna no 1061 to External Affairs, Ottawa, July 6, 1973.

97. Ibid.

98. Ibid.

99. Ibid. Letter from B. Margaret Meagher, Ambassador of Canada, Sweden, to Dr. W. Tovell, Director, R.O.M., June 12, 1973.

100. Ibid.

101. Ibid., Message from External Affairs, Ottawa, no. 1186 to Peking, 6 July, 1973, p. 2.

102. Ibid., Letter from A.W. Robertson, Director, Legal Advisory Division, to Deputy Minister, Department of Justice, August 16, 1973.

103. Ibid., Memo from FLA signed by A.W. Robertson, Director, Legal Advisory Division to FAC, September 19, 1973.

104. Ibid., Memo to file by Miss M.C. Gillies, September 26, 1973.

105. Ibid., File Pocket, Letter from T.B. Smith, Director, Advisory and International Law Section, to Mr. A.W. Robertson, September 7, 1973.

106. Ibid., p. 2.

107. Ibid., Memo from A.E.R. to the Minister, October 3, 1973, p. 3.

108. Ibid.

109 Ibid., Memorandum signed by L.J. O'Toole, to FAP, October 11, 1973.

110. Ibid., Memorandum from FLA to FAC, October 23, 1973.

111. Ibid., p. 1.

112. Ibid., Letter from Maurice Lafontaine, Deputy Secretary Administrative Policy, Treasury Board, No. TB 722988, to Mr. A.E. Ritchie, Under-secretary of State for External Affairs, December 10, 1973.

113. R.O.M. Archives, Memo from Mr. M. Henderson, Subject: Meeting with Department of External Affairs, Ottawa, 6 January, 1975, to Mr. K.A.R. Torrance, January 7, 1975.
This lack of insurance was mentioned by Mr. N. Torno in my interview with him about the exhibition on February 26, 1981, and it is also corroborated by the copies of the insurance policies in the R.O.M. Archives.

> Attachment and Termination of Cover:
>
> Risk attaches hereunder from the time of loading on board two aircraft (Pan Am and Swedish Airlines) at Stockholm Airport, Sweden on/or about 24th July, 1974 and continues while in transit to Malton Airport, during the time of the exhibition and up to and including such time as they are reloaded on board aircraft on/or about 24th November for transit to Washington, D.C., U.S.A..
> (R.O.M. Archives, The Collection of Archaeological Finds of the People's Republic of China Policy No. MP 466 Reed Shaw Stenhouse Limited Insurance Brokers.)

Thus as far as the Canadian side knew, the exhibition was uninsured from the time it left the Toronto airport until it reached American airspace. According to Mr. J.H. Harvey, Assistant Controller, Operations, R.O.M., the Canadian side was responsible for the artifacts until the exhibition entered U.S. airspace.

> "The inter-governmental agreement between Canada and the People's Republic of China stipulates that Canada is responsible for the security of the exhibits until the aircraft cross the border into the United States."
> R.O.M. Archives, Letter from Mr. J.H. Harvey, Assistant Controller, Operations, R.O.M., to Mr. Roger Plourde, Cultural Affairs Division, November 14, 1974.

However, the Chinese side was informed of the extent and duration of Canadian coverage.

> "Insurance coverage has been confirmed, so far as Canada is concerned to the point where the doors of the second aircraft are closed. Following this, we assume insurance taken out by the United States will become operative."
> R.O.M. Archives, Letter from Mr. J.H. Harvey, Assistant Controller-Operations, to Mr. Wang Chu-liang, Charge d'Affaires P.R.C. Embassy, November 7, 1974.

114. H.D. E.A. Archeo P.R.C. 67-7 Vol. 2, Telegram from London 2841 to

External Affairs, Ottawa, December 7, 1973.
. . . "The Genius of China." In Chinese context this phrase refers to Lin Piao and is therefore not acceptable for use in exhibition.

115. The following article illustrates this point: Hsinhua News Bulletin, June 13, 1974, p. 5.
"the veteran worker condemned Lin Piao for preaching the Confucian precept "restrain oneself and return to the rites" in an attempt to subvert the dictatorship of the proletariat and restore capitalism, had Lin Piao's scheme succeeded, hundreds of millions of labouring people would have once again had the miserable life the child labourers had experienced in the old society, he said, "we'll never allow that to happen exclamation" he declared."

116. H.D. E.A. Archeo P.R.C. 67-7 Vol. 2, Telegram from Peking, 2809, to External Affairs, Ottawa, November 13, 1973.

117. Ibid.

118. Ibid.

119. Ibid.

120. Ibid

121. Ibid., Vol. 2, Message from the Canadian Embassy Stockholm, no. 496 to the Undersecretary of State for External Affairs, Ottawa, December 18, 1973, p. 1 copy of the inter-agency agreement.

122. Ibid., Vol. 2, Message from External Affairs, Ottawa, no. 2048, to Peking, December 19, 1973, p. 2.

123. Ibid., Telegram from London, no. 2841, to External Affairs, Ottawa, December 7, 1973.

124. Ibid., Telegram from Peking, no. 3142 to External Affairs, Ottawa, December 28, 1973.

125. Ibid., p. 5.

126. Ibid., Telegram from London, 2841, to External Affairs, Ottawa, December 7, 1973.

127. Ibid.

129. Ibid.

130. Ibid., Telegram from Peking, 3149, to External Affairs, Ottawa, December 31, 1973, pp. 3-4.

131. Ibid., p.2.

132. Ibid., p.2.

133. Ibid., p.3.

134. Ibid., p.3.

135. Ibid., Message from Ottawa, no. 2098, to Peking, December 21, 1973.

136. The R.O.M.'s efforts to accommodate the Chinese ideological demands were considerable.

> Royal Ontario Museum intends to make use of Chinese historical scheme and to preserve chronological sequence in display. Information content of charts, maps, captions will be drawn exclusively from information material travelling with the exhibit, supplementary material requested and recent Chinese publications.
>
> Ibid., Message from External Affairs, Ottawa, no. 2098, to Peking, December 21, 1973.

137. Ibid., Vol. 3, Message from External Affairs, Ottawa, no. 125, to Peking, January 17, 1974, pp. 1-2.

138. Ibid., Message from External Affairs, Ottawa, no. 274, to Peking, February 7, 1974, p. 2.

139. Ibid., Vol. 3, Telegram from Peking, no. 290 to External Affairs, Ottawa, February 11, 1974, p. 1.

140. Ibid., Telegram from Ottawa, no. FAC-331, to Peking, February 19, 1974.

141. Ibid., p. 2.

142. Ibid., Telegram from Peking, no. 398, to External Affairs, Ottawa, February 21, 1974.

143. Ibid., Reluctant acceptance was also noted in Ibid., Vol. 3, Message from Ottawa, no. FAC-528, to Peking, February 26, 1974, p. 1.

144. Ibid., Telegram from Peking, no. 483, to External Affairs, Ottawa, [illegible]

Chapter 4
The Chinese Exhibition
From the Museum's Perspective

The successful showing of the Chinese Exhibition at the Royal Ontario Museum was the result of the dedicated efforts of the museum staff in cooperation with members of Canada's Department of External Affairs. Interested museum parties had lobbied for the visit of an exhibition from the People's Republic of China to the Royal Ontario Museum since the 1960's.[1] Indeed, the museum has its own long established interest in China's history, as exemplified by its world-renowned in-house collection of Chinese artifacts.[2] Thus the museum was eager to exhibit the results of more recent Chinese archaeological research. This persistent interest in the exhibition was vindicated when Dr. Tovell, the Director of the museum, was informed by External Affairs, on December 5, 1972, that the Chinese Exhibition would be sent to Canada. The Chinese could not say at that time when the exhibition would be sent to Canada, other than an off the record comment of late 1974 or 1975. Canadian Embassy officials in Peking did not want to press for further details, at that time, since it "would only invite Chinese annoyance," and advised waiting until the negotiations with the first exhibition hosts, France and Great Britain were complete.[3] As noted in the previous chapter the negotiations for the inter-governmental and inter-agency agreements were lengthy and complex. Furthermore as with the agreements, China's internal political and ideological struggles influenced the museum arrangements for displaying the exhibition in Toronto. The following discussion will describe the complex arrangements made by the museum for the exhibition in Toronto. References will be made to the preparations of the other host exhibitors in as far as they affected the exhibition's visit to Canada, and prompted a politically influenced response from the Chinese.

The significance of the Chinese Exhibition was not underestimated in the least by the organizing officials of the Royal Ontario Museum and Canada's Department of External Affairs. As the first and largest cultural exhibition from the People's Republic of China, to visit North America, it required meticulously planned arrangements. As in the case of the negotiations for the inter-governmental and inter-agency agreements, Canadian officials drew upon the experiences of previous host exhibitors. In order to coordinate the Royal Ontario Museum's preparations for the exhibition, two responsible bodies--the Chinese Exhibition Council under the chairmanship of N. Torno,[4] and the Chinese Exhibition Committee under the chairmanship of Barbara Stephen[5]--were created. The inter-governmental agreement allowed "for the formation of a Canadian Exhibition Council to assume responsibility for the exhibition in Canada."[6] Consequently, the Chinese Exhibition Council of the Royal Ontario Museum was formed to assume these duties and to act as the signator of the inter-agency agreement. The Council was incorporated on January 18, 1974, on behalf of the museum, so that the business of the exhibition would "be handled separately from the Royal Ontario Museum's other operations and collections."[7]

The Chinese Exhibition Committee, was established to make all the internal museum preparations and arrangements for exhibiting the exhibition. Committee members were responsible for a variety of tasks such as design, display, programmes, security, admission arrangements etc..[8] Royal Ontario Museum staff studied the efforts made by other host exhibitors and drew upon their experiences. As the exhibition

travelled from country to country in Europe, the Chinese began to express dissatisfaction with the manner in which the exhibition was displayed and interpreted. This dissatisfaction reached a climax just weeks before the exhibitions's opening in Toronto. Canada had to accept tighter controls on the format of the exhibition design. While Canada had attempted to learn from the experience of others it seemed that China had pre-judged the result. The following discussion seeks to identify the aspects of the exhibition's interpretation that prompted Chinese criticism, concluding with an analysis of the most controversial aspect of the exhibition, the text of the catalogue.

From the outset, the Chinese had emphasized the political and ideological sensitivities regarding the interpretation of China's history and culture. The influence of China's current politics upon the past, however, was not always fully appreciated by all of the exhibition organizers. The exhibition's contents were the result of archaeological work between 1949 and 1973; consequently the exhibition was a vindication of the People's Republic of China's interest in history and a commitment to protect China's cultural legacy, in spite of bad press about the Cultural Revolution. According to the Chinese, the exhibition had a specific purpose to illustrate "the historical development of life and production of the Chinese people."[9] Some of the western organizers and later the audiences who saw the exhibition, however, had their own notions of the purpose of China's history. The current Chinese political themes were to be ignored or subdued at best. The exhibition was recognized as being superior for its distance artistically and chronologically from China's recent and revolutionary

past and present. After a tour of the original exhibition in Peking in 1973, one Canadian observer reported that:

> . . .the exhibition does not bear the amateurish and contrived marks of most exhibitions in China, which feature "socialist realist" illustrations of the nature of class struggle in the old society with frequent juxtaposition of the artifacts and utensils used by rich and poor.[10]

China's ongoing political struggles and ideological debates stemming from the Cultural Revolution, however, came to direct and to influence the presentation of this exhibition during its western tour.

The Role of the British and the French

Time was a factor that affected the preparations for the exhibition. The French, the first hosts of the exhibition, had to make their preparations within four to five months while the British had six to seven months of lead time.[11] Although the exhibition was very well received at the Petit Palais in Paris, with good reviews in the French press and with a total of 350,000 visitors,[12] the impression received by some observers was that the exhibitors had not made any special efforts to present the exhibition to its true advantage.[13] For example, inadequate lighting and insufficient data on the labels identifying the artifacts, weakened the exhibition's presentation.[14] Canadian curators felt they could prepare a better exhibition design. After visiting the Paris exhibition, Dr. Shih, of the Far Eastern Department of the Royal Ontario Museum:

> . . .voiced some reservations about the quality of graphic materials (ie. charts, maps, site photographs etc.) supplementing and complementing the objects themselves, pointing out that much better examples

> have been published in the People's Republic of China. They (the Chinese curators) indicated agreement and rather subtly that these had been a French responsibility.[15]

Thus, Royal Ontario Museum staff were able to start more detailed preparations through their knowledge of the types of material to be displayed and the types of cases that would have to be built. The museum staff also had more time to do the research to prepare extra labels, better graphics and maps, in order to avoid the same interpretive problems. This extra effort to provide more data on the artifacts proved to be worthwhile since the Chinese decided not to permit organized tours of the exhibition,[16] to insure control over the correct ideological versions of China's history.

The British presentation of the Chinese Exhibition was quite different from that given by the French. The organization and preparations for the exhibition were influenced by the joint sponsorship of the exhibition by the British government with the Times Newspapers of London. The British government dealt with the negotiations for the agreements, while as a major sponsor of the exhibition, the Times Newspapers played a major role in the curatorial preparations for displaying the exhibition. The Chinese Exhibition Council of London,[17] organized by the British government, was the signator of the inter-agency agreement, but the actual mechanics of displaying the exhibition came under the direction and responsibility of staff selected by the Times Newspapers.[18] This sponsorship by a corporate entity seemed to have an impact on the exhibition because of the emphasis on commercial aspects.

The British encountered some difficulties in the negotiations

for the agreement to hold the exhibition which was signed by the Chinese on July 2, 1973. The exhibition opened on September 29, 1973. The delays and short lead time caused some anxiety. In fact, "they had taken out abandonment insurance as a hedge against the possibility of the Exhibition never coming off."[19]

The involvement of an independent organization like the Times Newspapers of London also added to the complications of the exhibition arrangements. An agreement had to be arranged between the Times and the British government. This agreement was beset with problems as well, but they were settled by a letter from the Times to the Royal Academy, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and to the Chairman of the Chinese Exhibition Council.[20] Essentially, the letter set down the Times responsibilities, its commitments to pay rent to the Royal Academy, the payment of staff, the disposal of any monies collected and the recognition that the government would have to handle any disputes with outside governments and authorities.[21]

Despite the anxieties created during the negotiations, the British organizers attributed the success of the British-Chinese negotiations to the close working relationship established between C.D. Hamilton, the chairman and Editor-in-chief of the Times Newspapers, and Sung Zhi-guang, the Chinese Ambassador in London.[22]

> Every move made by the Chinese Exhibition Council as well as the exhibition organizers was communicated to the Ambassador. When he was not present the details were explained to the next in command at the Chinese embassy. They achieved this through a series of informal lunches and talks. They did not go into details, they simply painted the picture as it was going along in broad general lines, showed Mr. Sung the posters, catalogues, etc., in the making and all

> of the other steps and invited his comment. His initial reaction was one of amusement at the way in which they intended to publicise the Exhibition. He became more interested however, and actually helped with the calligraphy in a manner that commended itself very much to Professor Watson as well as to his colleagues on the Chinese Committee in Peking. Thus an excellent relationship was built up and this became the foundation of their (the British) success with the Chinese.[23]

This close relationship between the British and the Chinese may have helped in the preparations for the exhibition; but later Chinese dissatisfaction with certain aspects of the British display intensified, after the exhibition had gone to Vienna.

In preparation for the Canadian version of the exhibition, the Royal Ontario Museum made an effort to establish a close working relationship with the Chinese Embassy in Ottawa.[24] In the interest of expediting the preparations for the exhibition, the Royal Ontario Museum hoped that many of the arrangements and necessary approvals could go through the Chinese Embassy in Ottawa rather than referring back to Peking for approval. In fact, a good relationship was established between the Chinese Ambassador and the staff of the Royal Ontario Museum. This relationship became particularly important in the later resolution of the catalogue question by the Chairman of the Chinese Exhibition Council, Noah Torno and His Excellency Ambassador Chang Wen-ching.

Commercial Influences Upon the British Version of the Exhibition

The Times Newspapers were well experienced as the sponsors of an international exhibition, since they had organized, financed and operated the Tutankhamen Exhibition at the British Museum in 1972.[25]

The organizers of the Chinese Exhibition drew upon this experience with the Tutankhamen Exhibition in order to prepare to market the Chinese Exhibition. The Tutankhamen Exhibition was a great success drawing more than 1.6 million visitors during a period of four months. The Times Newspapers was able to recover the exhibition costs because of the large attendance, a nine-month exhibition period, and rent-free space in the British Museum. In the case of the Chinese Exhibition, the British organizers were not as optimistic about making a profit with an exhibition time of sixteen weeks, and a budget including rental of the Royal Academy. Consequently, the organizers, Taverner and Pearce anticipated a profit of only 100,000 pounds.[26] The daily attendance of the Chinese Exhibition, however, eventually exceeded that of the Tutankhamen exhibition with eight to nine thousand people per day.[27]

The Chinese were undoubtedly pleased with the high volume attendance although the capitalist hard sell of the exhibition was overwhelming both from ideological and cultural standards. Because of the participation of the Times Newspapers, this commercial aspect came to the forefront and affected much of the presentation.

> The whole approach is to sell the Exhibition to the public as hard as they can through the medium of advertising, promotion, reproduction and all the other devices and gimmicks they could conjure up. Advertising agents were brought in to handle the design of the posters and the like and they have gone to tremendous pains to hammer the theme on buses, on the underground, by means of street boardings and so forth.[28]

This commercial approach to marketing and interpreting the exhibition was criticized in some "learned journals."[29] The British organizers felt:

> . . .that a commercial approach like this is the only way to bring the treasures to the masses, and this the academics are slowly coming to realize is one of the big objectives of the whole business. Mr. Taverner said that after all if you were going to stage an exhibition there is only one way to do it and that is well.[30]

The Chinese and the Times may have shared the similar objective of delivering a mass line but the ideological basis was quite different. The result of this commercial pitch was the spreading of a contagion of Jade Fever, similar to Tut Fever.[31] Some sinologists felt that the exhibitors did not make a sufficient effort to display the artifacts to their full historical and educational advantage. The approach should have aimed for maximum education dividends that stretched the audience's mind and imagination, rather than seek short term economic gains.

Commercialism, however, was an important aspect of the London exhibition. Indeed, a wide selection of goods was created as souvenirs of the exhibition visit--postcards, replicas, and most important of all, the catalogue. Although the costs of mounting the exhibition were the main impetus behind this seemingly mercenary approach to marketing the exhibition, the Times did have some altruistic purposes for acquiring profits. Specifically the profits were donated to the Great Britain-China Committee, organized to further cultural ties between Great Britain and China.[32] Later the Great Britain-China Committee was succeeded by the Great Britain China Center, with similar goals and objectives of promoting greater understanding and further contacts.[33]

There was also some dispute over the purpose of publicity.

Members of the B.B.C. had gone along to Peking with the original Franco-British delegation, with plans of photographing the collection. The Chinese took a dim view of this advance publicity out of concern that it would spoil the audience's curiosity if they could see the exhibition's contents on television. Instead the British tried to convince the Chinese that the promotion would generate more interest to see the real thing.[34] But the commercialism with all the publicity and promotion of the exhibition offended Chinese sensibilities. The ideological tensions climaxed with the production of two films: "Times of Silk and Gold," and "Times of Jade and Bronze," narrated for the B.B.C. by William Watson, the author of the British souvenir catalogue.

Despite the success of the exhibition in London, the British approach drew criticism from the Chinese on several points--the title, layout, presentation, interpretation and the commercialism. The British title for the exhibition and of the souvenir catalogue was The Genius of China which the Chinese rejected on grounds of the negative political associations brought to mind by the word "genius".[35] The layout had to leave the audience with the correct impression and understanding of China's view of its own history and place in the world. The exhibition was acclaimed in the British press however the layout created some confusion in the interpretation of the exhibits, and the distinctions between periods of China's history were unclear. Indeed, the layout seemed to encourage a division of China's history by dynasty rather than the preferred Marxist periodization. For example, the T'ang hall, which was created by British exhibitors, appeared to confuse the historical sequence. Visitors to the exhibition would wander through

part of the T'ang section then move back in time into the Five Dynasties section before exiting through the remainder of the T'ang section.[36] Although the exhibit displayed the artifacts in a striking manner, the historical context was subdued out of deference to the artistic presentation.

Another point of contention was the amount of space required for the exhibition. The original agreements were quite specific about the amount of space needed, both out of a concern for the clarity of presenting the correct sequence and for the security of the artifacts. The Chinese objected to the space limitation of 14,700 square feet, but the British replied that the exhibition layout was "already designed" and that there was not anymore space.[37] Although the British exhibition was a fait accompli, the Chinese were quite adamant about this issue in subsequent arrangements for the exhibition.[38]

The maps in the London exhibition did not adequately illustrate China's current geo-political position. The maps were placed at the beginning of each section of the exhibition, and showed three main cities and three rivers.[39] The provinces were noted with names in approximate positions, without showing specific boundaries.[40] The archaeological sites related to the artifacts in each section of the exhibition were also noted.[41]

Labels posed another problem since they did not provide sufficient archaeological and historical data on the artifacts.

> Very little emphasis has been put on the archaeological aspect and there are no photos of excavations or any reference to specific sites. One really has to read the catalogue throughly(sic) to discover which object came from the same tomb or site.[42]

These aspects of the exhibition became more politically significant when the exhibition was due to be sent to Canada. As the political atmosphere in China grew more tense, the Canadian exhibitors had to provide the Chinese with assurances that the Canadian presentation would adhere to the Marxist interpretation of China's history in every detail.

Vienna and Stockholm

Vienna and Stockholm were the next two stops on the exhibition tour. In Vienna, the exhibition was not displayed according to the Marxist sequence of Chinese history.[43] Yet, the exhibition's simple design and use of free standing cases impressed Henderson, from the Royal Ontario Museum.[44] The text of the Austrian catalogue was also subject to some revisions. For example, all references "to Western archaeological work had to be removed."[45] The Austrian's map of China also drew some criticism for its use of dotted lines for international boundaries.

> The Chinese felt that the dotted line was internationally recognized as an internal, provincial boundary marker and was therefore incorrect in the Austrian catalogue. They would like a solid line dividing the countries.[46]

The other objection to the Austrian catalogue was over the printing of the rest of a quote from Mao rather than reproducing his calligraphy. Another objection was more of a protocol issue concerning the numbers of Austrian and Chinese flags, on display with the exhibition. The Chinese wanted "one Chinese flag to each host country flag displayed."[47]

When the exhibition moved to Stockholm, the Swedish exhibitors merely removed the museum's permanent collection and used the existing display cases for the Chinese materials [48] instead of making any

special efforts in set and display design. As with the British exhibition, the Chinese were upset with the order of the artifacts in the Swedish exhibition.[49] It was reported that:

> Instead of chronological order, they want the various objects discovered at each excavation to be grouped together.[50]

The Chinese were also concerned with controlling any interpretations of the exhibition. For example, the Chinese objected to an independent lecture series offered by a Swedish professor. Since the lectures were not sponsored by the Swedish museum, hosting the exhibition, the Chinese were concerned that the professor would criticize China. Regardless of these concerns, "the Swedes . . . refused to cancel the lectures."[51]

The most startling event in Sweden was the withdrawal of exhibit number 258, a Confucian script, that was replaced by another script from the T'ang dynasty.[52] This change in artifacts foreshadowed the future difficulties for the exhibition's interpretation in Canada. The revisions of the Swedish catalogue also prompted some of the Royal Ontario Museum staff to be concerned about future implications for their version of the exhibition.[53]

The Impact of the Negotiations and the Agreements Upon the Catalogue

The catalogue, the main souvenir of the exhibition, became the subject of the greatest controversy between the Chinese and the Canadian exhibitors. Both the text and the format of the catalogue had changed as the exhibition progressed. These revisions were prompted by a shifting political atmosphere within China. These changes in

ideological standards proved to be particularly challenging to the Canadian organizers.

The Origins of the Canadian Catalogue: The Influence of Article I of the Inter-Agency Agreement

As the negotiations for the agreements took place both in Peking and Ottawa, Royal Ontario Museum officials considered several alternatives for producing a souvenir catalogue--writing and editing a completely Canadian version,[54] producing a joint catalogue with the Americans,[55] or revising the British version of the catalogue.[56] Canada's status as a bilingual nation also prompted consideration of the production of a bilingual catalogue;[57] but as the negotiations continued, it became increasingly apparent that the organizers would have to revise their plans in accordance with stricter guidelines from the Chinese. In particular, the terms of Article I of the inter-agency agreement influenced and directed all aspects of the exhibition including the layout of the artifacts, graphics, labels and finally the text of the catalogue.

The problems encountered during the exhibition tour prior to arrival in Canada influenced the positions taken by Chinese and Canadian officials during the negotiations. As the terms of the inter-agency agreement became clearer, it became obvious that many aspects of the exhibition display would have to be reviewed. Criticisms of the format of the London Exhibition and especially the British catalogue came out gradually, during discussions between Canadian and Chinese officials, on the wording of the agreements. The catalogue controversy developed when the Canadian revisions to the catalogue text were found

to fall short of the continually revising ideological standards of the Chinese.

Royal Ontario Museum officials hoped the wording of Article I of the inter-agency agreement would be the same as that in previous agreements. From the museum's perspective, it was a question of professional integrity.

> With regard to the presentation of the Exhibition the Canadian side prefers the wording adopted by the Chinese side in their other Exhibition agreements. That wording is considered to be consistent with sound museum practice.[58]

The Royal Ontario Museum made a sincere effort from the beginning to prepare their presentation in accordance with Chinese wishes. The Chinese did not appear however to recognize the time constraints affecting the Royal Ontario Museum in respect to the catalogue. Canadian officials advised the Chinese that the Royal Ontario Museum planned to use the British catalogue--with a new title and introduction -- unless the Chinese promptly provided photographs and graphics of the exhibition materials. The Chinese responded by stressing their objection to the British title and some captions, although the specific captions were not identified. The Canadians were inclined to assume that the Chinese would accept the Royal Ontario Museum alternative on the catalogue if the photographics were not supplied.[59] As the discussions continued, however, Canadian assumptions proved to be false as the Chinese raised more objections to the Canadian catalogue.

Once the Royal Ontario Museum decided out of considerations of finance and time to use a revised version of the British catalogue, the Chinese voiced even stronger criticisms of the British version of

the exhibition catalogue and presentation. Of course, representatives of the Royal Ontario Museum were concerned that the Chinese might veto the Canadian presentation either on curatorial issues or the revisions of the catalogue. Royal Ontario Museum officials were anxious that any problems be solved through discussions at the Embassy level in Ottawa rather than a more lengthy process of referring to Peking. The Chinese assured the Canadians that any problems would be dealt with promptly either in Ottawa or Peking.[60]

The subsequent difficulties with the text of the catalogue were not anticipated and the problems were not resolved quickly or easily. Canadian officials in Peking had warned Ottawa of the potential pitfalls of relying upon the Embassy in Ottawa for final approval on cultural issues.

> On the role of Chinese Embassies abroad, you should be aware that Chinese Ambassador and Cultural Attaché in Rome both viewed much denounced Antonioni film long in advance of release and approved it. They are both now on leave in China. We suggest it would be prudent for us to submit to the information department as soon as possible a complete list of changes in detail which the Royal Ontario Museum proposed to make to the British Catalogue.[61]

Chinese interest in the text of the catalogue was also indicated in other aspects of the inter-agency agreements. As part of the verbal understandings with the terms of the inter-agency agreement, the Canadian side had to provide the Chinese side with "three hundred copies of each of its major publications relating to the exhibition."[62] When the exhibition returned to China, these publications were to be distributed within China. Further instructions on the text of the catalogue requested that "proofs of all publications concerning the exhibition . . . be

submitted to the Chinese Embassy in Ottawa."[63] Although there were some liberties for the Canadian side in the use of the Chinese materials, the final publication remained subject to Chinese approval. This last minute veto would prove to be quite perplexing.

The Catalogue Controversy In Canada

The catalogue controversy was discussed by members of the Department of External Affairs, the Canadian Embassy in Peking, and the Royal Ontario Museum with their Chinese counterparts at the Bureau of Foreign Affairs, and the Chinese Embassy in Ottawa. With the approach of the date of the exhibition's opening, decisions about the publication of the catalogue had to be made, sometimes without clear official approval of the Chinese. Official approval seemed to be stalled, and neither officials in China nor at the Chinese Embassy in Ottawa appeared to want to take responsibility for final approval. In the absence of official approval or disapproval and with approaching deadlines, the Royal Ontario Museum pressed on with its decision to use a revised version of the British catalogue.

The museum strove to fulfill its obligations to provide the Chinese, with its proposed revisions to the catalogue. During a visit of Chinese officials to the Royal Ontario Museum to discuss the preparations for the exhibition, the Chinese were provided with copies of the revisions to the catalogue and with explanations for the changes.[64] The museum officials reported to External Affairs that the Chinese "seemed pleased and agreeable but made no official comment."[65] Without official comment, the catalogue was not really endorsed. At this time,

External Affairs also received information that the Confucian script was withdrawn and replaced in the Swedish version of the exhibition.[66] This change in artifacts signalled a major change in China's mood about the ideological message of the exhibition.

The Chinese views of the impact of the terms of the inter-agency agreement and accompanying oral agreements, upon the catalogue and any publicity were outlined to Canadian representatives in a meeting with Mr. Su Shih-min, at the Chinese Embassy. Specifically Su reminded the Canadian representatives:

> . . .that all publicity material be based on material supplied by the Chinese side or on material from Chinese sources. Proofs or copies of all such material must be sent to the Embassy for approval before release.[67]

The Chinese officials at the Embassy did not want to make any final decisions on the Canadian revisions to the catalogue. In China, officials at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs were also hesitant to allay Canadian concerns about a veto by refusing to make any official comments. In the absence of any opinion, Canada decided not to supply any further information on revisions unless it was requested.[68] Chinese silence on these issues was confusing and no doubt nerve wracking for the Royal Ontario Museum.

Information on the catalogue revisions was reportedly forwarded to the Chinese Embassy in Ottawa. External Affairs noted that there was no point in pushing the matter about approval of revisions. It seemed more tactful at the time to wait and see.

> Catalogue changes have been given to Chinese Embassy in Ottawa. . . . Since catalogue has already gone to print we agree that no purpose would be served by further attempts to obtain

approval for these changes.[69]

The catalogue crisis became more apparent in the further efforts to secure a firm approval of the text even though it had gone to the publishers because of printing deadlines. The Chinese Embassy had been relatively enthusiastic about the preparations for the exhibition but in the absence of official endorsement, the Royal Ontario Museum remained understandably uncertain and anxious about the approval of the text.

> The other question pertains to our catalogue now being printed in Britain. The Chinese Embassy has now been most cooperative and helpful and they have in fact the full text we are employing in the Embassy right now. Without coming out and asking for it, we would like to secure a firm declaration from them that they do in fact accept the content and order of this catalogue. Naturally we will rush the first copy to the Ambassador and expect him to give it his approval right then. I hate to think what we would do if he should suddenly demand a change. I am seeking the assurance now because we foresee the necessity of increasing our order from the initial 50,000 by another 50,000, a decision we shall have to take within the next ten days.[70]

For the Royal Ontario Museum, it was particularly important since breaking even on the exhibition costs depended upon the sale of the catalogues, as well as admissions and souvenir sales. Dr. W. Tovell tried to clarify with Ambassador Chang the issue of official approval for the catalogue since the Royal Ontario Museum was anticipating great success with the exhibition and wanted to order a second printing.

> Before we place this additional order, we wish to assure ourselves that there has been no change of view with regard to the acceptability of our catalogue as agreed verbally at our meeting on April 16th. I would therefore be most grateful to have Your Excellency's reassurance on this matter as our decision for re-ordering the catalogue must

> be taken within a week now if we are to obtain delivery in time.[71]

But by asking for a written endorsement of a previous verbal approval, the Royal Ontario Museum left itself open to some reconsideration of the entire issue. Although Tovell thought a copy of the catalogue had been given to the Chinese Embassy, on March 20, 1974,[72] the Chinese insisted that a copy was not received.

> When Mr. Yao Jen-liu of our Embassy visited your museum on March 20, 1974, he was not given the text of your catalogue. What he received were only the two-page material entitled "Changes to the Catalogue" and 21 pages of material including some charts which your Museum proposed to supplement. The above-mentioned materials have been duly transmitted by the Embassy to the Department concerned in Peking for consideration.[73]

This response also indicated some of the cause of delay in approval since the Embassy had to communicate with Peking. These were the types of delays that the Royal Ontario Museum wanted to avoid.

The Chinese, on the other hand, had a different perception of the events that lead to the catalogue crisis.

> When Mr. Su Shih-min of our Embassy met the Canadian officials on the occasion of the signing of the Agreement on April 16, 1974, he made the following remarks with regard to materials for publicity, which is actually a mere affirmation of the verbal agreement reached by the Chinese and Canadian sides in Peking: the Canadian side shall use materials provided by the Chinese side for publication, or in case using its own materials, shall send the proofs to the Chinese Embassy prior to this printing for comment, though the Chinese side is not responsible to give approval to its printing. In the course of the talks, neither the Chinese side nor the Canadian side made reference to the catalogue or its printing.[74]

The Chinese Embassy in Ottawa was not empowered to make any decisions without authorization from Peking about the Chinese exhibition. Nevertheless,

the Embassy did indicate disapproval of actions taken by the Canadian side long after the Canadian side sought some opinion upon them by the Chinese. Consequently, the Royal Ontario Museum was informed on June 10, 1974 by Counsellor Wang Chu-liang that an additional printing of the catalogue was not approved of by the Embassy.

> I feel surprised and deem it unfortunate that you have already printed your catalogue of the Exhibition of Archaeological Finds of the People's Republic of China without prior consultation with the Chinese side.
>
> The printing of the catalogue is an important affair. In view of the latest development, we are now reporting the matter to Peking asking for instruction. We expect that our Embassy officials shall approach the Canadian side for discussion. The date for the meeting shall be suggested in the near future.
>
> For the time being, you are requested not to print any more catalogues. I trust this will meet with your approval.[75]

This was a bombshell, considering the amount of time and money invested in preparations for the exhibition and the catalogue. Some of the worst fears of the organizers seemed confirmed.

At this point, the Royal Ontario Museum strove to check on the sequence of events that created the controversy. Guy Pearse, the exhibition manager, established that the text of the catalogue had been given to Mr. Yao of the Chinese Embassy during his visit to the Royal Ontario Museum on March 10, 1974. According to Pearse's estimates the Chinese had "27 days in which to react favorably or otherwise to the text."[76] Then on April 16, 1974 at the signing of the inter-agency agreement, the Canadian side--Royal Ontario Museum officials and a representative from External Affairs--"received a verbal indication from the Chinese side that the text of the catalogue was acceptable."[77]

The Canadian Embassy, in Peking, was informed of Chinese disapproval of the Canadian catalogue, in a statement from the Deputy Director of the Information Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Peking. This information was forwarded to the Royal Ontario Museum in a letter from Freeman Tovell to Walter Tovell on June 25, 1974.

> During our (External Affairs representatives) discussions concerning the Exhibition we agreed that the Canadian side must use material provided by the Chinese side and that the Canadian side must give the Chinese side proofs of the catalogue before it was printed. This was to avoid problems encountered in France and England. During further discussions, the Canadian side had said that it was going to use the British catalogue because of shortness of time but that it would modify those points which the Chinese side opposed. We learned in March that the Canadian side had provided the Chinese Embassy with a list of modifications but it did not provide full proofs of the catalogue. We regard this as a violation of our verbal agreement. . . .Now we have received a message that the Canadian side has printed 50,000 copies of the catalogue before hearing our opinion. This is not in accordance with our verbal agreement.[78]

As far as the Chinese were concerned, the Canadian catalogue still needed revisions. They supplied a copy of a Chinese catalogue, to be used as a guideline for revising the Canadian one. According to the Chinese, the problems with revisions were the result of Canadian errors.

> We did not expect these problems to arise since we told the Canadian side of our concern very early in the negotiations. We hope that all the necessary measures will be taken to modify the catalogue in order to ensure the success of the exhibition and for the spirit of friendship between our two countries.[79]

The financial considerations for the Royal Ontario Museum were quite significant. Time was running out as well; and the museum budget depended upon the return of the capital outlay for the exhibition, through the sale of the catalogue. The interest expressed in the

exhibition promised large sales in the catalogue. The Chinese were reminded of the considerable efforts made by Canada to keep the Chinese informed about the catalogues.

> Despite requests for a list of any further changes the Chinese might wish to make while it was still technically possible to include them, no such list was received. Because of the great urgency to have the catalogue printed, the Chinese side was informed both in Peking and Ottawa that due to the time factor it would not be possible to submit proofs to the Chinese side for its examination.
>
> On March 20 the Chinese Embassy was given a list which detailed all changes being implemented by the council. No response was received nor any indication given by the Chinese side that these changes were not entirely satisfactory nor was it indicated by the Chinese side that it had any view on these changes or wished any other changes made until June 17. This, of course, approximately seven weeks before the exhibition was due to open. Meanwhile, at the time of the signing of the interagency agreement on April 16, the Council received from the Chinese Embassy what it believed in good faith to be verbal assurances that the Chinese side was in agreement with the changes it had painstakingly made, that it had no others to propose and that the provision of proofs as earlier agreed orally would not now be necessary. In these circumstances the council's belief that the Chinese side had no further comments to make on its catalogue was clearly a reasonable one.[80]

The Canadian side felt that this review of their efforts to comply with the agreements would demonstrate to the Chinese that they had acted in good faith.

Time was of the essence. Chinese dissatisfaction with the catalogue threatened to cancel the exhibition. In an effort to promote discussion and to resolve the crisis, representatives of the Canadian side in Ottawa proposed the Chinese re-examine the Canadian position in a spirit of good faith and cooperation.

> The council is confident that the Chinese side will cooperate sympathetically in order to overcome the

> grave difficulties it now faces in making final preparations for the exhibition. It believes the two sides should henceforth not look backwards on how this situation has arisen, but forward so as to solve it in the interest of continuing friendship between our two peoples.[81]

On June 28th, 1974, just over a month before the proposed opening of August 8th, Dr. W. Tovell went to Ottawa to discuss further the catalogue problem with representatives of the Chinese Embassy. In an effort to resolve the problems, the Canadian side offered to print a "Corrigenda and Addenda," with a revised historical table and a map, that would be placed so as to block out the map of the original Canadian catalogue. Tovell . . .

> could not give the exact details of how this would take place until we have talked with a publisher. However it is the principle that matters. The sheets would hide the map that you (Mr. Su Shih-min) requested not be used.[82]

Instead the discussions on revisions brought forward more specific criticisms of the British catalogue such as the maps and historical interpretation of the text. A letter from Dr. Tovell to Mr. Su Shih-min put forward the Museum's proposals that there would not be a reprint of the revised English catalogues and the Chinese catalogue --that had been received on June 17-- would be used if it was necessary to print a second catalogue. Tovell recalled the impossibility of complying with the Chinese suggestions for revising the British catalogue.

> I recall that you indicated that the changes requested in the revised English catalogue were only the major changes and that there were statements in the revised English text which did not give a valid picture of Chinese history. You also indicated that you would like to see the changes that were submitted to the Royal Ontario Museum be incorporated into the

> catalogue. In reply I pointed out that this was impossible as the catalogues were now in transit somewhere in the middle of the Atlantic Ocean and that there were no facilities in Canada for reprinting the catalogue and that the method I suggested previously appeared to be the only solution open to us, particularly in view of the shortness of time.
>
> In closing, you indicated that you would submit our proposals to Peking for comment.[83]

The proposed revisions to the catalogue from the Chinese side had come too late, and attempts, at this point, to correct the problem to the complete satisfaction of the Chinese were impossible.

The catalogue crisis continued through July and up until the August 8th opening, as all parties defended their interpretations of the events and of the agreements affecting the catalogue. Specifically, the Chinese side objected to the Canadian side's interpretation of Chinese statements.

> I (the Chinese Representative in Peking) have gained a distinct impression that the Canadian side is shifting responsibility for its printing of the British catalogue on to us. We cannot accept this. You (the Canadian representative) refer to good faith several times. We have never mentioned good faith. We have said that the Canadian side has printed the British catalogue without receiving our opinion on revisions and that this is against our verbal agreement. On this we are on firm ground. You only submitted part of the catalogue for our opinion, and even then before you obtained our opinion you published.
>
> According to our report from Ottawa, your responsible members state Peking had approved the publication. We never agreed to the publication of the British catalogue. I said that after the British catalogue was revised it would need approval. Our Embassy in Ottawa did not agree to publication. We never agreed to the publication of the British catalogue. I said that after the British catalogue was revised it would need approval. Our Embassy in Ottawa did not agree to publication. Because you did not receive any objections does not mean we accepted it. Besides you say that on April 16 the Chinese side agreed to the changes. This does not accord with facts. At the beginning of June we contacted the Canadian authorities

> concerned to discuss the matter. Before that we had not expressed our attitude. Therefore, from this statement I have a deep impression that the relevant organization of the Canadian side is shifting responsibility to the Chinese side. We cannot agree with this.[84]

Evidently both the Canadian and Chinese sides had very different opinions on this issue and its development. One can appreciate the Chinese criticisms of the Canadian side interpreting silence as approval; however the Canadian side had advised the Chinese about the necessity of a decision within certain deadlines.

The Chinese appreciated the Canadian approach of looking forward to resolving the problem rather than looking backward on how it occurred; yet the Chinese seemed to want the blame shifted completely onto the Canadian side. The Chinese were also determined that the Canadians acknowledge responsibility. In a forward looking spirit, the Canadians offered to print a corrigenda and addenda; however this solution was unacceptable to the Chinese.

> You must revise the British catalogue according to our opinions or print a catalogue based on our materials.[85]

The Chinese response to the corrigenda and addenda solution seemed to be an ultimatum which threatened the possibility of having an exhibition.

> When the Chinese were asked if the Chinese side would be content with anything less than a complete reprinting, they were told that the catalogue must be revised "according to Chinese materials" or the Chinese catalogue be used. A Corrigenda and Addenda would be unacceptable.[86]

The catalogue issues were raised again in a meeting on July 4th, 1974, between W. Tovell and Su Shih-min at the Chinese Embassy in Ottawa. More problems with the British catalogue surfaced in these

discussions. For the Chinese, the only solution was reprinting.

> . . .Mr. Su raised the points which comprised his opening statements and were as follows: for the 50,000 catalogues that have been published, the Chinese government does not agree with a "Corrigenda and Addenda" solution. They hope that the catalogue will be reprinted according to the changes provided by the Chinese side. He stressed that only important changes were given to us but on answer to a question from me, I gathered that these are the only changes that they would request. However they do indicate that there are other errors in the catalogue. Also, they apparently take exception to some of our translations, eg. "state" and "dynasty".[87]

Some points of contention were avoided. The Chinese were quite particular about the map of China to be displayed in the exhibit. The Chinese were specific about boundaries, showing Peking as a capital and Taiwan as a province. A map for the exhibition was provided by the Department of External Affairs. Nevertheless, the corrigenda and addenda solution to the catalogue controversy, that was frequently proposed, remained unacceptable.[88] The concern with publications included not only the catalogue but also any aspect of promotion of the exhibition. Consequently, the Chinese insisted on their right to veto anything that did not represent the exhibition according to their perspective.

> Mr. Su stressed that for the successful holding of this exhibition, two agreements had been signed and there had also been verbal agreements. These were that if the Canadian government were to publish material, the Canadian side must use material supplied by the Chinese side or send proofs prior to publication.[89]

Evidently with regard to the catalogue, there was some misunderstanding over the format of presenting the corrections to the Chinese. The Chinese expected more than two pages of revisions. The entire circumstances of this difficulty were explained to External Affairs

by Dr. W. Tovell.

> Mr. Su indicated that no proofs had been sent in advance ~~and, as a~~ matter of fact, only two pages of changes were submitted (I MUST EMPHASIZE HERE THAT THEY HAVE TAKEN THE TWO PAGES AS THE ONLY CHANGES, WHICH IS CORRECT: HOWEVER, THE ENTIRE BRITISH CATALOGUE WAS PART OF THE TEXT THAT WAS TO BE USED, MR. SU STATED, I BELIEVE, THAT 24 MARCH 1974 WAS THE DATE FOR THIS). Without waiting for any response from the Chinese side, 50,000 copies were published.
>
> Mr. Su referred to meetings of 2 February and 21 February 1974 in the Canadian Embassy when Mr. Evans met with Chinese officials and during this meeting the Chinese officials re-affirmed their views on the Watson catalogue. Therefore, they consider what we have done to be a violation of the agreements and understanding.
>
> The difficulties, he stressed, were not from the Chinese side: "We provided our own changes." He closed by expressing the hope that everything could be solved; however, the Royal Ontario Museum had not changed the views of the Watson catalogue.[90]

For the Royal Ontario Museum, the catalogue difficulties represented a considerable setback in the planning which continued to threaten the possibilities of cancellation.

The situation deteriorated even further when the Canadian and Chinese representatives continued to disagree over whether the catalogue had been discussed at an earlier date.

> The point to be made here is that it was my clear understanding that after the discussions in the Department of External Affairs after the signing of the agreement on 17 April, 1974, I had indicated to the Chinese side that the catalogue was already being published; this statement was repeated twice and supported by a statement on file from Mr. John Ausman of the Department of External Affairs. However, Mr. Su indicated that catalogues were not mentioned during that meeting. He stressed, again, the hope that we would solve this smoothly but there was no alternative open to us from the Chinese side. He went on to say that there were problems in France and Britain but things went smoothly in Vienna and

Stockholm, so why are we having trouble in Canada.[91]

Yet in Stockholm, the Confucian script was withdrawn from the exhibition, which seemed to foreshadow greater difficulties with the interpretation of the exhibition.

Mr. Su Shih-min criticized Dr. W. Tovell's letter of July 3, 1974 for failing to summarize the discussion accurately. According to Mr. Su's viewpoint, the letter did not adequately express China's dissatisfaction with the Watson catalogue.

> As you will recall, at the meeting you handed to me a letter dated July 3, 1974 which purported to summerize (sic) our discussion on June 28, 1974. After reading it, I responded to state that the letter did not correctly interpret our discussion on June 28, as it made no account of almost all the views expressed by our side, particularly those views concerning the necessity of deleting the gross mistakes in Watson's Catalogue and our being unable to accept your proposal to attach a "Corrigenda and Addenda" to the Canadian Catalogue, which is apparently inappropriate to a matter of such serious nature. You said that you agreed to the above mentioned statement made by me.[92]

The Chinese were insistent that the text of the catalogue be revised. If the catalogue was not revised, the Chinese felt that the agreements had been violated. Consequently, the Royal Ontario Museum and the Department of External Affairs were caught trying to work out an acceptable formula that would permit the use of the existing 50,000 catalogues.

Instead, inquiries into methods of complying with Chinese demands seemed to uncover even more difficulties. For example, the publisher of the catalogue was unwilling to revise the copyright text without agreeing to the specific revisions requested by the Chinese. Even if a new catalogue had been published, it could not be prepared and

delivered in time for the exhibition opening, it would arrive six to eight weeks after the opening. A telex from Bob Ducas, a Times representative, to Barbara Stephen reveals much about the British stand on these revisions.

> This whole situation is a direct repeat of what happened to us here in London. Then we insisted that the catalogue we had produced was used. As you know it was. Would suggest most earnestly that Ottawa pays attention to the Chinese critique but still uses the catalogue in precisely the same form as produced for you now. Any questions before we see a sight of the critique or the suggested changes, please do not hesitate to get in touch. Obviously if Ottawa digs their heels in then there is going to be no problems on this side of the Atlantic but if Ottawa falls in line with the Chinese wishes then speed is of the very essence.[93]

Evidently, the publisher did not appreciate that the situation had deteriorated since the exhibition was held in London nor that many of the difficulties with the exhibition arrangements in London helped to set the stage for the controversy in Canada.

The Text and The Format of The Catalogue

The catalogue controversy is most clearly illustrated by a comparison of the catalogue texts in particular the British catalogue and the Canadian revised version of the British catalogue, with the textual corrections requested by the Chinese.[94] The Chinese interpretation of history with its revised ideological themes had to be clearly presented both in the exhibition and in the souvenir catalogue. Consequently, the appropriate heroes of China's class struggles had to be celebrated and the villains were castigated or ignored. Confucius became the villain of the piece for his efforts to maintain a slave

society instead of supporting the "progressive" change in social structure from slave to feudal society. However Confucius' major crime was to remind the more ideologically strident members of China's political elite of the revisionist trends within the Communist party.

The Revisions

As with the title of the exhibition, the Chinese were quite particular about the title of the catalogue. For the exhibition and the catalogue, the British used the title The Genius of China: An Exhibition of Archaeological Finds of the People's Republic of China.[95] The word "genius" celebrated the achievements of the upper classes rather than the struggles of the lower classes. Thus "genius" seemed to imply the artifacts in the exhibition were only the result of the directions or authority of an inspired elite. Hence the British title celebrated the leadership in China's past rather than paying tribute to China's artisans who struggled under a corrupt leadership. On the contemporary front, "genius" brought to mind the ongoing struggles between the masses and the ruling elite.

Both archival sources of material for this thesis contained a photocopied copy of the British catalogue with the problem sections crossed out. The ideological reasons for these corrections were not provided. Nevertheless in the case of the British catalogue, Canada was willing to accommodate the Chinese. Indeed the Canadian version of the British catalogue contained many revisions beginning with the title, which was changed to The Chinese Exhibition: The Exhibition of Archaeological Finds of the People's Republic of China.[96] Catalogue

revisions were made in the maps, the table of contents, chronological tables and most significantly the interpretation of the careers of Confucius and Emperor Chin Shih Huang Ti.

The maps were a point of controversy. In both the British and the Canadian revised version of the catalogue, maps of China were on the inside front and back flaps of the catalogue. Both maps were the same. The Chinese rejected the maps[97] because international boundaries were not clearly identified according to the Chinese view. Both the mainland and the island of Taiwan had to be presented on the maps in the same colour. Additionally, the ownership of some islands off Vietnam's coast--the Paracels--had to be illustrated as being part of China rather than of Vietnam. Finally Peking had to be clearly identified as the capital of China.

Also the table of contents in both the British catalogue and the Canadian revised version revealed an approach to China's history that became contrary to Chinese preferences and perspectives.[98] In both of these catalogues, the sequence of China's history was outlined in divisions by dynasty. The Canadian version of the British catalogue changed the titles of three sections--the title of section six from the British version of "The Kingdom of Tien" became the "Western Han dynasty: the Kingdom of Tien "[99] and the British title for section two, "The Period of Six Dynasties"[100] was revised in the Canadian version as "The Chin, Northern and Southern Dynasties."[101] Finally, section twelve was also changed from the British version of "The Liao and Yuan Dynasties"[102] to the Canadian version of "The Liao, Chin and Yuan Dynasties."[103]

Both the British catalogue and the Canadian revised edition contained chronological tables which were alike apart from a few revisions in the Canadian edition.[104] The revisions requested by the Chinese asked for the replacement of the table with one from a Chinese catalogue, with red covers, entitled: The Exhibition of Archaeological Finds of the People's Republic of China.[105] This Chinese catalogue became available to the Royal Ontario Museum bookstore once the supply of Canadian catalogues was exhausted.

Confucius

The changing status of Confucius prompted many of the Chinese requests for revisions. During the anti-Confucius and Anti-Lin Piao debates in China, Confucianism was once again interpreted as a reactionary philosophy that had hindered China's social, political and economic development. Through historical analogy, Confucianism and revisionism advocated social stability and the maintenance of the status quo; while Mao's version of communism advocated continuous revolution and class struggle. All references to Confucianism in the catalogue had to be revised appropriately to demonstrate China's ideological departure from a revisionist past. For example, the Chinese requested the deletion of the following passage that appeared in both the British and in the Canadian revised edition catalogues.[106]

> Study of the traditional rites was a natural outcome of the Confucian philosophy, which saw them as sustaining the personal and political relations necessary to a stable society. This kind of antiquarianism flourished therefore between the third century B.C. and the second century A.D., when Confucianism was first establishing itself as the orthodox world view; and again in the

> eleventh and twelfth centuries A.D. when traditional native attitudes were affirmed against the 'foreign' infection of Buddhism, in the intellectual atmosphere which produced Neo-Confucianism.[107]

The Chinese also requested the deletion of other references to Confucius such as those to the restoration of Confucianism during the Han dynasty.[108] Instead, as counterpoint, references to the accomplishments in dramatic social change during the Chin dynasty (interpreted as repressive by some Western sources) were celebrated for prompting a change in Chinese society from slave to feudal.[109]

The most specific criticism of Confucius came in the withdrawal of a fragment of the Confucian analects from the exhibition collection for display in Sweden. In the British catalogue, a picture of the fragment excavated in 1967 is presented along with a translation.[110] The exhibit was replaced for the exhibition's visit with a paper manuscript excavated in 1964 at Turfan, Sinkiang, which was a record of land allocation and register of the household of Ning Ho-ts'ai of Kao-ch'ang County of the T'ang Dynasty.[111]

According to the ongoing campaigns in China at the time of the exhibition's arrival in Canada, Confucius was presented as a representative of the Slave Society, whose philosophy and teachings hindered China's political progression to a Feudal Society. Confucius and his disciples were labeled as revisionists who attempted to keep China back or as was repeatedly noted by articles in Hsinhua News Bulletin to "turn back the wheel of development."[112] By historical analogy Lin Piao was labeled as a disciple of Confucianism and was consequently accused of being a restorationist who was attempting to prevent the next phase of China's development. In an effort to prevent

the development of any positive impression of Confucius from the exhibition, the Chinese requested the deletion of many of the references to Confucius' contributions as a stabilizing force in China's development.

On the other hand, the negative reputation of Emperor Chin Shih Huang Ti, remembered for burning the books and burying Confucian scholars alive, was downplayed by many of the catalogue revisions requested by the Chinese. Confucius and Chin Shih Huang Ti were the figureheads representing opposing ideological forces of Slave and Feudal Societies. Confucius represented pragmatism and revisionism, and his philosophy was the ideological mainstay that upheld the slave system. In keeping with the ideological spirit of the anti-Confucius anti-Lin Piao campaign, the Chinese looked upon Emperor Chin Shih Huang's actions of routing Confucianism as helping to propel China from slavery to feudalism. Instead the cruelty of Chin Shih Huang was underplayed in preference to his unifying leadership of China.

As comparisons were drawn between Lin Piao and Confucius, comparisons were made between Mao Tse-tung and Chin Shih Huang Ti. This fact may have prompted the demands for many revisions of the portions of the Canadian version of the British catalogue, on the Chin dynasty and the Western Han dynasty. The revisions played down any negative criticisms of Chin Shih Huang Ti. For example, in both the British catalogue and the Canadian revised version of the British catalogue, the opening section on the Chin Dynasty reads as follows:

> The victory of Ch'in and the consequent unification of China initiated a short period of despotic rule by a boastful monarch, who gave no thought to the patronage

> of art or of any but the most practical science. His armies campaigned into Annam (North Vietnam) and Korea, and in the north-west were engaged in continual struggle with Hsiung-nu, Shih Huang Ti "First Emperor" as he immodestly named himself, opposed the increasing power of merchants, controlled weights and measures (inscribing on many bronzes the text of his decree, a variant fragment of which is seen on the exhibit number 137) and built roads.[113]

Having been recognized as a hero for his unification of China, and condemnation of the slave owners etc., Chih Shih Huang Ti could not be described as a despot. Instead the proposed revision avoided the criticisms.

> The Chin dynasty was period in which a unified multi-national feudal country was formed in China. In keeping with the trend of historical development, Chin (Ch'in) Shih Huang, the first Emperor of Chin (Ch'in) (259-210 B.C.) defeated the contemporary states and brought them under unified control in 221 B.C.. It was the first time in Chinese history that a unified feudal country under centralized authority had been founded.
>
> Chin (Ch'in) Shih Huang abolished the vassal system and introduced the system of establishing prefectures and countries. With a firm hand he suppressed the attempts of the slave owning nobles to restore their lost power, introduced a uniform system of writing, effected the standardization of money, weights and measures and had roads for couriers built all over the country. By carrying out political, economic and cultural reforms he helped to promote the development of the feudal system.[114]

Thus Chin Shih Huang Ti went from despot to social reformer. Some negative references were requested to be deleted from the text completely. For example, the reference to the execution of Chin's childless wives and burial with him was supposed to be deleted.[115] References to Confucius and the repression of the scholarly class were also to be deleted. For example, the following text had to be deleted because of its criticism of Chin Shih Huang Ti and its positive tone in describing the restoration of Confucianism.

> Under the following Western Han dynasty the intellectual release effected by the removal of Shih Huang Ti's oppression of theoretical discussion and writing led to a burst of creative scholarship. Texts were edited and historical documents scanned in an effort to reach an objective assessment of tradition in all its aspects. On the one hand Confucian philosophy was gradually rescued from its recent retreat and began to infiltrate the ranks of the official class. On the other, attention to popular superstitions and mythology became respectable among the educated.[116]

Because of Mao's preference for comparisons with Chin, references to Emperor Chih Shih Huang Ti's repression of the scholarly class might have prompted comparison with the repression of scholars during the Cultural Revolution under the leadership of Mao.

The history of China's foreign relations and relations with minority groups also came under scrutiny, in the proposed revisions of the Canadian version of the British catalogue. References to China's historical relations with other nations in Asia, to minorities within China and to the periods of China's history under foreign domination were also carefully revised. In the British catalogue and the Canadian revised version of the British catalogue, China was described as an expansive conqueror. The Chinese requested the deletion of such references.

> In the late first century A.D. we see the Chinese hold on Central Asia threatened but retained;[117]

The revisions also revealed a different interpretation of China's relations with other countries. For example, a section describing the Han period to T'ang period textiles etc., reads as follows in both the British and Canadian catalogues.

> Archaeologically the extent of Chinese authority and trade in Central Asia-through the basin of the

> Tarim from Tun Huang at the exit from China proper to Pamir plateau- is traced by finds of textiles.[118]

The Chinese did not want the historical image of an imperialist conqueror. Consequently, they requested the following revision.

> Archaeologically the event of trade with Central and Western Asia from Ch'ang an, the capital of Han and T'ang through Kansu and Sinkiang provinces to Afghanistan and Iran and westward- is traced by finds of textiles.[119]

Other references to Chinese authority were to be deleted.

References to China's lack of unity and loss of territorial control also had to be revised. For example, in the description of the Period of Five Dynasties and the Sung Dynasty, the Canadian revised version of the British catalogue reads as follows:

> Upon reunification in 960 by General Chao K'uang yin who became the first Sung emperor, the northeast beyond the wall remained in the hands of the Khitan confederation of Turkish and Mongol tribes, who named their dynasty Liao.[120]

The recommended revision states:

> General Chao K'uang-yin reunified China in 960 and became the first emperor of the Sung dynasty.[121]

In reference to the Liao, Chin and Yuan dynasties, any mention of the conquest of China was supposed to be deleted. For example, the sentence

> The Mongols whose emperors called their house Yuan (original), had completed their conquest of China by 1271.[122]

was revised to state:

> Shortly after the Mongols proclaimed the Yuan dynasty in 1271, they completed their reunification of China.[123]

Negative descriptions of collaboration of the Chinese with their conquerors

were to be deleted, such as this section.

> The Mongols attempted simultaneously a despotic control of their Chinese subjects and a personal assimilation of Chinese culture. Many Chinese intellectuals and artists, out of patriotism eschewed the advantages of the summons to court, but the greatest of painters, Chao Men-fu, had no qualms in rallying to Kublai.[124]

The following sentence from the original catalogues accepts the foreign presence.

> No baleful effect upon art can be attributed to the foreign rule. Painting flourished.[125]

The proposed revision eliminates acknowledgement of foreign influence.

> Under the rule of the Yüan dynasty painting flourished.[126]

Possibly these positive effects of past foreign rule and the compromises made by some of the Chinese to serve foreign interests could not be noted out of concern about any potential criticisms from the more radical segment of China's leadership that wanted to curb the growth of China's contacts with the west.

The entire section of the Canadian version of the British catalogue entitled "China in the East Asian Context" was supposed to be deleted.[127] This passage noted the spread of cultural influences within and beyond China's borders. Part of this passage also referred to the political fragmentation of China and the independence of the Kingdom of T'ien, which was not accepted by Mao's government.

References in the section of the catalogue describing the artifacts were also rigorously checked. For example, a phrase was supposed to be deleted from the description of artifacts 229-134--Pottery figures of two acrobats and four musicians.

> . . .after the expansion of Chinese power through the Tarim basin under the emperor Wu Ti at the end of the second century B.C.[128]

Revisions were also required in section eight entitled "Chin, Northern and Southern Dynasties."[129] The title was supposed to be changed to "The Three Kingdoms, Western and Eastern Chin Dynasties and Northern and Southern Dynasties A.D. 220-589."[130] In the British catalogue, this section was entitled the "Period of the Six Dynasties A.D. 220-580."[131]

Section nine of the Canadian version of the Watson catalogue, which referred to Emperor Wu Ti's expansion and contact with Western Asia also came under criticism. References to Chinese control of the silk route had to be deleted. For example, the conclusion of a description of silk routes was unacceptable.

> The routes to the north and south of Tarim Basin--The 'Silk Route'--were in constant use even during the period of the Six dynasties when Chinese control of the oasis cities, situated along them was relaxed.[132]

This section was to be replaced with the following phrase.

> The route to the north and south of the Tarim Basin--the 'Silk Route'--remained in constant use throughout the period of Northern and Southern dynasties.[133]

Other issues for revision were the sections on minorities and China's history under the domination of foreign powers.

The Resolution of the Catalogue Problem

The final solution on the catalogue controversy came about as the result of a meeting between the Chinese Ambassador to Canada and Mr. Noah Torno, the Chairman of the China Exhibition Council. According to Mr. Torno's assessment of the situation the Chinese rejection of the Canadian version of the British catalogue left the

following possibilities: accepting a total loss, printing a new catalogue, and accepting that a new catalogue would not be ready for the opening of the exhibition. Mr. Torno approached the problem by recounting to the Chinese Ambassador, Mr. Truman's remark "the buck stops here." Then in reference to resolving the catalogue problem, Mr. Torno said "the buck stops here with me."[134]

Unless an agreement was reached, the exhibition would have been cancelled. No exhibition would have been a major disaster on the diplomatic front for Canada and China, and a major setback for the Royal Ontario Museum, after the museum had invested so much time, money and effort for the exhibition. The final compromise proposed by Mr. Torno was the publication of a new catalogue, entitled The Exhibition of Archaeological Finds of the People's Republic of China: The Official and Authentic Introduction and Catalogue.[135] This new catalogue was a supplementary insert that was sold with the Canadian version of the British catalogue.[136] The Chinese Embassy had to obtain approval from Peking. The only remaining problem was the approaching deadline.

This new catalogue section was deemed acceptable since the Chinese wrote the text. It followed the Marxist format of Primitive, Slave and Feudal societies. The format also consisted of a description of each period followed by a list and description of artifacts. Chin Shih Huang Ti was presented as a reformer and there was an emphasis placed on China's contributions to world civilization. There was no mention of Confucius. As a final courtesy, the Ambassador's wife chose the yellow colour for the catalogue covers.[137] For the Royal

Ontario Museum, the solution was acceptable since the yellow catalogue inserted with the original Canadian version of the British catalogue, allowed for the sale of the catalogue package.

The Royal Ontario Museum had 50,000 copies of these catalogues printed, which were given at no extra cost with the sale of the Canadian revised version of the British catalogue.[138] Once the supply was exhausted, the Chinese came forward with a red catalogue entitled: The Exhibition of Archaeological Finds of the People's Republic of China.[139] This catalogue's purpose was identified in the first page, as presenting China's contribution to history.[140] The chronology followed the Marxist framework.

In retrospect, Mr. Torno did not feel that the Canadian side went too far in accommodating the Chinese, since the exhibition was their product and their material. In assessing the complexities of resolving the catalogue controversy, Mr. Torno felt that the people at the Chinese Embassy did not have the authority to approve the text since the authority was in Peking.[141] The Exhibition opened on August 8, 1974 and closed on November 16, 1974.

1. Data from the External Affairs Archives and from the Royal Ontario Museum Archives suggests that the efforts to obtain an archaeological exhibition started during the 1960's, however a report on the Chinese Exhibition by Mrs. Stephen and Mrs. Downie states these efforts started in the 1950's.
R.O.M. Archives, "The Chinese Exhibition Report" by Mrs. Barbara Stephen, Associate Curator-in-charge, Far Eastern Department, September 4, 1975, p.1.

2. The Far Eastern Collection of the Royal Ontario Museum is described in detail in the following three texts: 1. Henry Trubner, The Far Eastern Collection, Handbook of the Far Eastern Collection, (Toronto: The Royal Ontario Museum, 1968), 2. Doris Dohrenwend, The East Asian Galleries, A Guide to the Collection, (Toronto: Royal Ontario Museum, 1969), 3. Lewis C. Walmsley, Bishop in Honan Mission and Museum in the Life of William C. White, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1974).

3. Historical Division, External Affairs, Archeo P.R.C., 67-7, Vol.1 Letter from Miss C. Gillies, Cultural Affairs Division, External Affairs, Ottawa, to Dr. W. Tovell, Director, Royal Ontario Museum, December 5, 1972.

4. The Chinese Exhibition Council, a corporate body independent of the Royal Ontario Museum, entered into all the agreements in order to obtain the Exhibition. The Members were Mr. J.R. Evans, Mr. Maxwell Henderson, Dr. J.Gordon Parr, Mr. A.E. Ritchie, Mr. Chester Ronning, Mrs. Barbara Stephen, Mr. Kenneth R. Thompson, Dr. W.M. Tovell and the chairman, Mr. Noah Torno.
R.O.M. Archives, Minutes of the Chinese Exhibition Council
This text contains details on the formal organization of the council and its functions.

5. The Chinese Exhibition Committee planned "the details of the Exhibition on behalf of the Chinese Exhibition Council."
R.O.M. Archives, Minutes of a Meeting of the Board of Directors of the Chinese Exhibition Council of the Royal Ontario Museum, March 25, 1974, p.2.
from: R.O.M.: Minutes of the Chinese Exhibition Council
The Committee chairman was Mrs. Barbara Stephen, a member of the Chinese Exhibition Council and Associate Curator of the Far Eastern Department of the Museum. Other members included: Mr. Guy Pearse, the Exhibition Manager whose duties were assumed later by the Deputy Exhibition Manager, Mrs. H. Downie, Mr. J. Anthony-Display, Mr. J.H. Harvy-General Services, and Mr. A. MacDonald-Publications and Information.
The members of this committee were noted in a Director's Memorandum, No.9, April 8, 1974, R.O.M.: Minutes of the Chinese Exhibition Council. Mrs. Downie took over for Mr. Pearse, after his resignation, part way through the exhibition's visit in Canada. Interview with Mrs. B. Stephen, September 1980.

6. R.O.M. Archives, "Minutes of a Meeting of the Board of Directors of the Chinese Exhibition Council of the Royal Ontario Museum, 25 March, 1974, R.O.M.: Minutes of the Chinese Exhibition Council.

7. R.O.M. Archives, "Minutes of a Meeting of the Board of Directors of the Chinese Exhibition Council of the Royal Ontario Museum, 25 March, 1974, p.2.
R.O.M.: Minutes of the Chinese Exhibition Council.

8. Ibid.

9. R.O.M. Archives, Letter from Mr. F. Tovell, Director, Cultural Affairs Division, to Dr. W. Tovell, Director, R.O.M., May 22, 1973. These comments were referred to as those of an unidentified member of the Canadian Embassy in Peking who saw the exhibition collection on March 28, at the Peking Historical Museum.
In a document of the Historical Division, External Affairs, these comments were attributed to Miss Margaret Cornish and they were forwarded by Morris Copithorne of the Canadian Embassy, Peking, to the Undersecretary of State for External Affairs,
H.D. E.A. Archeo P.R.C. 67-7, Vol. 1, Memo no. 256, April 27, 1973.

10. H.D. E.A. Archeo P.R.C. 67-7 Vol 1, Memo no. 256, April 27, 1973.

11. R.O.M. Archives, Exhibition of Chinese Archaeological Treasures Royal Ontario Museum-Toronto, August 1974, by Maxwell Henderson, Director (Administration), Diary, London, Tuesday, October 30, 1973, p.1.

12. Nancy Kuo, "Letter from London, The Chinese Exhibition in Paris and London," Eastern Horizon, Volume XIII, Number 1, p.63.

13. Interview with Dr. W. Tovell, February 26, 1981.

14. R.O.M. Archives, "Report of Dr. Shih's Visit to Chinese Treasures Exhibition Petit Palais, Paris France, August 1973, p.2.

15. R.O.M. Archives, Memorandum from H.Y. Shih, to Noah Torno, Subject: Chinese Archaeological Exhibition, August 3, 1973, filed with a cover letter from Noah Torno to Dr. H.Y. Shih, August 9, 1973.

16. Although the Chinese did not allow tours of the exhibition, the Royal Ontario Museum had tours of their own in-house collection, supplementary exhibitions and lectures, all of which helped to promote the Chinese Exhibition. The in-house auxillary exhibitions consisted of a display on the Lower Rotunda entitled "Faces of Old

China"--which were photographs from the museum collections--, a display on the first floor rotunda--which was a Chinese garden with a display of fish in the aquarium--, and another display in the Textile Gallery entitled "Visions of Cathay" --which was a display of Chinese and Chinoiserie fabrics. (R.O.M. Archives Director's Memorandum No. 20, July 22, 1974, p.3.). Other promotional materials were on display in the Toronto Dominion Centre, the Royal Bank, the Museum Subway TTC, the T. Eaton Company, the display case outside the museum, and a stamp corner. (R.O.M. Archives, Director's Memorandum, No. 20, July 22, 1974, pp. 3-4). A Touring Committee gave lectures in the Far Eastern Galleries of the R.O.M. (R.O.M. Archives, Director's Memorandum, No. 20, July 22, 1974, p.4).

> The ROM member's committee has organized daily programmes of ROM's own famous Chinese galleries. Objects in the collection are used to acquaint the visitor with Chinese cultural history and thus enlarge his appreciation of the exhibition.
> (R.O.M. Archives, Promotional Material, n.d. from the Chinese Exhibition Advertising and Publicity)

A lecture series on Chinese archaeology was sponsored by the Bishop White Committee (R.O.M. Archives, Royal Ontario Museum, 25th Annual Report, July 1974/June 1975, The Far Eastern Department, by Hsio-Yen Shih, Curator).
School visits were arranged as well and education kits--consisting of notes on different aspects of the exhibition with emphasis on the historical significance of the exhibits--were given to teachers to prepare students for a visit to the exhibition. (R.O.M. Archives, Promotional Material, n.d., from the Chinese Exhibition Advertising and Publicity material.).

17. The administrative details of the Chinese Exhibition in London are noted in detail in a diary of Maxwell Henderson's visit to London from October 29, 1973 to November 6, 1973.
R.O.M. Archives, "Exhibition of Chinese Archaeological Treasures Royal Ontario Museum-Toronto August 1974 " by Maxwell Henderson.

18. Ibid., p.1.

19. Ibid., p.3.

20. Ibid., p.12.

21. Ibid., pp. 12-13.

22. Ibid., p.11.

23. Ibid., p.11

Mr. Taverner and Mr. Pearse emphasized strongly the significance of a close relationship with the Chinese to the success of the exhibition in London.

24. Indeed British advice may have later influenced the Canadian organizer to include a recognized friend of China, Mr. Chester Ronning, on the Chinese Exhibition Council. This point was raised by Alex MacDonald in his "Report on Chinese Exhibition, London."

> A matter that was stressed at one meeting attended by a Foreign Office representative and Freeman Tovell, was the need for a well recognized National Exhibition Committee which would include particularly a member noted by the Chinese as a "Friend of China" . . . the sort of man we might have in mind would be Chester Ronning.
> R.O.M. Archives, "Report on Chinese Exhibition, London, October 23, 1973," by Alex MacDonald, p.3.

25. R.O.M. Archives, "Exhibition of Chinese Archaeological Treasures Royal Ontario Museum-Toronto August 1974, by Maxwell Henderson, p.2.

26. Ibid., Diary, p.5.

27. Nancy Kuo, "Letter from London, The Chinese Exhibition in Paris and London," Eastern Horizon, Volume XIII, Number 1, p.64 .

28. R.O.M. Archives, "Exhibition of Chinese Archaeological Treasures Royal Ontario Museum-Toronto August 1974," by Maxwell Henderson, Diary, p. 4.

29. Ibid., p. 4.

> Mr. Pearse said occasionally articles come out in learned journals deprecating the commercial approach.

30. Ibid., p.4.

31. The symptoms of Jade fever are described in greater detail in Nancy Kuo's "Letter from London, The Chinese Exhibition in Paris and London," op.cit. p.64.
Tut fever later struck Canada, so much so that Laura Secord made a lollipop with the face of the Death Mask of King Tut.

32. R.O.M. Archives, "Exhibition of Chinese Archaeological Treasures Royal Ontario Museum-Toronto August 1974," by Maxwell Henderson, pp.8-9.

33. R.O.M. Archives, Data from the Director's Office 1974-75,

"The Great Britain-China Centre," September 1974 The purpose of this organization was described as follows:

> The Great Britain-China Centre has been established with the encouragement of Her Majesty's Government for the purpose of promoting on an unofficial basis understanding between the peoples of the United Kingdom and the People's Republic of China, by fostering closer cultural, social and economic contacts between them. It is non-political in character. It succeeds the Great-Britain--China Committee which during the past two years gained valuable experience in operating as an unofficial body designed to promote cultural contacts, although it had no permanent staff of offices.
> Ibid.,p.1.

The funding for this organization came from the British government and from the Exhibition profits.

> Operating funds are assured by a grant-in-aid of 25,000 per annum from Her Majesty's Government. By the generosity of the China Exhibition Council the Centre has also benefitted from the donation of a major part of the Exhibition profits which were at the Council's disposal.
> Ibid., p.1.

34. R.O.M. Archives, M. Henderson's diary, op.cit., p. 10.

35. Nancy Kuo, "Letter from London . . . " op.cit., p.63.

> In London, the exhibition of Chinese archaeological finds is organized by the Times and Sunday Times, which simply call it the Chinese Exhibition after their first suggestion of "The Genius of China" was rejected by the Chinese officials.

36. R.O.M. Archives, A. MacDonald's Administration General File "Chinese Exhibition At The Royal Academy," p.2.

37. R.O.M. Archives, "Report on Chinese Exhibition, London" by Alex MacDonald, October 22, 1973, p.2.

> Personally I thought London should have used more space. In fact 14,700 square feet was used. I asked if the Chinese had objected. "Yes they did but we told them that it was already designed and anyway we didn't have any more space."

38. The figures given for the amount of needed floor space varied. The original figure appears to have been 2,000 square meters but the British felt from the beginning that the exhibition could be displayed in 1500 square meters (H.D. E.A. Archeo P.R.C. 67-7, Vol. 1, Memo Number 149 from Peking to Ottawa, March 9, 1973.). However in a later memo, the figure given to the Swedes was 2500 square meters (H.D. E.A. Archeo P.R.C. 67-7, Vol. 1, Memo Number 171, March 23, 1973). Finally, the Swedes were asked to

reserve 2,000 square meters for the exhibition (H.D. E.A. Archeo P.R.C. 67-7, Vol. 1, Letter to Mr. Walter Tovell, Director, R.O.M., from B. Margaret Meagher, Ambassador of Canada, June 12, 1973).

39. R.O.M. Archives, A. MacDonald's Administration General File, "Chinese Exhibition At the Royal Academy," p.3.

40. Ibid.,The problems with the British map were also noted in a memo to file, April 19, 1974, which was based on a telephone call of April 18, 1974 from Mr. John Ausman, Cultural Affairs Division, Department of External Affairs, Ottawa. This information was forwarded to Mrs. Stephen by Mrs. Downie on April 19, 1974. Specifically Mr. Ausman's comments were based on information he received from Mr. Charles Hill. The memo noted:

> "Regarding the map of China in the catalogue, the British map only showed a portion of China and therefore had no international boundary lines marked."

41. Ibid.

42. Ibid., p.4.

43. Ibid., Minutes Chinese Exhibition Committee,

> "Mr. Henderson gave an account of his visit to the Chinese Archaeological Exhibition in Vienna Austria, ... The strict order for the exhibiting, as laid down by the Chinese for us, had not been adhered to and one required a catalogue for viewing.

44. Ibid.

45. R.O.M. Archives, Memo to File, April 19, 1974, April 18, 1974 Telephone Call from Mr. John Ausman, Cultural Affairs Division, Department of External Affairs, Ottawa, to Mrs. Downie, p.1.

46. Ibid., p.1.

47. Ibid., p.1.

48. Interview with Mrs. B. Stephen, September, 1980.

49. R.O.M. Archives, Memo to File, April 19, 1974, April 18, 1974 Telephone Call from Mr. John Ausman, op.cit. p.1.

50. Ibid., p.1.

51. Ibid., p. 2.

52. H.D. E.A. Archeo P.R.C. 67-7, Vol. 4, Telegram Number 562, from Peking to Ottawa, March 11, 1974.
"Item to be replaced is No. 258. Fragment of Confucian Analects. Hsiao Te allowed as to its archaeological correctness but said that it was politically incorrect during present campaign to criticise Confucius. Item to replace it is entitled Kao-Chang Hsien Ning-Ho Tsai Shou-Tien Hu-Chi (?Register of Landholders?) and is of equal valuation.

53. R.O.M. Archives, Letter from Mrs. H. Downie to Mr. Guy Pearse, 19 March, 1974.
"The Chinese have altered their text of the Swedish catalogue. Two reps from their Embassy and we are wondering if it will be the same for us and if Alex (A. MacDonald) will have to go to London to negotiate with the Printers."

54. H.D. E.A. Archeo P.R.C. 67-7 References to the printing of a Canadian catalogue can be found in several sources.
a) H.D. E.A. Archeo P.R.C. 67-7 Vol. 3.
Message from Ottawa to Peking, January 10, 1974.
"If ROM is to consider printing North American Catalogue structured on Chinese plan for presentation of exhibition rather than using British Catalogue essential they know whether they could be sent immediately to Toronto. Grateful early reply."
b) H.D. E.A. Archeo P.R.C. 67-7, Vol. 3., December 28 1973, PEK-793, Chinese Archaeological Exhibition in Canada, Additional Talking Points, p. 1 e
"The Royal Ontario Museum will be requesting additional graphic material supplied to the French and British authorities is not considered adequate or suitable for use in Canada. In particular, the Museum is considering printing its own catalogue. Can the Chinese authorities provide glossy black and white photos. . ."
c) H.D. E.A. Archeo P.R.C. 67-7, Vol. 2.
Message from Ottawa to Peking 2093, December 20, 1973
"R.O.M. considering printing own catalogue rather than using British. Can Chinese authorities supply Black/White photographs of every item in collection. . .

55. R.O.M. Archives, Meeting Concerning Exhibition of Chinese Archaeological Treasures with Officials of National Gallery of Art, Washington, D.C., January 2, 1974, by Maxwell Henderson, pp. 5-6.
Before the controversy over the Canadian version of the Watson Catalogue developed, the Canadian side considered several options before ordering texts from Great Britain. Specifically Guy Pearse,

the Exhibition Manager reported that:

> "So far as the catalogue is concerned, providing the Chinese are happy with the Canadian version, the Americans will take it. Therefore, it is of crucial importance for us to have a firm declaration from the Chinese as to the acceptability of the content and order of the catalogue. Once we have this, the way will then be clear for us to confirm the increased order. In my view, we would have nothing to lose by putting up the order by at least another 60,000. Unsold copies could be useful to the Americans.
>
> What we could do would be to ask Rainbirds to print 60,000 but only bind 40,000. In late August, having seen how the sales are going, we could then decide whether to bind the remaining 20,000 or leave them unbound for sale to the Americans, who would of course need their own top and tail?
> (R.O.M. Archives, Letter from Mr. G. Pearse to Mr. M. Henderson, 22 May, 1974.).

56. The decision to use the British catalogue was based on cost and quality issues as was noted in the following references.

a) R.O.M. Archives, Report on Chinese Exhibition, London October 22, 1973, by Alex MacDonald, p.2.
> "I think the catalogue excellent and, provided we get the same objects, perfectly suitable for our own exhibition. The cost, landed in Toronto, would be $2.00. This included copy changes on the first 16 pages and provision for inflation."

b) R.O.M. Archives, Letter from Dr. W. Tovell to Mr. F. Tovell, 12 June, 1973.
> "You might be interested in knowing that we have already contacted the British government with regards to catalogues. It is anticipated that we will buy sheets and have them bound with a suitable preface and cover for the ROM exhibit. This will mean a considerable saving in the cost of the catalogues and we hope to sell them for $5.00.

57. Bilingual additions were made to the catalogue as was noted in a letter from Mr. N. Torno to Mr. A. MacEachen discussing the financial costs of the catalogue problem.
> "The Canadian catalogue, "The Chinese Exhibition," was compiled using copyright material originally used for the London Exhibition, with appropriate bilingual additions for use in Canada."
> R.O.M. Archives, Letter from Mr. Noah Torno, Chairman, Chinese Exhibition Council, to The Honourable A. MacEachen, Secretary of State for External Affairs, Ottawa, August 23, 1974.).

58. H.D. E.A. Archeo P.R.C. 67-7 Vol. 2, December 28, 1973, PEK-793, "Chinese Archaeological Exhibition in Canada Agreement between Organizations Suggested Canadian Revisions, p. 1.

59. H.D. E.A. Archeo P.R.C. 67-7 Vol. 3, Telegram from Peking to Ottawa No. 98, January 15, 1974.

60. R O.M. Far Eastern Library Archives, Letter from Mr. Freeman Tovell to Dr. W. Tovell, March 4, 1974.

61. H.D. E.A. Archeo P.R.C. 67-7 Vol. 3, Telegram Number 483, from Peking to Ottawa, February 28, 1974, p. 3.
Criticisms of M. Antonioni's documentary on China are noted in the Hsinhua News Bulletin, Hsinhua News Agency No. 9158, Sunday February 10, 1974, pp. 3-10 Article 020905 "Chinese PLA fighters criticize Antonioni's anti-China film." The soldiers criticized the film for its distorted descriptions of socialist China and Tienanmen Square.

62. H.D. E.A. Archeo P.R.C. 67-7 Vol. 3, Letter from Mr. Freeman Tovell to Dr. W. Tovell, February 22, 1974.

63. Ibid.

64. H.D. E.A. Archeo P.R.C. 67-7, Vol. 4, Message Number 727, from Ottawa to Peking, March 21, 1974.

65. Ibid.

66. Ibid.

67. H.D. E.A. Archeo P.R.C. 67-7, Vol. 4, Memo from Mr. J. Ausman, Subject: Chinese Archaeological Exhibition, to Mr. F. Tovell, April 4, 1974.

68. H.D. E.A. Archeo P.R.C. 67-7, Vol. 4, Telegram Number 1004, from Peking to Ottawa, April 19, 1974.

69. H.D. E.A. Archeo P.R.C. 67-7, Vol. 4, Message Number 964, from Ottawa to Peking, April 19, 1974.

70. R.O.M. Archives, Letter from Mr. A.M. Henderson to Mr. F. Tovell, Director, Cultural Affairs Division, Bureau of Public Affairs, Department of External Affairs, May 27, 1974.

71. R.O.M. Archives, Letter from Dr. W. Tovell, to the Ambassador Chang Wen-chin, Embassy of the People's Republic of China, June 5, 1974.

72. R.O.M. Archives, Letter from Dr. W.M. Tovell to Chang Wen-chin, P.R.C. Ambassador to Canada, June 5, 1974.
"As you know, we gave the text of our catalogue to Mr. Yiao during his visit to the Museum on March 20th last."

73. R.O.M. Archives, Letter from Mr. Wang Chu-laing, Counsellor of the Embassy of the P.R.C. in Canada, to Dr. W. Tovell, June 10, 1974.

74. Ibid.

75. Ibid.

76. R.O.M. Archives, Letter from Guy Pearse, Exhibition Manager to Mr. J. Ausman, Cultural Affairs Division, Bureau of Public Affairs, June 5, 1974.

77. R.O.M. Archives, Letter from Dr. W. Tovell to Chang Wen-chin P.R.C. Ambassador to Canada, June 5, 1974.

78. R.O.M. Archives, Letter from Mr. F. Tovell, Director, Cultural Affairs Division, to W. Tovell, June 25, 1974.

79. Ibid.

80. Ibid., Memo attached to the letter.

81. Ibid., Memo attached to the letter.

82. R.O.M. Archives, Letter from Dr. W. Tovell, to Mr. Su Shih-min, First Secretary, Embassy of The People's Republic of China, Ottawa, July 3, 1974.

83. Ibid.

84. R.O.M. Archives, Letter from Mr. F. Tovell, to Dr. W. Tovell, July 4, 1974.

85. R.O.M. Archives, Letter from Mr. F Tovell to Dr.W. Tovell, July 4, 1974.

86. Ibid.

87. R.O.M. Archives, Report on the Conference with First Secretary, Embassy of the People's Republic of China, Mr. Su Shih-min, 4 July, 1974, 3-5 p.m., Ottawa, by Dr. W. Tovell.

88. Ibid.

89. Ibid., pp.2-3.

90. Ibid., p.3.

91. Ibid., p.4.

92. R.O.M. Archives, Letter from Mr. Su Shih-min, First Secretary, Embassy of the People's Republic of China, Ottawa, to Dr. W. Tovell, July 9, 1974.

93. R.O.M. Archives, Copy of a telex from Bob Ducas in New York to Barbara Stephens, 19 June, 1974.

94. R.O.M. Archives, Changes to the Canadian Edition of the Catalogue Requested by the People's Republic of China on Monday, June 17, 1974.

95. William Watson, The Genius of China: An Exhibition of Archaeological Finds of the People's Republic of China, London: Times Newspapers Ltd. 1973.

96. The Chinese Exhibition: The Exhibition of Archaeological Finds of the People's Republic of China, Text by William Watson, London: Times Newspapers Ltd. 1973.

97. R.O.M. Archives, Changes to the Canadian Edition of the Catalogue Requested by the People's Republic of China on Monday, June 17, 1974, Point 1.
The map issue was also mentioned in an interview with Mrs. B. Stephen, September 1980.

98. The Chinese Exhibition: The exhibition of archaeological finds of the People's Republic of China, op.cit. p.5.
The Genius of China: An exhibition of archaeological finds of the People's Republic of China, op.cit., p.5.

99. The Chinese Exhibition: The exhibition of archaeological finds

of the People's Republic of China, op.cit. p.5.

100. The Genius of China: op.cit. p.5.

101. The Chinese Exhibition: op.cit. p.5.

102. The Genius of China: op.cit. p.5.

103. The Chinese Exhibition: op.cit. p.5.

104. The Genius of China: op.cit. p.14.
The Chinese Exhibition: op.cit. p.14.

105. The Exhibition of Archaeological Finds of the People's Republic Of China, Edited and Published by the Organization Committee of The Exhibition of Archaeological Finds of the People's Republic of China, 1974.

106. R.O.M. Archives, Changes to the Canadian Edition of the Catalogue Requested by the People's Republic of China on Monday, June 17, 1974, Point 4, p.12.

107. Ibid.

108. Ibid., Point 9, The Chinese Exhibition: op.cit. pp.98-99.

109. Ibid.,Point 9.

110. The Genius of China: op.cit. pp.132-133.

111. The Chinese Exhibition: op.cit. p.132.

112. Both Peking Review and Hsinhua have articles repeating this theme of how Lin Piao was advocating a revisionist approach through his support of Confucianism. For example:

> "Lin Piao used these terms about restoring the old order in a bid to restore capitalism and this was part of his counter-revolutionary scheme to subvert the dictatorship of the proletariat."
> Hsinhua News Bulletin, No. 9147, Wed. January 30, 1974, 012905 tshingua university runs cadres', workers' study classes to deepen criticism of Lin Piao and Confucius, p.9.

113. The Genius of China, op.cit. p.98.
The Chinese Exhibition, op.cit. p.98.

114. R.O.M. Archives, Changes to the Canadian Edition of the Catalogue Requested by the People's Republic of China on Monday, June 17, 1974, Point 9.

115. Ibid.

116. Ibid.,
The Chinese Exhibition, op.cit. pp.98-99.

117. Ibid., Point 6
The Genius of China, op.cit. p.18
The Chinese Exhibition, op.cit. p.18.

118. The Genius of China, op.cit. p.19
The Chinese Exhibition, op.cit. p.19.

119. R.O.M. Archives, Changes to the Canadian Edition of the Catalogue Requested by the People's Republic of China on Monday, June 17, 1974, Point 6.

120. The Chinese Exhibition, op.cit. p.20.

121. R.O.M. Archives, Changes to the Canadian Edition, op.cit. point 6.

122. The Chinese Exhibition, op.cit. p.20.

123. R.O.M. Archives, Changes to the Canadian Edition, op.cit. point 6.

124. Ibid., Changes point 6
The Chinese Exhibition, op.cit. p.20.

125. Ibid., Changes point 6
The Chinese Exhibition, op.cit. p.20.

126. Ibid., Changes point 6.

127. Ibid., Changes point 7
The Chinese Exhibition, op.cit. p.21.

128. Ibid., Changes point 9
The Chinese Exhibition, op.cit. p.21.

129. The Chinese Exhibition, op. cit. Section 8.

130. R.O.M. Archives, Changes op. cit. point 12.

131. The Genius of China, op.cit. Section 8.

132. R.O.M. Archives, Changes op.cit. point 13
The Chinese Exhibition, p.129.

133. Ibid., Changes point 13.

134. Interview with Mr. Noah Torno, February 26, 1981.

135. According to Mr. N. Torno, the yellow catalogue was given away with the Canadian version of the Watson catalogue. In fact the Canadians submitted a statement which was to be inserted in the Canadian catalogue to the Chinese for their approval.

> "The Chinese Exhibition Council of the Royal Ontario Museum offers with its compliments the accompanying volume received from the People's Republic of China. This volume contains corrected information not available at the Royal Ontario Museum when our own catalogue was printed."
> (R.O.M. Archives, CN Telegram from Mr. N. Torno, Chairman of the Chinese Exhibition Council of the Royal Ontario Museum, to Mr. Liu Keng-yin, First secretary of the Embassy of the People's Republic of China, Ottawa, July 18, 1973.)

The Canadian Embassy, however, was under the impression that the Canadian version of the Watson catalogue was being given away with the yellow catalogue.

136. The Exhibition of Archaeological Finds of the People's Republic of China: Official and Authentic Introduction and Catalogue, Edited by the Organization Committee of the Exhibition of Archaeological Finds of the People's Republic of China, Toronto: Printed by the Chinese Exhibition Council of the Royal Ontario Museum, 1974.

137. Interview with Mr. Noah Torno, February 26, 1981.

138. R.O.M. Far Eastern Library Archives, Governmental Correspondence, (Canadian) The Exhibition of Archaeology Finds in the P.R.C., Letter from Mr. Noah Torno to the Hon. A. MacEachen, Secretary of State for External Affairs, August 23, 1974.

139. The Exhibition of Archaeological Finds of the People's Republic of China, Edited and Published by the Organization Committee of

The Exhibition of Archaeological Finds of the People's Republic of China, 1974.
Interview with Mrs. H. Downie, September, 1980.

140. The Exhibition of Archaeological Finds of the People's Republic of China, op.cit.

141. Interview with Mr. N. Torno, February 26, 1981.

Chapter 5
Conclusions

After the resolution of the catalogue dispute, the exhibition opened and was a great success. Although the text of the catalogue was the primary issue of debate, Chinese sensitivities about their politics and ideology surfaced in response to the media interpretations and publicity about the exhibition. In fact the response of China to the Western media offers yet another perspective of the politics surrounding the exhibition and the cultural and ideological distance between East and West. All these points of conflict--the media interpretations, the text of the catalogue and the difficulties in the negotiations for the exhibition--serve to illustrate the complications and pitfalls of cultural diplomacy. The exhibition experience raises some significant questions about the role of cultural diplomacy in the development of international relations. In particular, the following discussion shall examine the exhibition experience with a view to understanding the purpose of cultural diplomacy in furthering the development of relations between Canada and the People's Republic of China.

The exhibition opening was a media event in itself, encompassing both cultural and political objectives. At the opening reception, Madame Leger, wife of Governor General Jules Leger, gave an address stressing the significance of the exhibition and its purpose to prompt people to learn more about China.

> It is a captivating experience to contemplate the artifacts representing the millenia of Chinese history and constituting as such one of the most splendid heritages of the whole humanity. Each object of the collection evokes the creativity of man and his constant search for beauty.[1]

Chang Wen-chin, the Chinese Ambassador, also addressed the reception

and expressed China's hopes that the exhibition would promote greater understanding. The Ambassador's remarks also noted China's view on the purpose of the history to be represented in the exhibition collection and the influence of more contemporary politics upon history.

> We attach great importance to the scientific study of the development of China's history and culture in the light of historical materialism to ascertain the true history which has been so much distorted and reversed by the reactionary ruling classes in the past. And we advocate critically assimilating the legacy of the fine ancient national culture of China, so as to benefit the marching tempo of new China. The movement now being launched in China of criticizing Confucius and Lin Piao signifies a great transformation in the ideological and cultural spheres. This movement not only helps the broad masses of people to attain a fair understanding of the development of Chinese history, but also will exert far-reaching influence on the prospect of the Chinese revolution.[2]

China's exhibition was to be a showcase for China's past and present.

For the Chinese, the emphasis on the cultural aspects of the exchange was muted in deference to the political statement that had to be made. Specifically, as was stated by Chang Wen-chin, China's current political system was the impetus inspiring the study and the analysis of the past.

> Since the founding of the People's Republic of China, guided by Chairman Mao's policy of "Making the past serve the present" great stress has been laid on the work of preserving antiquities and carrying out archaeological excavations. With the full support and active participation of the workers, peasants and soldiers, departments of cultural relics and archaeological excavations throughout the country carried out extensive surveys; preservation and excavations of many important ancient sites and tombs, and discovered enormous quantities of cultural relics This enriched the great treasure-house of Chinese art. It also presented valuable evidence of highly scientific value, serving to analyze and interpret objectively the development of Chinese history.[3]

China had a message about history and man's political, economic and social development. Through the exhibition, this message had to be delivered

undiluted by Western views of China in order to satisfy the more ardent ideologues within China. China's cultural and political revolution was broadcast beyond its own borders.

This Chinese objective encountered some contradictions with the western objectives of marketing the exhibition for profit as well as education. Both parties shared the objective of attracting maximum attention to the Chinese exhibition; but the ideological basis of both parties was in opposition. To the Chinese, the philosophical issues behind the exhibition could not be ignored because of the ideological furor within China.

From the Western perspective, the main objective was to promote the exhibition and any interest in China in order to maximize profits from the exhibition and to generate an atmosphere to advocate other ventures with China. To aid the promotion plans, the Royal Ontario Museum kept the press carefully apprised of the developments in the arrangements for the exhibition. Government and museum press releases announced the conclusion of negotiations and agreements, and advised the press on the significance of the exhibition.[4] Nevertheless, External Affairs and the Royal Ontario Museum made every effort to make certain that no embarrassing issues were brought up in the press that might have jeopardized the negotiations, agreements and finally the exhibition itself. Publicity became a sensitive issue because of China's own concerns about her correct political image abroad. When difficulties developed in the negotiations, the Canadian Government and the Museum were justifiably concerned that these difficulties not be publicized since they would have only exacerbated the existing problems. As a result of this sensitivity, the R.O.M. kept careful control of any

information that was released to the press. This control of information was encouraged by officials in Ottawa and by the Canadian Embassy staff in Peking.[5]

Despite the care in limiting information to the Canadian press, an article in the Financial Post by Arnold Edinborough, entitled "Here is an unique exhibition that really sells itself"[6] did create some controversy. The single offensive point in the article is a reference to the British title of the exhibition: "The Genius of China: An Exhibition of Archaeological Finds of the People's Republic of China."[7] Otherwise the article is a glowing tribute to the marketing of the arts and the businesslike approach of the Royal Ontario Museum to the exhibition. Nevertheless, the more sensitive issue of the catalogue controversy did not escape the notice of Boston Globe reporter, Robert Taylor.

> Not least of the exhibition's attractions is the disclosure of how Chinese today view their past. A curiosity of the show is a second catalogue described as the "official and authentic introduction and catalogue," and it is an extremely revealing document.[8]

Later, when the exhibition moved from Toronto to its American premiere in Washington, the Americans became embroiled in their own political controversy with the Chinese.[9]

In House Museum Operations: Films, Set Design and Tours

The Chinese were concerned about the promotion of the exhibition as well as any negative publicity. In the case of the advertising over the radio to promote the exhibition, scripts for the proposed advertisements were submitted to Chinese Embassy Staff for their approval.[10] For example, the R.O.M. checked with the Chinese about a publicity plan consisting

of the filming of the unpacking of the Jade Suit for a television preview.[11]

These publicity sensitivities extended to the showing of films in association with the exhibition. This evening film programme was offered to complement the Chinese exhibition.[12] The films presented information about China's past and present. Initially, the museum planned to use the BBC films: "Times of Silk and Gold" and "Times of Jade and Bronze."[13] These films had been made by the BBC in China and William Watson, the author of the controversial "Genius of China" catalogue narrated both films. The films were quite well received by western audiences. Indeed they were broadcast in Canada on CTV nationwide, while the exhibition was held at the R.O.M.. Nevertheless as problems developed with the catalogue, the Chinese also expressed displeasure with the films for the references to Confucius in the dialogue. These two films were dropped from the proposed film programme and other films were offered instead, such as three films by Felix Greene: One Nation Many Peoples, Self-Reliance and Eight or Nine in the Morning and films from the Chinese Embassy--New Discoveries in Archaeology: The Discovery of a 2100 year Old Tomb, Prawns, Bamboo, Historical Relics Unearthed During the Cultural Revolution, On Perilous Peaks Dwells Beauty in Infinite Variety, Sparkling Canals of Shaoshan, China Today and the White Haired Girl.[14]

An unfortunate mistake in the advertising of the film programme led to some strong audience protests when the more propagandistic films were offered instead of the B.B.C. productions. The correspondence between Mrs. H. Downie, the exhibition manager at the R.O.M. and Mr. Kuo Ch'ing, the 2nd Secretary of the Chinese Embassy, on this issue sums up the tensions.

> I (Mrs. H. Downie) am very sorry about the film presentations on Sunday and I would like to explain what happened. At the beginning of July the museum sent out its monthly ROM, a copy of which I believe you (Mr. Kuo Ch'ing) have. This booklet goes to all the museum's members and to other special groups and I know that you are aware that it included information regarding the Sunday films which were The Times of Jade and Bronze and The Times of Silk and Gold. However we reached an agreement with you whereby we would not show these films but chose from among the ones that were sent from the Embassy.
>
> At the same time it was impossible to get signs prepared with the change of programme so, of course, the only people who knew about a Sunday programme at all were those who received the July/August Preview. The few that showed up were naturally upset that they did not see the film for which they had come and also were expected to pay for admission. In the evening there were so few that we cancelled the performance. I do hope that we will have a better reception for all the films this week when signs will be available.[15]

Because of the lack of attendance to the films and their propagandist nature, the R.O.M. limited its advertising to internal promotion and cancelled admission fees for the Sunday showing.[16]

The determination on the part of the Chinese to keep control over the interpretation of the exhibition was carried over to other in-house museum operations such as set design and the decision to cancel tours. The notes on design and display demonstrated how the audience's attention could be influenced by the layout of the exhibition. Being aware of this point, the Chinese wanted the exhibition to adhere strictly to their sense of historical order. Of course the R.O.M. was also striving to adhere to its audiences' expectations of the display. Some sense of the effort involved to achieve these objectives is noted in a R.O.M. kit that compared the techniques used by the London, Paris and Toronto museums.

> For those who saw the Chinese Exhibition in Paris and then in London, the display elements were in sharp contrast. The French, perhaps because of shortage of time, elected to display the objects in stark simplicity. The British, on the other hand, spent more than $100,000. on display areas, cases and lighting. To view the jade burial suit, for example, a visitor "descended" into an area with all the brooding moodiness of a tomb. Overall, the Royal Academy was dark with the objects themselves bathed in light.
>
> John Anthony, chief of display at the Royal Ontario Museum, saw the Chinese Exhibition in a different way.
>
> "I liked what the British did," he says, "but as I walked around the Royal Academy I began to see the Exhibition in Toronto in terms of a brighter environment--with carefully chosen coloured complimentary backgrounds against which the objects themselves would strengthen and come to life. The jade funeral suit was certainly dramatic in London, but the lighting changed the colour of the jade and, I think, made it difficult to examine properly. The suit is displayed at the Royal Ontario Museum under hard quartz lighting which sharpens objects and maintains natural colour.[17]

The Chinese saw the purpose of the design and layout of the exhibition as emphasizing the historical and political aspects of the struggle of development in China. The jade suit was a work of art but it also represented the decadence of China's past.

The Chinese were quite particular about tours of the exhibition. Usually for special exhibitions, a member's committee of the R.O.M. offered public tours to explain exhibitions.[18] This proposal in the event of the Chinese Exhibition, however, had to be vetoed in order to prevent more difficulties with the Chinese over historical interpretation as was explained by B. Stephen.

> There is also a fundamental policy reason for not offering such a tour; the Chinese have made it extremely clear that the interpretation of the material in the exhibition is a Chinese prerogative. The graphics, presenting the material in the way the Chinese wish, are their interface with the public. Judging from Chinese reaction to the simplification

> and reduction of these graphics in London, we could expect difficulty with the Chinese if we were to take over any part of the role of interpreting the exhibition. Yet any guided tour would inevitably be selective, and people would have insufficient time to see even the objects let alone the graphics. It is essential that the public be allowed to make the choice of which objects to stop and study and which to walk past with the aid of labels, graphics and catalogue.[19]

The Members committee, however, did offer an introduction to China tour of the R.O.M.'s own China collection which complemented the Chinese Exhibition and the committee gave the proceeds to the Royal Ontario Museum.[20]

A teaching kit prepared by the museum to help school tours of the exhibition also stressed China's view of its own history. A chronology of Chinese history used the major Marxist divisions of Primitive, Slave and Feudal with the subdivisions of dynasties more familiar to western historians. The notes accompanying this chronology stressed the political influences upon history in China as well.

> Mao Tse-tung has written: "Let the past serve the present!" The exhibition performs this function well by giving us a glimpse of a rich cultural past while at the same time demonstrating the care being taken by the Chinese people today in unearthing it.[21]

The notes gave facts on the arrangement for the exhibition, its significance and the time span. The Chronological Table of China's history was followed by a chart comparing development in China and the West according to the major time divisions in the exhibition. The kit also included notes on major aspects of the exhibition--Shang pottery, bronzes, the Jade suit, the Flying Horse, an explanation on set design, bibliographies of the staff involved with the exhibition, a list of materials available

in the shop and a copy of Rotunda, the R.O.M.'s magazine with featured articles on China. Thus the R.O.M. made every effort to accommodate the ideological views of the Chinese in displaying the exhibition and at the same time tried to take into account the tastes of its Canadian audience.

Cultural Diplomacy: Political Dividends

The Chinese exhibition tour was a major cultural event and a great international success. The significance of the exhibition in promoting East-West relations can be statistically measured by the attendance figures of some of the host museums--350,000 in Paris, 750,000 in London and 200,000 in Vienna.[22] The R.O.M. hoped for a total attendance of 320,000 but within nine days of the exhibition's closing the attendance was 360,000.[23] Each of the host nations aspired to improved relations with China as a result of this cultural exchange. These expectations of immediate political or economic dividends as a result of cultural diplomacy however may be unfair. Culture is not really a commodity like wheat but an expression of a nation's identity and world-view. Sometimes cultural relations have been dismissed as "nice but inconsequential"[24] but a more serious evaluation of cultural diplomacy depends upon looking at the results in the long term rather than the short term. Instead, cultural relations are an important building block in the field of international relations. Cultural exchanges establish the ground work that can lead to other things.

Unfortunately, the Chinese Exhibition's visit to Canada coincided with the Anti-Confucius Anti-Lin Piao campaign, which prompted

a controversy over the catalogues and exhibition interpretation. As the radical ideologues within China were exerting more political influence, the exhibition's tour of the West had to be politicized to suit the ideological campaign in China. The Chinese radicals were determined the West would be instructed on the finer points of China's contribution to world history. Through this power play in foreign relations, the radicals hoped to demonstrate in China their authority over the pragmatists. Thus the exhibition's visit to Canada hinged upon complying with Chinese demands for control over the interpretation of the exhibition and would test the limits of newly established Canada-China diplomatic relations. As Dr. Tovell observed the exhibition taught us not only about China's past but about China's present.

Nevertheless the question does arise--was Canada too compliant in accommodating Chinese demands about the exhibition and the catalogue? As N. Torno observed the exhibition was China's product.[25] Yet a Canadian public institution was used to display a major exhibition according to the Maoist version of Marxism-Leninism. This aspect of the exhibition was probably happily overlooked by much of the exhibition's audience, out of a preference to just admire the objects for their own intrinsic value and beauty. Yet this ideological dimension of the exhibition offered the Canadian public a better understanding of the political motivations of a quarter of the earth's population. In fact, for us to understand the struggles of China's peasants today, it is probably important to understand and appreciate their past in terms of their political theory of struggle.

Unfortunately reciprocity was not extended to Canadian cultural

exhibitions that were sent to China, such as an exhibition of Eskimo Prints (Peking January 20--February 4, 1973, followed by two weeks in Shanghai).[26] An exhibition of Group of Seven Paintings, icons of Canadian culture, was subject to Chinese veto and the proposed tour of the Vancouver Symphony to China was cancelled since western classical music remained a target of political criticism in China.[27] To some degree an apology could be made for China, since the People's Republic was just emerging from its self-imposed cultural isolation of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution.

To some extent nations are still expected to pay tribute to China--in spite of the revolution--by checking that the cultural offering is appropriate to China's standards, political or otherwise. It may be unreasonable but it is Chinese. After China's long isolation from the international community, the West was and continues to be willing to court China in hopes of further economic and political dividends. The means to that end is often thought to be culture. In this respect, Canada was just as eager as other nations to court China.

Since contact with China was sought, China was in a position to dictate terms. The demands about the exhibition arose out of difficulties with the European hosts of the exhibition which later conincided with a growing turmoil within China. Together these events combined to create awkward precedents that left Canada making every effort to accommodate the Chinese in the negotiations and arrangements for the exhibition. The unfortunate coincidence of political controversy in China with the exhibition's visit to Canada made the Canadian position

more uncomfortable. In fact Canada's leverage on these difficulties was limited. Although Chinese insistence upon the control of the interpretation was a response to political turmoil within China amongst the factions aspiring for leadership, the interpretation of this archaeological exhibition was used to reinforce certain Chinese viewpoints of their relationship with the world. Despite the antiquity of the artifacts and their origins under a completely different political system, the Chinese interpreted the artifacts as symbols of the continuity and integrity of China as a nation whose legitimate rulers now adhere to Mao's unique version of Marxism-Leninism. To demonstrate the development of Communist China as the logical outcome from China's traditional past, class struggle is noted as a continuous theme throughout China's history. Artifacts recovered by archaeological and therefore scientific means are interpreted as evidence of the class struggle throughout China's history. This theme of class struggle becomes China's contribution to world history.

In spite of the internal political struggles, the exhibition was a tribute to China's past history and the skills of her current archaeologists and historians in bringing that past to light again. The exhibition also served to attract the attention of the West to the East and was one more step leading to better relations. Mao's dictum of "let the past serve the present" revealed much of the Chinese objectives in the catalogue and the exhibition. The catalogue itself was not only a description of the exhibition's artifacts but a format for presenting China's view of history and a recounting of China's contributions to world history. As the political mood changed within China, however, the interpretations of China's history were subject to

ideological review. Consequently, the requests for changes in the catalogue and the controversy were the result of ideological turmoil within China and were a response to some western interpretations. The catalogue had to present the view clearly that the people were the heroes not the elite, in order to maintain a sense of continuity from the past endorsing the current leadership. China's dogmatic approach on these issues proved to be a challenge to Canada's sense of cultural diplomacy.

The final counterpoint to Mao's dictum of "Let the Past serve the Present" is Confucius' statement, "In all things, I follow Chou." One can cast a modern interpretation upon this phrase by seeing the Chou as Chou En-lai, the pragmatic father of China's modernization. Despite the effort to link Chou En-lai to the past, he was a man for the future as was proved by his outline of the four modernizations carried on by his successors. In fact, the Chinese Ambassador to Canada made a remark to Dr. Tovell that seemed to foreshadow the shift to pragmatism and modernization when he stated: "next time we will make the money."[28]

It has been over a decade since the Chinese Exhibition catalogue controversy threatened to cancel the visit of the Chinese Exhibition to Canada and thereby thwart the newly established diplomatic relations between Canada and China. National prestige on both sides depended upon the success of the exhibition. Fortunately, the exhibition was a success from the standpoints of profit and the cultural goodwill established in Canada towards China. Nevertheless, the experience forces some reassessment of the purpose of Cultural Diplomacy and the conflicts

and dynamics of the Canada-China relationship which are revealed by considering the characteristics of their national identities.

The Chinese Ambassador's comments to Dr. Tovell on future profits foreshadowed the dramatic change in China's attitude towards relations with the West and China's economic policy. In keeping with China's modernization process--outlined by Chou En-lai during the Fourth National People's Congress[29]--T'eng Hsiao Ping, Chou's successor, has now led China towards developing its own version of capitalism. It is much more convenient for the West to have a more eager and willing customer for technology. But neither Canadians nor other westerners should look upon China with visions of the treasures of the mythical Cathay. It has been a tempting illusion of a motherlode that has seized the western imagination with hopes of cashing in on a huge Asian market.

In anticipation of the growth of this Asian market, Canada has been looking westward and has been promoting links with the Pacific Rim. Canadian politicians and businessmen alike have been tending to look upon the Pacific market as a great future resource and possible cure to a sagging home economy. Thus much is expected of any links established between Canada and Asia, and especially in this case between Canada and China. It is within this context of economic and political ambition that so many dividends are expected of cultural exchanges and relations. The resulting confusion of objectives and anticipated dividends expected of the Chinese Exhibition undoubtedly exacerbated the tensions that developed over the catalogue.

The Chinese Exhibition was a great success as a cultural event but one cannot help but question some aspects of the event in

terms of furthering Canada-Chinese relations and examining it as an illustration of Cultural Diplomacy. For the People's Republic of China, the exhibition was a particular success in spite of the political turmoil within China. The exhibition was a tremendous public relations event serving to dispel many of the negative anti-culture images of Cultural Revolution China that were held in the West. The sense of acceptability and respectability to be achieved through this exhibition was just another step for the People's Republic of China to counter the policies of isolation and non-recognition. An archaeological exhibition was the perfect medium for this message, since it embodied an expression of China's cultural identity, territorial claims--vis à vis the Soviet Union, Vietnam and Taiwan--and world view of history. Thus for the People's Republic of China, the exhibition was an important step in normalizing her relations with the rest of the world and ending her isolation from the West--the source of the modernization and technology sought by China. The exhibition could only help to set the groundwork for future contacts.

Canada also needed the exhibition to be a success. It was an achievement to be one of the hosts to the exhibition and especially to be the first north American host to the exhibition. Nevertheless because of the political tensions within China at the time of the negotiations for the exhibition, Canada had to be extremely accommodating to Chinese demands, some of which came at the last minute. A public institution, the Royal Ontario Museum, had invested a considerable amount of time and money in preparations for the exhibition and could not have endured the loss of prestige or money if the exhibition had

been cancelled. Yet a Canadian institution played host not only to an exhibition of China's artifacts but to an exhibition of China's ideology.

Keeping in mind the spirit of hospitality of Canada towards China and the purpose of Canadians learning about the Chinese through this exhibition, the Chinese were perhaps reasonable in expecting the exhibition to be displayed in keeping with their political ideology. The point is, however, this hospitality was not reciprocated to Canadian cultural exchanges. The Chinese cancelled the proposed tour of China by the Vancouver symphony since Western classical music was subject to political criticism in China.[30] Because of Chinese political campaigns, the timing for Canada's cultural offerings to China did not appear to be appropriate. The Chinese did host a Canadian exhibition of paintings, and an exhibit of Eskimo art but both exhibitions were displayed according to the Chinese viewpoint.[31] The reception of the Canadian paintings exhibition was deemed uncertain by Burns, a reporter for the Globe and Mail in China.

> Can the Chinese worker set aside his scruples about the corrupting influence of bourgeois art and learn to love Canadian landscapes?[32]

Nevertheless the different opinions on the purpose of art and politics are lessons to be learned if the relations are to be developed or pursued. The ideological conflicts of Canada and China were evident in their attitudes towards the arts. Canada espouses freedom of the arts; while China espouses the politics of art and its political purposes. As a result:

> Given the diametrically opposed philosophies of the two governments it might seem strange that either of them should consider the arts a fruitful area for

> exchanges. That they do is probably best explained by the fact that the Chinese are anxious to reap the propaganda benefits that accrue to them from exhibits like the relics display and a acknowledging that there must be some mutuality, accept displays of foreign expertise in the arts on their own soil as the price that must be paid.[33]

Yet China did not play the game fairly since the Chinese exerted as much control on the Canadian message as they demanded of Canadians on the Chinese exhibition.

> What is more difficult to explain is the eagerness with which Western governments avail themselves of the opportunities thus opened, given the expense involved and the conditions that the Chinese exact, the case of a display of paintings these would include a Chinese right of veto over the canvases, the manner in which they are presented and the content of the catalogue--a veto that could and probably would be used to eliminate anything so politically sensitive as an attempt to explain the philosophy towards the arts that prevaile (sic) in Canada.[34]

No apologies can be made for China's unfairness in their behaviour towards our exhibition.

Nevertheless the Western nations including Canada were in a mood to court China in hopes of developing the trade market, but China was weathering another political tantrum at home. The scars of these political tantrums will probably endure and China may not quite appear to understand the give and take of cultural relations and exchanges. This misunderstanding has its historical roots in China, since the traditional viewpoint of the Middle Kingdom and the expectation of tribute prevails even in "revolutionary" China. Despite the revolution and the ideology, the Chinese have an embedded sense of superiority in their cultural achievements. Since the Western nations were quite anxious to court China, China was in a position to set the terms for

the exhibition.

> For reasons that I am glad to leave to the political analysts to explain, we seem terribly eager these days to find things to admire about life in China today, and the Chinese have proved to be shrewd judges in ministering to this appetite. This display is by far their most stupendous coup in in the strange world of East-West oultural exchange--a world in which essentially nonpolitical accomplishments are used as counters in a game of securing potential advantage. 35

Thus with her entourage in tow, Princess Tou Wan served her country's interests by helping to promote an interest in China.

Within this context, Canada did not have much choice with regards to the veto threats about the Chinese exhibition and thus became very accommodating to Chinese demands. Canada had to pay for precedents established by other nations and for political tensions within China. Because of the ideological campaigns within China, the Chinese were not really eager to entertain western culture. Consequently, Canada, as one of the international hosts of the Chinese exhibition, was not really in a position to dictate terms to the Chinese. For the sake of Canada's national prestige, the prestige of the Royal Ontario Museum, and economic profit, Canada was quite accommodating to China's terms. One is left wondering whether too much was compomised and yet there were not any reasonable alternatives. Unless Canada had worked out a solution to the catalogue controversy, a veto threat of the Chinese remained a genuine possibility. The ardent ideologues in China would not have cared about the loss of China's prestige if an international exhibition was cancelled. It would have been just more fuel for the political campaign in China and the embarassment would have been considered just a problem for Chou En-lai and the Foreign Ministry of China.

One can only speculate about what may have happened if Canada had called China's bluff on the veto threat. If the exhibition had not been held in Canada, the Royal Ontario Museum would have suffered a considerable loss, relations between Canada and China would have suffered a formidable setback and one can only speculate whether the exhibition would have gone to the United States. However, the U.S. exhibitors were concerned about any awkward precedents set for them by Canada's experience with China in the negotiations since the negotiations went primarily in succession. If the U.S. had not been the next host to the exhibition, Canada could have called China's bluff perhaps by refusing to pay the transport of the exhibition back to the People's Republic of China. As it was, the return fare of Princess Tou Wan and company was not brought up in the negotiations for the exhibition. Nevertheless, China could have countered Canada's position by sending the exhibition to another European host nation. There were possibilities to challenging the veto threat, but probably much more than the exhibition would have been lost. For all intents and purposes, China appeared to be in a better position to negotiate and set terms than Canada or any other nation that wanted to host the exhibition.

The complexity and controversy surrounding the Chinese exhibition serve to illustrate the complexities of Cultural Diplomacy. Cultural relations are optimistically regarded as a positive exchange between nations to promote international understanding. Its purposes include friendship and the promotion of other contacts. The standards and definitions of cultural diplomacy seem to be vague and enigmatic. The Chinese Exhibition experience illustrates some of the expectations

of cultural exchanges--both the short term benefits and the long range ambitions.

Indeed some of the source of conflict and controversy can be understood when one considers aspects of the national identities of both China and Canada. China has been long-recognized for its lengthy historical record which is a testament to a firm sense of identity. Although the 1949 revolution in China symbolizes a break with the past, the Chinese have derived a firm sense of identity and a sense of security from their past. On the other hand, Canada is, comparatively, a country in its infancy, and Canadians appear vague in their sense of identity. The problem is exacerbated even more by Canada's proximity to the United States. This fact works both for and against Canada, since many nations regard Canada as a stepping stone or point of access to the United States. In Canada's struggle for a separate and unique identity, the national psyche must appear schizophrenic with a tendency towards multiple personalities. To illustrate the point specifically, Canada espouses an official policy of two official languages and cultures--English and French. Of these, the English side has the most difficult time expressing itself as being different from the United States. The French language stands as an effective barrier to some intrusions. The multiple personalities aspect is encouraged by the other official policy of multi-culturalism, as opposed to the melting pot syndrome of the United States. Multi-culturalism appears sometimes to be an effort to appease all those left out of the bilingualism/biculturalism of French and English, and thus make everyone feel at home. Finally, the Canadian cultural mosaic includes a multi-lingual and multi-cultural native

society. The combinations and permutations make for interesting official gifts for abroad.

Canada's emerging identity has both its strengths and weaknesses. As a nation that is open to so many cultural influences, Canada is forced into confronting many of the ethnocentric traditions that have plagued man since the beginning of time. This confusion in Canada's national image is somewhat clarified by taking note of author Margaret Atwood's identification of "survival" as a constant thematic occupation in Canadian literature.[36] The imagery of vagueness and lack of the specific in Canada's national identity is captured in Gille Vigneault's line in his national anthem for Quebec--"mon pays, ce n'est pas un pays, c'est l'hiver. Consequently, Canada's culture is not as readily identifiable or definable as a commodity like wheat. Yet strength lies in this weakness. A policy of multi-culturalism does make Canada more open to considering a variety of viewpoints. This perspective has made Canada, a nation sought by others to help in solving international crises. Idealistically, through cultural exchanges, Canadians became exposed to other opinions and ideologies and thereby better equipped to mediate on the international stage.

Nevertheless, the stage appears to have been set for some complexity and controversy when one compares Canada--a nation struggling toward identity--with China--a nation with a firmly established sense of history and identity as an unified country. Granted China has had its periods of division and disunity, but the comparison of Canada's and China's sense of identity only serves to illustrate that there was a different sense of expectations in cultural exchanges and cultural

diplomacy.

Undoubtedly cultural exchanges do encourage hopes for other types of economic and political contact. However, cultural exchanges should not be subjected to the same checks and balances as other forms of exchange. Canadians must ask themselves whether it is reasonable to expect so many dividends from cultural relations. It is somewhat degrading to the memory of Dr. Norman Bethune to expect reminders of his personal sacrifice to help in every form of contact with China. The same holds true for expecting the innocence of Anne of Green Gables to help in redressing trade imbalances between Japan and Canada. Instead cultural exchanges should serve to express national identity and world view to each other. The real objective of cultural exchanges is a more "idealistic enrichment" that can not be measured in the coin of the realm. The exhibition did generate real profits for the Royal Ontario Museum but there were incalculable dividends for both Canada and China in terms of generating a greater interest in China. Nevertheless Canadians should not expect the personal links forged through cultural relations to withstand all the pressures of political and economic tensions. Indeed when political tensions erupt, cultural associations are discredited as was the case when the Soviets shot down a commercial South Korean jet that drifted into Soviet airspace. The enduring contributions of cultural diplomacy must be the reduction of international suspicions, through the recognition and even celebration of our common humanity and experience.

Cultural relations and exchanges can be the most enduring and even more positive since the exchange is not in commodities. Their

value rests primarily in that they are symbolic events that help us to retain a better perspective when relations become strained. In a time when we court global catastrophe through the real threat of nuclear war, it is important to explore every peaceful avenue that will help us to recognize the common bonds and common struggles of all nations on this planet. China was isolated through a cold war mentality and through non-recognition. We can see the folly of such policies. If Canada is to pursue an idealized role as an international peacemaker Canadians must continue their education for that role through cultural exchanges. Finally, cultural diplomacy satisfies some basic human needs!

> If you have only two pennies left, spend one on bread and the other on music. The one will give you the means to live, the other will give you the reason.[37]

Now more than ever, the reasons are just as important as the means!

1. R.O.M. Archives, Notes for the remarks of Her Excellency Madame Leger of the Occasion of the opening of the Exhibition of Archaeological Finds of the People's Republic of China in Toronto on August 7, 1974.

2. R.O.M. Archives, Ambassador Chang Wen-Chin's Speech at the Opening of the Exhibition of Archaeological Finds of the People's Republic of China, August 7, 1974.

3. Ibid.

4. R.O.M. Archives, Press Release The Chinese Exhibition Confirmed for R.O.M. For Release 10 a.m. March 15, 1974.

5. Concerns about publicity are mentioned in the following documents of E.A. H.D. Archeo P.R.C. 67-7 Vol. 4: Memo from FAC to PDM, May 10, 1974, Telegram from Peking to Ottawa, May 8, 1974.

6. Arnold Edinborough, "Here is an unique exhibition that really sells itself," Financial Post, April 13, 1974.

7. E.A. H.D. Archeo P.R.C. 67-7 Vol. 4, Telegram from Peking to Ottawa, written by Ambassador Small, May 8, 1974.

8. Robert Taylor, "China Show Opens in Toronto," The Boston Globe, August 8, 1974.

9. The controversy at the U.S. premiere of the Chinese Exhibition focussed on the Chinese refusal to admit journalists from Taiwan, South Africa, South Korea and Israel to a press preview of the Exhibition. The U.S. State Department cancelled the preview and the American press responded with a mini-boycott of the opening reception. The resulting controversy prompted more press attention to the exhibition, the agreements and relations between China and the U.S.. The issues are discussed in greater detail in the following articles:
Murrey Marder, "Who Won the Big China-U.S. Press Preview Confrontation?" Washington Post, December 12, 1974, p. A 21.
Ann Wood, "Peking Sees Red, sets up bamboo curtain at show," New York Daily News, December 12, 1974.
Paul Richard, "Chinese Art Preview Cancelled," Washington Post, December 10, 1974, pp. B1-2.
Editorial, "An Acceptable Deal," Washington Post, December 12, 1974.
Paul Richard, "Chinese Art: Classy Not Classless," Washington Post, December 12, 1974, p. C1.

10. R.O.M. Archives, Letter to Mr. Yao Jen-liu, Third Secretary, Embassy of the People's Republic of China, July 19, 1974.

11. R.O.M. Archives, Letter to Mr. Yao Jen-liu, from Guy Pearse, July 10, 1974.

12. R.O.M. Archives, Director's Memorandum, No. 20 July 22, 1974 signed by W. Tovell, Director, Maxwell Henderson, Director Administration and Controller, and W.B. Scott, Associate Director.

13. R.O.M. Archives, The Chinese Treasures Exhibition by R. Keast and D. Crowdis, 18 March, 1974.

14. R.O.M. Archives, R.O.M. film programme, Chinese Exhibition Supplementary programmes (probably written by H. Downie).

15. R.O.M. Archives, Letter to Mr. Kuo Ching-an, Second Secretary, The Embassy of the P.R.C. from Mrs Hugh R. Downie, Deputy Exhibition Manager, August 13, 1973.

16. R.O.M. Archives, Minutes of a Meeting of the Chinese Exhibition Committee of the R.O.M., August 18, 1974.

17. R.O.M. Archives, Kit Display and Design Notes.

18. R.O.M. Archives, Memo to Dr. W. Tovell, M. Henderson and H. Downie, from Mrs. B. Stephen, January 16, 1974.

19. Ibid.

20. R.O.M. Archives, R.O.M. Members Committee Exhibition of Archaeological Finds of the People's Republic of China August 8-November 16, 1974, Report of the Member's Committee of the Royal Ontario Museum, November 29, 1974.

21. R.O.M. Archives, Background Information Chinese Exhibition Kit, p.3.

22. R.O.M. Archives, Press Fact Sheet for Immediate Release, June 26,1974.

23. R.O.M. Archives, Press Release, November 7, 1974.

24. George A. Cowley, "The Emergence of Culture as a Facet of Foreign Policy," International Perspectives, September-October, 1976, p. 27.

25. Interview with Mr. Noah Torno, February 26, 1981.

26. Personal Files of Dr. B.L. Evans, Department of History, University of Alberta, Telegram from Peking to Ottawa, January 5, 1973.

27. John Burns, "Cool Reception likely for Canadian Paintings in China," Globe and Mail, September 25, 1974.

28. Interview with Dr. W. Tovell, February 26, 1981.

29. Dick Wilson, Chou The Story of Zhou En-lai 1898-1976, (London: Hutchinson, 1984), p. 288.

30. John Burns, "Orchestra's China trip postponed," The Globe and Mail, June 15, 1974, p. 32.

31. The tight rein on the exhibition of Canadian landscapes is noted in John Burns' article: "What's Canadian Art to Mao's Chinese?" Victoria Times, September 26, 1974
The exhibition of Eskimo art was well received and the documents on the arrangements for the exhibition indicate that the Chinese were kept well advised by the Canadians on the preparations. This point is illustrated in the following document from the personal files of Dr. B.L. Evans, Department of History, University of Alberta, Telegram from Peking to Ottawa, October 27, 1972.

32. John Burns, "What's Canadian Art to Mao's Chinese?", Victoria Times, September 26, 1974.

33. Ibid.

34. Ibid.

35. Hilton Kramer, "Old Pleasures for the China Watchers," The New York Times, December 13, 1974.

36. Margaret Atwood, Survival A Thematic Guide to Canadian Literature, (Toronto: Anansi, 1972).

37. George A. Cowley, "The Emergence of Culture as a Facet of Foreign Policy," International Perspectives, September/October, 1976, p. 32.

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2. Royal Ontario Museum Archives,
Archive material is kept by the Royal Ontario Museum Library and Archive, and by the Far Eastern Department Library. The Main Library Archives were reorganized and catalogued, as I was finishing my research. Mr. Robert Nixon, who was working at this reorganization, informed me during my last visit to the Museum, of the new reference system for the Archives. Consequently the materials on the Chinese Exhibition can now be found within these categories.

RG 13 Chinese Exhibition Council of the ROM
A Minutes 1974-75
B Maxwell Henderson's Files
RG 14 CEC-ROM Executive CTEE.
A Minutes 1974
RG 30 Director's Office
A Correspondence, (Tovell) 1974-75
B Director's Memoranda, (Tovell)
C Departmental Annual Reports
RG 103 Information Services Department: Chinese Exhibition Records

However my references will refer to the specific document and cite the location as R.O.M. Archives or R.O.M. Archives Far Eastern Department.

3. Dr. Brian L. Evans, Private Papers, Department of History, University of Alberta, Edmonton, Alberta.

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3. Tovell, Dr. W., Director, Royal Ontario Museum, Ontario: Toronto, Interview, February 26, 1981.

4. Torno, Mr. Noah, Chairman, Chinese Exhibition Council, Ontario: Toronto, Interview, February 26, 1981.

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